

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.9154 18 October	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali (S/2022/731)		Mali	Special Representative of the Secretary-General	13 Council members, ^c all invitees ^h	
S/PV.9200 23 November					One Council member (Mexico) ⁱ	

^a Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^b The Special Representative and the Executive Director of the Youth Association participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^c Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^d The Special Representative and the President of Women in Law and Development in Africa in Mali participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^e Mali was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. The Director of Mali Musso participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^f Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Kenya, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and United States.

^g For: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; against: none; abstaining: China, Russian Federation.

^h Mali was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.

ⁱ The representative of Mexico spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2374 \(2017\)](#) concerning Mali.

Americas

12. The question concerning Haiti

During the period under review, the Council held seven meetings and adopted two resolutions under the item entitled “The question concerning Haiti”, including resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Five meetings took the form of briefings, and two were convened for the adoption of a resolution.⁴⁷⁰ More information on the meetings, including participants and outcomes, is provided in the table below. In addition, Council members held informal consultations of the whole in connection with the item.⁴⁷¹

In 2022, the Council heard three briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) in connection with the periodic reports of the Secretary-General on the activities of the Mission and two briefings in emergency meetings convened further to the deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in the country from September 2022.⁴⁷² The Council also heard briefings by the Deputy Secretary-General, the Deputy Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP), the Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and two representatives of civil society.⁴⁷³ The Council also heard a briefing by the representative of Gabon in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) concerning Haiti, which had imposed targeted sanctions.⁴⁷⁴ In addition to statements by Haiti, which was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship on four occasions, the meetings under the item also featured statements by the representative of Belize on behalf

⁴⁷⁰ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

⁴⁷¹ See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 8.

⁴⁷² See [S/PV.8969](#), [S/PV.9066](#), [S/PV.9136](#), [S/PV.9153](#) and [S/PV.9233](#). See also [S/2022/117](#), [S/2022/481](#) and [S/2022/761](#).

⁴⁷³ See [S/PV.9066](#), [S/PV.9136](#) and [S/PV.9233](#).

⁴⁷⁴ See [S/PV.9233](#).

of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the representative of Canada on behalf of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti of the Economic and Social Council, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of the Dominican Republic, and the Permanent Observer for the International Organization of la Francophonie to the United Nations.⁴⁷⁵

In her statements to the Council, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General reported on the three intersecting crises in the country, namely, economic, security and political. She gave a briefing on the developments following the decision of the Government of Haiti to reduce regressive subsidies on fuel, the dire security situation, including alarming levels of gang violence, and the blockade of the nation's main fuel terminal and its impact on the socioeconomic and humanitarian situation, including a new cholera outbreak. She also reported on efforts by the Government and stakeholders in Haiti to address the root causes of the crisis.

At the meeting held on 18 February,⁴⁷⁶ the Special Representative stated that the situation in Haiti remained fraught and highly polarized, despite some signs of progress. The unveiling of the new Government of Haiti on 24 November 2021 appeared to have eased tensions somewhat and that momentum seemed to be building around an effort to form an inclusive, credible and effective provisional electoral council. Gang violence continued to plunge major urban centres into lawlessness and grief. Criminal armed groups had a strong hold on the economic and social lives of millions of children, women and men, noting in particular their indiscriminate use of abduction and murder, as well as sexual and gender-based violence. The Special Representative stressed that the Haitian National Police could not, on its own, curtail the alarming rise in gang-related insecurity. She expressed the view that the newfound momentum, epitomized by the imminent creation of a United Nations multi-donor basket fund for security assistance for Haiti, must translate into increased Government funding for the police force, as well as additional international financial and technical support.

Beyond the security situation, the Special Representative highlighted the need for socioeconomic projects and reintegration activities in the neighbourhoods most affected by gang violence, to end impunity and to ensure that reform in the judiciary could be sustained over the long term. The lack of impact and effectiveness of development aid over many years required the formulation of a new approach, one premised on a deeper coordination of international efforts and a real partnership with the Haitian authorities and actors. It was imperative for all Haitian leaders to engage constructively in order to steer the country towards elections and for the international community to engage with them to create the security and political conditions necessary for national elections, as well as to ensure urgent structural reforms to tackle gang violence, address impunity and corruption, strengthen the justice system and transform the economy in a sustainable manner.

In her statement on 16 June,⁴⁷⁷ the Special Representative drew the attention of Council members to a rapidly deteriorating security situation in Haiti, with gangs expanding their zones of influence. She noted a rise of 36 per cent rise in kidnappings and 17 per cent in intentional homicides, compared with the last five months of 2021, incidents of sexual violence against women and girls, restrictions on the freedom of movement of people and goods, the displacement of at least 17,000 people, and the absence of basic necessities such as food, water and medicine. With respect to efforts to end the ongoing political and institutional vacuum, the Special Representative noted the formation in late March of a civil society-led tripartite committee to enlarge consensus among various political platforms, including the Government, to forge a common path forward. In parallel, the Prime Minister, Ariel Henry, was holding direct talks with the leadership of the Commission for a Haitian Solution to the Crisis (Montana Group), which had proposed new modalities to relaunch formal negotiations.

In his statement at the same meeting, the Executive Director of Volontariat pour le développement d'Haïti provided an overview of what, based on his experience with civil society on the ground, were the most pressing challenges in Haiti and recommendations for addressing them. He underscored the need to broaden consensus on governance, take urgent transnational action against those involved in the illegal arms trade and financial crimes, and provide international support for the Haitian National Police. Furthermore, he encouraged BINUH to work more closely with young people and civil society and opined

⁴⁷⁵ See [S/PV.9066](#), [S/PV.9136](#), [S/PV.9153](#) and [S/PV.9233](#).

⁴⁷⁶ See [S/PV.8969](#).

⁴⁷⁷ See [S/PV.9066](#).

that the Mission would be even more effective if it had adequate resources to strengthen its good offices mission and its work of advising and supporting the Haitian National Police.

On 15 July, by resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#), the Council unanimously extended the mandate of BINUH as set out in resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#) for a period of one year, until 15 July 2023.⁴⁷⁸ The Council acknowledged the letter dated 29 April from the Secretary-General (S/2022/369), in which he provided recommendations for adjustments to the mandate and resources of BINUH,⁴⁷⁹ and, on that basis, made several changes to the mission. Specifically, the Council increased the number of civilian and seconded personnel serving as police and corrections advisers in the police and corrections unit from 30 to 42 and provided that the human rights unit would include dedicated capacity to address sexual and gender-based violence, including the identification of women's protection advisers.⁴⁸⁰ In terms of tasks, the Council requested BINUH to work with UNODC and other relevant United Nations agencies to support Haitian authorities in combating illicit financial flows and the trafficking and diversion of arms and related materiel, and in enhancing the management and control of borders and ports.⁴⁸¹ With respect to the situation in Haiti, the Council demanded an immediate cessation of gang violence and criminal activities and expressed its readiness to take appropriate measures, as necessary, against those engaged in or supporting gang violence, criminal activities, or human rights abuses or who otherwise took action that undermined the peace, stability and security of Haiti and the region.⁴⁸² Lastly, the Council requested the Secretary-General to develop possible options for enhanced security support for the efforts of the Haitian National Police to combat high levels of gang violence, and to submit a written report by 15 October.⁴⁸³

At the meeting held on 26 September,⁴⁸⁴ the Special Representative noted that gang, economic and political crises in Haiti had begun to intersect in new and frightening ways. She reported that, following the Government's announcement of its decision to reduce regressive subsidies on fuel, roadblocks had been set up throughout the country, which had generated a countrywide lockdown that lasted for five days. On 18 September, one of the largest alliances of criminal gangs in the capital had blocked the nation's main fuel terminal in Varreux, cutting the capital off from its primary source of fuel, creating shortages across the country and closing down hospitals. The chronic situation at the fuel terminal threatened to highlight the very real limits of the Haitian National Police. National stakeholders had begun to re-engage with a renewed sense of urgency, and government representatives, political groups and civil society organizations had launched new consultations on ways to forge a broader consensus on a path to elections. Insecurity had also severely curtailed humanitarian access and the various crises had converged into a humanitarian catastrophe. She called upon the Council to take urgent action to support Haitians in their efforts to build a better future.

In her statement at the same meeting, the Deputy Executive Director of WFP noted that the humanitarian situation in Haiti had reached new levels of desperation. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and WFP expected food security to deteriorate further in 2022 and to surpass the record high of 4.5 million people estimated to face crisis levels of food insecurity or worse. Insecurity made it very difficult and dangerous to implement humanitarian and development programmes. Gangs were blocking access to fuel supplies and key logistics hubs and protesters had ransacked and looted humanitarian warehouses throughout the country. In that regard, she looked forward to increased support from Member States to further facilitate humanitarian access and ensure the protection of humanitarian actors, personnel and assets. The Executive Director of UNODC noted that violence and organized crime, as well as the presence of and clashes between armed groups, were compromising stability, security and the rule of law in Haiti, hampering the efforts to achieve peace and the prospects for lasting development. She underscored the need to prioritize supporting services that aimed to uphold and implement the law and criminal justice so as to assist the population and prevent any regional destabilization. In that regard, the Government of Haiti had directly tasked UNODC with supporting its border-management capacity-building endeavours. Investments and efforts in the security sector should

⁴⁷⁸ Resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, fifth preambular paragraph. For more information on the mandate of BINUH, see part X, sect. II.

⁴⁸⁰ Resolution [2645 \(2022\)](#), para. 2.

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*, para. 8.

⁴⁸² *Ibid.*, para. 5.

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*, para. 10. See also [S/2022/747](#).

⁴⁸⁴ See [S/PV.9136](#).

be accompanied by similar efforts throughout the entire criminal justice system. She noted the activities planned by UNODC, with the support of BINUH and other organizations, on border management and tracking illicit financial flows.

In her briefing on 17 October,⁴⁸⁵ the Special Representative reported that in addition to the three intersecting crises – economic, security and political – Haiti was facing a humanitarian crisis, as a growing number of cholera cases had been confirmed on the island. Gangs continued to blockade the Varreux terminal and, without the free movement of fuel, Haiti would be unable to get ahead of the crisis. Regarding the political situation, the Special Representative noted that resolution 2645 (2022) had generated a sense of urgency and that civil society representatives were attempting to bring all stakeholders around a common proposal, with the support of the good offices of the United Nations. Against a backdrop of insecurity and a humanitarian crisis, on 7 October, the Council of Ministers had authorized the Prime Minister, Ariel Henry, to request the support of a specialized international armed force to help secure the free movement of water, fuel and medical supplies. The Special Representative reiterated the call of the Secretary-General for Haiti's partners to consider that request as a matter of urgency.

On 21 October, by resolution 2653 (2022), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council unanimously imposed sanctions measures concerning Haiti for an initial period of one year.⁴⁸⁶ The measures consisted of a travel ban, asset freeze and targeted arms embargo against individuals and entities designated as responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions that threatened the peace, security or stability of Haiti. By the resolution, the Council established a Committee mandated to monitor implementation of the sanctions measures and to designate individuals and entities subject to the measures, and to consider requests for exemptions.⁴⁸⁷ Furthermore, the Council requested the Secretary-General to create, for an initial period of 13 months, a Panel of Experts to support the work of the Committee.⁴⁸⁸ The Council also expressed its intent to consider authorizing the Ombudsperson to receive delisting requests.⁴⁸⁹

Explaining her delegation's vote in favour of the resolution, the representative of the United States, as co-penholder together with Mexico, expressed the view that the sanctions measures imposed by resolution 2653 (2022) accomplished the objectives of specifically targeting bad actors in Haiti and allowing humanitarian aid to reach civilians. She added, however, that the measures were only the first step and noted the request from the Government of Haiti and the recommendation of the Secretary-General for the Council to authorize a non-United Nations international security assistance mission to help improve the security situation and enable the flow of humanitarian aid. According to the representative of Mexico, by imposing the sanctions measures, the Council had sent a clear signal that the violence in Haiti could not remain unpunished. He further stressed the importance of the embargo on the transfer of arms to non-State actors that were destabilizing the country. The representative of China, while noting that his country had always called for caution in the use or threat of use of sanctions in international relations, recalled that his delegation had been the first to propose the imposition of measures against the criminal gangs in Haiti, considering the urgency of the situation. In contrast, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that, despite his delegation's support for the resolution, it was not convinced that international restrictive measures would provide an adequate response to the range of problems plaguing Haiti and that a lasting solution should lie in an inclusive political process, socioeconomic development and the eradication of poverty and inequality. Several Council members⁴⁹⁰ stressed the importance of humanitarian exemptions in the new sanctions regime. Speakers⁴⁹¹ also welcomed the inclusion in the resolution of specific benchmarks to review the sanctions. Some Council

⁴⁸⁵ See S/PV.9153.

⁴⁸⁶ Resolution 2653 (2022), paras. 3, 6 and 11.

⁴⁸⁷ Ibid., paras. 19 (a) and (c).

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid., paras. 4 and 21.

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid., nineteenth preambular paragraph. For more information on the sanctions measures concerning Haiti, see part VII, sect. III. For more information on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022), see part IX, sect. I.B.

⁴⁹⁰ See S/PV.9159 (Norway, United Arab Emirates, Brazil and Ghana).

⁴⁹¹ Kenya, United Arab Emirates, Brazil and Ghana.

members⁴⁹² highlighted the Council's recognition of the need for due process safeguards in the resolution, and welcomed its intention to authorize the Ombudsperson to receive delisting requests under the new sanctions regime.

Opening the meeting held on 21 December,⁴⁹³ the Deputy Secretary-General stated that, at the end of 2022, Haiti was in a deepening crisis of unprecedented scale and complexity that was cause for serious alarm. She noted that Port-au-Prince and the region beyond were suffering the worst human rights and humanitarian emergency in decades. Specifically, the Deputy Secretary-General informed Council members that 90 per cent of cholera cases in Haiti were in areas already suffering high rates of severe acute malnutrition. She condemned the reports of widespread sexual violence by armed gangs. She called for international support and solidarity with Haiti and urged every country with the capacity to do so to urgently consider the Government's request for an international specialized armed force to help restore security and alleviate the humanitarian crisis, in accordance with the letter dated 8 October from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Council.⁴⁹⁴

At the same meeting, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General noted that the siege of the main oil terminal in Haiti had come to an end in early November through a concerted effort by the Haitian National Police. Fuel had begun to flow in a number of neighbourhoods in the Port-au-Prince area, allowing hospitals and businesses to open and creating the semblance of a possible return to normalcy. Hope had quickly been dispelled, however, as a new level of gang activity had immediately been felt across the capital, marked by spikes in kidnappings, killings and rapes. The increase in recorded rapes, according to the Special Representative, reflected a horrendous *modus operandi* of the gangs, which used sexual violence to intimidate and subjugate whole communities. Further compounding the plight of the millions living amid the violence, she added, was the catastrophic economic situation, with some 20,000 people facing famine-like conditions, large levels of displacement, 34 per cent of schools remaining closed and 15,000 suspected cases of cholera.

The Special Representative noted that the adoption of the sanctions measures by the Council under resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) was widely welcomed by Haitians, while subsequent bilateral sanctions appeared to have generated a renewed sense of urgency on ways to restore democratically elected institutions. In October and November, civil society groups had launched a new round of inclusive consultations on a transitional road map with members of the Montana Group, private sector associations, trade unions and religious organizations, which had resulted in the development of a national consensus document. The document outlined steps for moving Haiti to elections within an 18-month time frame, with a transitional council and oversight mechanism. She expressed the view that the sanctions measures imposed by the Council would be most effective as part of a comprehensive approach that included both the ongoing political dialogue and enhanced operational security support for the Haitian National Police, as outlined in the letter of the Secretary-General.

In his first briefing to the Council as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) concerning Haiti, the representative of Gabon stated that, in accordance with the resolution, the Committee had imposed measures on individuals and entities it designated as being complicit in or having participated, directly or indirectly, in activities that threatened peace, security or stability in Haiti, including a travel ban, assets freeze and a targeted arms embargo. The Chair informed the Council of his expectation that, once appointed, the Panel of Experts would assume its duties in January 2023 and would provide the Council with its interim report no later than 15 March 2023. He echoed resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) in urging all Member States, as well as international, regional and subregional organizations, to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts.

The editor of *Haiti Liberté* offered the view that previous military interventions in Haiti by the Council following the coups d'états in 1991 and 2004 had cemented an unjust and illegal status quo and noted that Haitians were patently and almost universally opposed to any more United Nations interventions. He questioned the imposition of targeted sanctions by the Council against Jimmy Cherizier, known as "Barbecue", whom he described as a spokesman for a federation of neighbourhoods dedicated

⁴⁹² Norway, Ireland and Brazil.

⁴⁹³ See [S/PV.9233](#).

⁴⁹⁴ [S/2022/747](#).

to keeping kidnapping, extortion, rape and other crimes out of their midst. An error of that magnitude, according to the editor, showed how easily misguided, counterproductive and blunt the Council's power under Chapter VII of the Charter could be, especially when it was receiving inaccurate and skewed information. The editor underlined the belief of *Haiti Liberté* that the situation in the country could not be resolved through foreign intervention, military force or even sanctions and that the only thing the United Nations might do was provide disinterested economic support to rebuild the ravaged economy and political institutions. He called on the Council to respect the principles enshrined under Article 2 (7) of the Charter.

In their statements at the meetings held throughout the year, Council members and other Member States⁴⁹⁵ focused on the further deterioration in the security situation in Haiti amid rising levels of gang activity and violence, including killings, kidnappings and sexual and gender-based violence, as well as on the socioeconomic conditions and the political impasse and institutional vacuum in the country. They expressed grave concern regarding its impact of the civilian population, particularly women and children.

At the meeting held in June, in anticipation of the renewal of the mandate of BINUH, Council members and other delegations⁴⁹⁶ took note of the assessment conducted by the Secretary-General and highlighted the need to strengthen different aspects of the Mission's work that they viewed as essential to addressing the situation on the ground, including good offices and mediation, capacity-building for the Haitian National Police to address gang violence, support for efforts to curb arms trafficking and illicit financial flows, and human rights protection, monitoring and investigation.

In September and October, following the outbreak of protests over the derogation of fuel price subsidies, including the blocking of the Varreux oil terminal, Council members and other speakers expressed deep concern at the increase in violence and the deterioration in the humanitarian situation, including the renewed outbreak of cholera in Haiti. They stressed the need for urgent action by the Council in support of national efforts to curb gang activity and ensure humanitarian access. As a means of addressing the gang problem, multiple speakers⁴⁹⁷ called for preventing the supply of arms and illicit financial flows to non-State actors and noted the Council's readiness to take appropriate sanctions measures against those responsible for the instability in Haiti as expressed in resolution 2645 (2022). Some speakers⁴⁹⁸ also stressed that economic and humanitarian conditions and the rule of law could not be restored without first stabilizing the security situation.

At the meeting held in December, further to the adoption of resolution 2653 (2022), several delegations⁴⁹⁹ welcomed the reopening of the oil terminal, but expressed regret that gang violence and insecurity remained widespread. Multiple delegations⁵⁰⁰ called on the Council to effectively utilize the sanctions regime to take action against those responsible for the violence and instability in the country. In this regard, some Council members⁵⁰¹ called on the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2653 (2022) to promptly begin its work and take action against those responsible for the violence and instability. Generally, however, speakers⁵⁰² concurred that sanctions alone were insufficient to address the multifaceted crisis in Haiti and therefore underlined the need for national actors, with the support of the international community, to take the steps necessary to end the political impasse and pave the way for undertaking institutional reforms and improving socioeconomic conditions.

⁴⁹⁵ See S/PV.8969 (United States, Mexico, Ireland, Norway, France, Albania and United Arab Emirates); S/PV.9066 (Mexico, Gabon (also on behalf of Kenya and Ghana), Brazil, China, Ireland, Russian Federation, Albania and Dominican Republic); S/PV.9136 (China, United States, Mexico, Brazil and Russian Federation); S/PV.9153 (Ireland, Norway, United Arab Emirates and China); and S/PV.9233 (Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Norway, Gabon, France, India, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Canada).

⁴⁹⁶ See S/PV.9066 (Mexico, Gabon (also on behalf of Kenya and Ghana), Brazil, China, Ireland, Russian Federation, Albania and Dominican Republic).

⁴⁹⁷ See S/PV.9136 (China, Mexico, Brazil and Russian Federation); and S/PV.9153 (United States, Brazil, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana) and China).

⁴⁹⁸ See S/PV.9136 (United States, Albania and France).

⁴⁹⁹ See S/PV.9233 (United States, Ireland, Brazil, Ghana, United Arab Emirates, France and Haiti).

⁵⁰⁰ Mexico, United States, Brazil, Kenya, Ghana, China, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Gabon, France, Haiti, Dominican Republic and Canada.

⁵⁰¹ Mexico, Brazil, China and France.

⁵⁰² Mexico, United States, Brazil, Ghana, France and Canada.

In October and December, Council members and other Member States exchanged views on the possible deployment of a multinational security force in support of the Haitian National Police, further to the request made by the Government of Haiti and the recommendations of the Secretary-General. Council members held differing views on the approach and benefits of such a deployment. At the meeting held on 17 October,⁵⁰³ the representative of the United States announced that her delegation was preparing, together with Mexico, a draft resolution that provided for the authorization of a non-United Nations security force, operating under Chapter VII of the Charter. The force would facilitate international support to the police and coastguard and rely on Member State contributions of personnel, equipment and other resources. Multiple Council members and other Member States expressed support for the deployment of the force, particularly considering the Government's request for assistance in that regard,⁵⁰⁴ while a number called for more discussions on how best the Council could support the police.⁵⁰⁵ Moreover, multiple speakers cautioned the Council against repeating the mistakes of previous international and United Nations interventions in Haiti, with some of them emphasizing the importance of any measures to that effect having the support of Haitians and regional actors.⁵⁰⁶

In their statements at the meetings held in 2022, the representatives of Haiti, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship, focused on the efforts of the Government of Haiti to stabilize the security and humanitarian situation and engagement with opposition groups to resolve the impasse and pave the way for future elections. The Minister stated that his country had experienced the limits of the United Nations presence in recent decades, yet following the withdrawal of the international forces, local structures could not achieve the same level of performance without receiving adequate training and means.⁵⁰⁷ At the meeting held on 26 September,⁵⁰⁸ following the outbreak of violent protests, the Minister stressed that Haiti needed very strong support from the international community to support the Haitian National Police in combating armed gangs and welcomed the decision by some countries to consider imposing sanctions on those who participated in criminal activities and insecurity in Haiti. At the meeting held on 21 December,⁵⁰⁹ after the Council's imposition of sanctions, the Minister observed that they had had a clear impact and should help facilitate inter-Haitian dialogue and support for a national compromise that could lead to general elections in 2023. He added, however, that without establishing an adequate security environment, it was deceptive to think that Haiti would emerge from the crisis for the long term and stressed that the vast majority of Haitians were in favour of receiving assistance.

Meetings: the question concerning Haiti, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8969 18 February	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) (S/2022/117)		Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and Head of BINUH	13 Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	
S/PV.9066 16 June	Report of the Secretary-General on BINUH (S/2022/481)		Dominican Republic, Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Executive Director of	13 Council members, ^c all invitees ^d	

⁵⁰³ See [S/PV.9153](#).

⁵⁰⁴ See [S/PV.9153](#) (United States, Mexico, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania and Dominican Republic); and [S/PV.9233](#) (United States, Kenya, United Kingdom, France, Dominican Republic and Canada).

⁵⁰⁵ See [S/PV.9153](#) (Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates and China); and [S/PV.9233](#) (Ireland, Kenya, Ghana, China, Norway and France).

⁵⁰⁶ See [S/PV.9153](#) (Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana)); and [S/PV.9233](#) (Kenya, Ghana and India).

⁵⁰⁷ See [S/PV.9066](#).

⁵⁰⁸ See [S/PV.9136](#).

⁵⁰⁹ See [S/PV.9233](#).

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
				Volontariat pour le développement d'Haïti		
S/PV.9095 15 July		Draft resolution submitted by Mexico, United States (S/2022/560)			Seven Council members ^e	Resolution 2645 (2022) 15-0-0
S/PV.9136 26 September			Canada, Dominican Republic, Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary- General, Deputy Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP), Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)	13 Council members, ^a all invitees ^f	
S/PV.9153 17 October	Letter dated 8 October 2022 from the Secretary- General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/747) Report of the Secretary- General on BINUH (S/2022/761)		Belize, Dominican Republic, Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary- General, Permanent Observer for the International Organization of la Francophonie to the United Nations	13 Council members, ^a all invitees ^g	
S/PV.9159 21 October	Letter dated 8 October 2022 from the Secretary- General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/747) Report of the Secretary- General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (S/2022/761)	Draft resolution submitted by Mexico, United States (S/2022/765)	Haiti		12 Council members, ^h invitee	Resolution 2653 (2022) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
S/PV.9233 21 December			Canada, Dominican Republic, Haiti	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, editor of <i>Haiti Liberté</i>	Deputy Secretary-General, all Council members, ⁱ all invitees ^j	

^a Albania, Brazil, China, France, India, Ireland, Kenya (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^b The Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^c Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon spoke (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^d Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship.

^e Brazil, China, Ghana, Kenya, Mexico, Russian Federation and United States.

^f The Dominican Republic was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship. The Special Representative, the Deputy Executive Director of WFP and the Executive Director of UNODC participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^g The Dominican Republic was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship. The representative of Belize spoke on behalf of the 14 States members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference.

^h Brazil, China, Gabon, Ghana, France, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates and United States.

ⁱ The representative of Gabon spoke twice, once in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [2653 \(2022\)](#) and once in his national capacity.

^j The Dominican Republic was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Haiti was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship. The representative of Canada spoke on behalf of the Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Haiti of the Economic and Social Council. The Special Representative participated in the meeting by videoconference.

13. Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/53](#))

During the period under review, the Council held five meetings and adopted one resolution under the item entitled “Identical letters dated 19 January 2016 from the Permanent Representative of Colombia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2016/53](#))”. Four of the meetings took the form of briefings, and one was convened for the adoption of a resolution.⁵¹⁰ More information on the meetings, including participants and outcomes, is provided in the table below. In addition, Council members held informal consultations of the whole in connection with the item.⁵¹¹

In 2022, the Council heard four briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Colombia and the Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia in connection with the periodic reports of the Secretary-General on the Verification Mission.⁵¹² In addition, the Council heard briefings by a former combatant of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP), the President of the Truth Commission of Colombia, the Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission and two representatives of civil society.⁵¹³ At the meetings, Colombia was represented by its President, its Presidential Adviser for Stabilization and Consolidation, its Vice-President and Minister for Foreign Affairs, and its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

⁵¹⁰ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

⁵¹¹ See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 40.

⁵¹² See [S/PV.8951](#), [S/PV.9015](#), [S/PV.9094](#) and [S/PV.9151](#). See also [S/2021/1090](#), [S/2022/267](#), [S/2022/513](#) and [S/2022/715](#).

⁵¹³ See [S/PV.8951](#), [S/PV.9094](#) and [S/PV.9151](#).