

Table 4
Meetings: briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Council, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9201 23 November					All Council members, Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism, Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) ^a	
S/PV.9218 12 December					Chairs of eight committees and two working groups ^b	

^a Before his briefing as Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities, the representative of Norway delivered a joint statement on behalf of that Committee, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism. All three Chairs spoke twice, once in their capacity as Chair and once in their national capacity.

^b Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Al-Shabaab; Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) concerning the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict; Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism, the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya; Chair of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa; Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) and the Committee established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) concerning Mali; and Chair of the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities.

32. Items relating to non-proliferation

A. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

During the period under review, the Council held three meetings in connection with the item entitled "Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction". One meeting took the form of a briefing, and two meetings were convened for the adoption of resolutions.¹¹⁴³ In 2022, the Council unanimously adopted two resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter.¹¹⁴⁴ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in the table below.¹¹⁴⁵

¹¹⁴³ For more information on format of meetings, see part II.

¹¹⁴⁴ Resolutions 2622 (2022) and 2663 (2022).

¹¹⁴⁵ See also A/77/2, part II, chap. 25.

On 14 March, the Council held a meeting under the item, focused on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004).¹¹⁴⁶ At the meeting, Council members heard a briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004), on its activities in 2021. In his briefing, the Chair underscored that the resolution remained a vital component of the global non-proliferation architecture aimed at preventing non-State actors, including terrorists, from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. States had made significant progress in the full implementation of the resolution, despite the gaps remaining for its full and effective implementation. He stated that 185 Member States had already submitted their first reports containing information on measures taken to comply with their obligations under the resolution, and 136 Member States had informed the Committee of their national points of contact for its implementation. Noting that 35 Member States had submitted voluntary national implementation action plans to the Committee since 2007, he said that, during the reporting period, the Committee had supported Botswana and Mongolia in the process of developing their own plans. The Committee would continue to support States that wished to conduct peer reviews, through which Member States could identify effective national practices and share them with the Committee and other partners. Emphasizing the important role of the Committee in facilitating assistance to Member States, the Chair noted that the Committee had received four new requests for assistance in 2021 and assured the Council that the Committee would include new programmes and updated information regarding available assistance on its website. As one of its main priorities, the Committee continued to conduct the comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004) as provided for in resolution 1977 (2011), pursuant to the extension of its mandate under resolution 2622 (2022). The review of the status of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) by Member States was a central theme of the comprehensive review.

After the briefing, Council members reaffirmed that resolution 1540 (2004) remained an essential component of the international disarmament and non-proliferation architecture in preventing non-State actors from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction and recalled the central role played by the Committee and its group of experts in that regard. Noting the importance of approving the Committee's mandate, the representative of the Russian Federation stated that the mandate should be based on the unifying principles of resolution 1540 (2004) and be aimed at maintaining the fundamental principles of the Committee's work, without endowing it with intrusive or attributive powers. Some Council members expressed concern over the evolving risks of proliferation posed by non-State actors, with the representative of the United Kingdom citing the risks posed by their attempted use of crude toxin weapons such as ricin and the representatives of China and the United Arab Emirates their exploitation of modern and new technologies, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, synthetic biology and artificial intelligence. Several Council members¹¹⁴⁷ expressed support for enhanced cooperation and coordination of the Committee with international organizations and other United Nations committees, such as those dealing with terrorism in delivering its mandate. Regarding the ongoing comprehensive review of resolution 1540 (2004), Council members¹¹⁴⁸ underlined the importance of inclusiveness of the process and encouraged broad consultations with, inter alia, Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations, civil society and the private sector.

On 25 February and 30 November, the Council convened meetings at which it adopted resolutions 2622 (2022) and 2663 (2022), respectively. Both resolutions were adopted unanimously, and both were adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter.

By its resolution 2622 (2022), the Council decided to extend the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) until 30 November 2022, with the continued assistance of its group of experts, as specified in paragraph 5 of resolution 1977 (2011).¹¹⁴⁹ It also decided that the Committee, while continuing its work pursuant to its mandate, would continue to conduct and complete the comprehensive review on the status of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and submit to the Council a report on the conclusion of the review.¹¹⁵⁰ Explaining his delegation's vote after the adoption of resolution 2622 (2022), the representative of the Russian Federation expressed concern that the Council had once again limited itself to a strictly technical rollover of the Committee's mandate, in the

¹¹⁴⁶ See S/PV.8993.

¹¹⁴⁷ France, India and Gabon.

¹¹⁴⁸ France, Ghana, Ireland, Norway, Brazil, United Kingdom, Russian Federation, United States and United Arab Emirates.

¹¹⁴⁹ Resolution 2622 (2022), para. 1.

¹¹⁵⁰ Ibid., para. 2. For more information on the mandate of the Committee, see part IX, sect. I.B.

interests of ensuring that the comprehensive review of the resolution's implementation could be concluded swiftly.¹¹⁵¹ He underlined the importance of undertaking the review appropriately and allowing substantive contributions to be made by key participants. He also underscored that failing to do so would lead to the added value of the review process being largely wasted. The representative of China expressed the hope that the Committee would elaborate plans to advance its work in an orderly manner, including with regard to the comprehensive review of the status of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), adding that the legitimate concerns of all parties should be accorded equal attention and be properly addressed in that process. Noting the comments made with respect to the process of a technical renewal of the mandate, the representative of Mexico, recalling his position as Chair of the Committee, clarified that consultations had been conducted in good faith, transparently and in response to all concerns expressed. He added that the great majority of members had expressed their preference for a technical renewal as the most viable way of undertaking the broad review mandated in resolution 1977 (2011). The representative of the United States stated that the technical extension would allow the Committee and its group of experts to continue their important work. During the upcoming comprehensive review and mandate renewal, his delegation would prioritize the full implementation of States' obligations under resolution 1540 (2004) by striving to improve the functionality and credibility of the Committee, empowering its group of experts and enhancing support for assistance- and outreach-related activities. Expressing strong support for the adoption of resolution 2622 (2022), the representative of the United Kingdom applauded the efforts of the Chair to secure an extension of the mandate.

In its resolution 2663 (2022), the Council endorsed the 2022 comprehensive review of the status of the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) and took note of its results as contained in its final report (S/2022/899). By the same resolution, the Council extended the mandate of the Committee for a period of 10 years, until 30 November 2032,¹¹⁵² and reiterated the mandate of the Committee in promoting the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), emphasizing in particular those aspects relating to outreach and technical assistance to Member States. After the adoption, 11 Council members delivered statements.¹¹⁵³ Some Council members emphasized the importance of the full, equal and meaningful participation of women in global disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and welcomed its inclusion in the resolution, encouraging the Committee to give due consideration to the matter in all its activities.¹¹⁵⁴ Council members also welcomed the strengthening of the Committee's cooperation with international, regional and subregional organizations and other committees.¹¹⁵⁵ Some Council members underlined the central role of the group of experts in monitoring and supporting the work of the Committee,¹¹⁵⁶ with the representatives of Norway and the United States highlighting the call for the Committee to review its internal guidelines on matters regarding its group of experts.¹¹⁵⁷ The representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States expressed disappointment that the new mandate did not go further in strengthening the Committee's support to Member States in implementing the resolution, with the former citing the issue of proliferation financing and the latter expressing regret that the Committee and its group of experts had not been given the tools they would need to work efficiently and effectively. The representative of China opined that the unfair and unreasonable aspects of the international non-proliferation regime remained striking, while the right of the majority of developing countries to the peaceful use of science and technology continued to be subject to many restrictions.

In 2022, the Council also heard an additional briefing by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) under the item entitled "Briefings by Chairs of subsidiary bodies of the Security Council".¹¹⁵⁸

¹¹⁵¹ See S/PV.8977.

¹¹⁵² Resolution 2663 (2022), para. 2.

¹¹⁵³ See S/PV.9205.

¹¹⁵⁴ Ibid. (Ireland, Albania, United Arab Emirates, Norway, Mexico and Ghana). See also resolution 2663 (2022), nineteenth preambular paragraph.

¹¹⁵⁵ See S/PV.9205 (Ireland, Albania, India and Ghana). See also resolution 2663 (2022), eleventh, fifteenth to seventeenth and twenty-first preambular paragraphs and paras. 21–23, 25 and 26.

¹¹⁵⁶ See S/PV.9205 (Ireland, United Kingdom, United Arab Emirates, Norway and United States).

¹¹⁵⁷ Resolution 2663 (2022), para. 5.

¹¹⁵⁸ See S/PV.9201. For more information, see sect. 31 above.

Meetings: non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.8977 25 February		Draft resolution submitted by Mexico (S/2022/147)			Five Council members (China, Mexico, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States)	Resolution 2622 (2022) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.8993 14 March					All Council members ^a	
S/PV.9205 30 November		Draft resolution submitted by Mexico (S/2022/881)			11 Council members ^b	Resolution 2663 (2022) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

^a The representative of Mexico spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#).

^b Albania, China, Ghana, India, Ireland, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

B. Non-proliferation

During the period under review, the Council held two meetings under the item entitled “Non-proliferation”. Both meetings took the form of briefings.¹¹⁵⁹ More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is provided in the table below.¹¹⁶⁰

Under the item, the Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, by representatives of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, speaking on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and by representatives of Ireland, speaking as Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Representatives of Germany and Iran (Islamic Republic of) participated in both meetings under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure and delivered statements.

On 30 June, the Council heard a briefing by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs on the thirteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).¹¹⁶¹ During the briefing, the Under-Secretary-General noted that diplomatic engagements in and around the Joint Commission with a view to restoring the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action resumed in November 2021.¹¹⁶² Nevertheless, despite their determination to resolve political and technical differences, the participants and the United States had yet to return to the full and effective implementation of the Plan and resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). She reiterated her appeal to the United States to lift or waive its sanctions, as outlined in the Plan, and to extend the waivers regarding the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran, while also calling upon the latter to reverse the steps it had taken that were not consistent with its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. She added that the bilateral and regional initiatives to improve relationships with the Islamic Republic of Iran remained key and should be encouraged and built upon. In addition to the issues with regard to the implementation of the commitments under the Plan, it was also important for the Islamic Republic of Iran to address the concerns raised by participants in the Plan and by other Member States in relation to annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). Emphasizing that the Plan was at a critical juncture, she expressed the hope that the Islamic

¹¹⁵⁹ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

¹¹⁶⁰ A

¹¹⁶¹ See [S/PV.9085](#). See also [S/2022/490](#).

¹¹⁶² See [S/PV.9085](#).

Republic of Iran and the United States would continue to build on the momentum of the previous few days of talks, facilitated by the European Union, to resolve the remaining issues. Speaking on behalf of the High Representative, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission, the Head of the Delegation of the European Union reported that, after more than one year of intense multilateral negotiations, very tough political choices had had to be made by all participants in the Plan and the United States to reach the delicate balance in the text. With the deal almost finalized and the space for further significant changes exhausted, it was therefore important to show the necessary political will and pragmatism to restore the Plan on the basis of the text on the table. While acknowledging the strong sense of urgency, he emphasized the importance of avoiding escalatory steps and preserving sufficient space for diplomatic efforts to succeed. He urged all Member States to refrain from actions and statements that would increase regional and international tensions and thereby escalate a military build-up in the region and beyond. The Security Council Facilitator thanked all Council members for their constructive engagement and flexibility in approving the thirteenth six-month report of the Facilitator on the implementation of the Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).¹¹⁶³ Elaborating on some aspects of that report, she mentioned that the Council had held one meeting in the “2231 format”, on 23 June 2022.¹¹⁶⁴ She also highlighted the importance of the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in conducting verification and monitoring activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran, as requested under resolution 2231 (2015), as well as for providing confidence for the international community that the country’s nuclear programme was for exclusively peaceful purposes. She added that the reports of the Director General of IAEA had played a key role in that regard.

After the briefings, representatives discussed the findings and recommendations set out in the thirteenth report of the Secretary-General, prior to its public release. They also discussed the ongoing diplomatic efforts to restore the Plan, the ballistic missile and space vehicle launches by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and issues related to implementation of resolution 2231 (2015). Many Council members¹¹⁶⁵ reiterated their ambition and call for a mutual return to the full implementation of the Plan and resolution 2231 (2015). In that context, several speakers¹¹⁶⁶ expressed concerns about the impediments to the verification and monitoring activities by IAEA in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the removal of surveillance cameras and monitoring equipment. Some Council members¹¹⁶⁷ called for the reconsideration of unilateral coercive measures imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran, and for the United States to lift all relevant unilateral sanctions on the country so that it could fully benefit from the economic dividends of the Plan.

On 19 December, the Council held its second briefing for the year pursuant to the relevant report of the Secretary-General.¹¹⁶⁸ In her statement, the Under-Secretary-General reported on the status of the negotiations, noting that the space for diplomacy appeared to be shrinking rapidly since her prior briefing.¹¹⁶⁹ She encouraged all parties and the United States to resume their efforts to resolve the outstanding issues, to prevent the gains achieved by the Plan after years of painstaking efforts from being completely lost. The Under-Secretary-General expressed regret about the reporting by IAEA on the intention of the Islamic Republic of Iran to install new centrifuges at the Natanz fuel enrichment plant and to produce more uranium enriched up to 60 per cent at the Fordow fuel enrichment plant, which would bring the country’s estimated stockpile to more than 18 times the allowable amount under the Plan. Speaking on behalf of the High Representative, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission, the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union stressed that the restoration of the Plan remained the only way for the Islamic Republic of Iran to reap the full benefits of the Plan and reach its full economic potential, as it would result in a comprehensive lifting of sanctions that would encourage greater cooperation by the entire international community with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Noting that the process to conclude a deal and bring the Plan back on track had been seriously challenged by various developments over the previous months, he reiterated that diplomacy and restoring the full

¹¹⁶³ S/2022/510, annex.

¹¹⁶⁴ See S/PV.9085.

¹¹⁶⁵ United States, Mexico, France, Norway, Ghana, Kenya, United Arab Emirates and Ireland.

¹¹⁶⁶ United States, United Kingdom, Norway, Ghana, United Arab Emirates, Ireland, Albania and Germany.

¹¹⁶⁷ Mexico, Gabon, China, Ghana, Ireland and Russian Federation.

¹¹⁶⁸ See S/PV.9225. See also S/2022/912. For the reports of the Joint Commission and the Facilitator, see S/2022/919, annex, and S/2022/937, annex, respectively.

¹¹⁶⁹ See S/PV.9225.

implementation of the Plan was still the best option for preventing the country from developing a nuclear weapon, which was also instrumental to the security of the whole region. The Facilitator emphasized the importance of the full restoration of the Plan as soon as possible and the need for all parties to the agreement to uphold it in both letter and spirit, avoid actions that undermined the implementation of commitments and ensure its full and effective operation.

During the deliberations, some Council members¹¹⁷⁰ reiterated the need to resume negotiations with all parties, with a view to returning to the full implementation of the resolution. Other Council members¹¹⁷¹ expressed their continued concern about the nuclear enrichment by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Several Council members¹¹⁷² called for further progress in the dialogue between the Islamic Republic of Iran and IAEA, to enable the Agency to provide assurances of the exclusively peaceful nature of the country's nuclear programme.

Concerning the implementation of paragraphs 3 and 4 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015), several speakers¹¹⁷³ raised concerns about the findings in the report of the Secretary-General concerning the transfer and use of unmanned aerial vehicles from the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Russian Federation and encouraged an inspection of those vehicles recovered in Ukraine. In that regard, the representative of Brazil stated that he would await an independent assessment of such allegations. The representative of the Russian Federation reiterated its assertion that any results of a "pseudo-investigation" were null and void from a legal standpoint, and that references to any alleged practice in the conduct of inspections were irrelevant. The representative of China expressed the hope that the parties concerned, including the Secretariat, would accurately interpret Council resolutions and documents, prudently handle issues such as the space launch by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the so-called transfer of unmanned aerial vehicles systems, and avoid influencing negotiations on resuming compliance.

Developments relating to the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) were also considered by the Council under the item entitled "Maintenance of international peace and security".¹¹⁷⁴

Meetings: non-proliferation, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9085 30 June	Letter dated 10 June 2022 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/482) Thirteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2022/490)		Germany, Iran (Islamic Republic of)	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	All Council members, ^a all invitees ^b	

¹¹⁷⁰ Gabon, Ghana, China and Kenya.

¹¹⁷¹ Ireland, Mexico, France, Albania, Norway and United Kingdom.

¹¹⁷² Gabon, United Arab Emirates and India.

¹¹⁷³ Ireland, France, Norway, United Kingdom and Germany.

¹¹⁷⁴ See [S/PV.9167](#). For more information, see sect. 35 below.

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	Letter dated 23 June 2022 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/510)					
S/PV.9225 19 December	Fourteenth report of the Secretary- General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) (S/2022/912)	Germany, Iran (Islamic Republic of)		Under- Secretary- General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Delegation of the European Union	All Council members, ^c all invitees ^b	
	Letter dated 6 December 2022 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/919)					
	Letter dated 12 December 2022 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2022/937)					

^a The representative of Ireland spoke twice, once in her capacity as the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and once in her national capacity.

^b The representative of the European Union spoke on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, in his capacity as Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

^c The representative of Ireland spoke twice, once in his capacity as Facilitator and once in his national capacity.

C. Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea

During the period under review, the Security Council held six meetings under this item. Five meetings took the form of briefings and one was convened to adopt a decision.¹¹⁷⁵ The Council adopted one resolution, under Chapter VII of the Charter, by which it extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [1874 \(2009\)](#) in support of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#).¹¹⁷⁶ The Council failed to adopt one draft resolution due to the negative vote of two permanent members. More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in the table below. In addition to the meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole in connection with the item.¹¹⁷⁷

During the period under review, Council members heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific of the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations.¹¹⁷⁸ Their briefings were focused on the unprecedented number of ballistic missile launches by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea during the year and the risk of a significant escalation of tension in the region and beyond.¹¹⁷⁹ Also in their briefings, they reaffirmed the Secretary-General's commitment to working with all the parties for sustainable peace and a complete denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, reiterating that the unity of the Council was essential to ease tensions and overcome the diplomatic impasse.¹¹⁸⁰ Noting the negative action-reaction cycle of missile launches and military exercises, the briefers stressed the importance of strengthening communication channels, including inter-Korean and military-to-military ones, in de-escalating tensions and lowering the risk of miscalculation.¹¹⁸¹ On the grave humanitarian situation in the country, the briefers expressed the readiness of the United Nations to assist people in need and reiterated the Secretary-General's call for the unimpeded entry of international staff and humanitarian supplies.¹¹⁸² In addition to Council members, Japan and the Republic of Korea participated in all meetings of the Council, under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At those meetings, Council members held differing views regarding the approach to the actions of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. For example, at the meeting held on 21 November,¹¹⁸³ many Council members¹¹⁸⁴ considered that the continued development and testing of nuclear weapons undermined the non-proliferation regime and raised tensions in the region and beyond, posing a threat to international peace and stability. Some speakers¹¹⁸⁵ criticized the continued silence of the Council. Considering the absence of consensus on the adoption of a draft resolution on the situation, the representative of the United States expressed his delegation's intention to propose a draft presidential statement to hold the Democratic People's Republic of Korea accountable for its dangerous rhetoric and destabilizing actions. Several Council members¹¹⁸⁶ called on all parties to demonstrate restraint and to reaffirm in practice their readiness to renew dialogue. While also expressing concern over the rising tensions and intensifying confrontation on the Korean peninsula, the representatives of China and Russian Federation expressed opposition to any military activity threatening the security of the peninsula. They argued that the draft resolution proposed jointly by China and the Russian Federation would help to ease the humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, create an atmosphere for dialogue and promote the realization of a political statement.

¹¹⁷⁵ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

¹¹⁷⁶ For more information on the mandate of the Committee and its Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.B.

¹¹⁷⁷ See [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 33.

¹¹⁷⁸ See [S/PV.9004](#), [S/PV.9030](#), [S/PV.9146](#), [S/PV.9183](#) and [S/PV.9197](#).

¹¹⁷⁹ See, for example, [S/PV.9004](#), [S/PV.9146](#) and [S/PV.9183](#).

¹¹⁸⁰ See [S/PV.9004](#), [S/PV.9030](#) and [S/PV.9146](#).

¹¹⁸¹ See [S/PV.9183](#) and [S/PV.9197](#).

¹¹⁸² See [S/PV.9004](#), [S/PV.9030](#), [S/PV.9146](#), [S/PV.9183](#) and [S/PV.9197](#).

¹¹⁸³ See [S/PV.9197](#).

¹¹⁸⁴ United States, Albania, Ireland, Gabon, India, Kenya, Brazil and United Arab Emirates.

¹¹⁸⁵ Albania, France, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, Mexico and Republic of Korea.

¹¹⁸⁶ Albania, France, Ireland, Norway, United Kingdom, Gabon, Mexico, Kenya and United Arab Emirates.

Also at those meetings, Council members discussed the role of sanctions in addressing the peace and security issues on the Korean peninsula. Some Council members affirmed the effectiveness of sanctions in slowing advancements by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in connection with weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles,¹¹⁸⁷ and some underlined the importance of sanctions compliance by all Member States and the full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions.¹¹⁸⁸ Some Council members expressed concern regarding the evasion of sanctions by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea allowing continued funding to its illegal weapons of mass destruction programmes, including through cyberactivity,¹¹⁸⁹ and some opined that all reasonable measures should be taken to prevent evasion, that the current sanctions regime should be updated to cover the new areas and that stricter sanctions should be imposed.¹¹⁹⁰ At the meeting held on 11 May, the representative of China, stressing that sanctions were only a means to an end, stated that sanctions should not be equated with, or used to replace, diplomatic efforts and that furthering sanctions by means of a resolution, as proposed by the United States, was an inappropriate way to address the situation.¹¹⁹¹ At the same meeting, the representative of the Russian Federation asserted that seeking mutually acceptable political and diplomatic solutions was the only way to peacefully resolve the issues concerning the Korean peninsula and expressed regret that the Council had only tightened the sanctions while ignoring positive signals from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the past few years. His delegation believed that the further strengthening of sanctions against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea exceeded the scope of the measures needed to cut off channels for funding nuclear missile programmes and exposed its people to unacceptable socioeconomic and humanitarian turmoil. At the meeting held on 5 October, the representative of Brazil called on the Council to seriously explore alternative avenues to reducing tensions on the peninsula and breaking the deadlock.¹¹⁹² He expressed the view that, while multilateral sanctions might be part of a comprehensive response, they alone could not address the peace and security issue of the peninsula.¹¹⁹³

In their deliberations, Council members also addressed the grave humanitarian situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Some Council members expressed the belief that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea itself had worsened the situation of its own people, by diverting resources from humanitarian needs to illegal military and ballistic missile programmes, and called upon the country to prioritize the needs of its people over costly military ventures and to allow the entry of relief organizations and the flow of humanitarian aid into the country.¹¹⁹⁴ In response to the concern that sanctions exacerbated the humanitarian situation, the representative of Norway, who chaired the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) in 2022, stated at various meetings that sanctions were not intended to have adverse humanitarian consequences for the civilians and that members of the Council continued to show that they had taken the humanitarian situation in the country seriously, with requests for humanitarian exemptions swiftly processed by the Committee.¹¹⁹⁵

In addition, in 2022, the Council convened two meetings to adopt decisions in connection with the item. On 25 March, under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council unanimously adopted resolution 2627 (2022), by which it extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 1874 (2009) for a period of 12 months, until 30 April 2023.¹¹⁹⁶ After the adoption of the resolution, several Council members made statements, in which they noted with concern the leaks of the 2021 interim and final reports of the Panel of Experts and the potential damage to the credibility of the work of the Committee and stressed the need for the Panel to improve its working methods.¹¹⁹⁷ The representative of Mexico expressed regret that Council members could not reach agreement on explicit instructions to the

¹¹⁸⁷ See S/PV.9030 (United States); and S/PV.9183 (Norway and United Arab Emirates).

¹¹⁸⁸ See S/PV.9030 (United Arab Emirates and India); and S/PV.9146 (United States, Albania, Ireland, Norway, India and United Arab Emirates).

¹¹⁸⁹ See S/PV.9030 (Albania, Ireland, United Kingdom, France and Norway); and S/PV.9183 (France).

¹¹⁹⁰ See S/PV.9030 (France and United States); and S/PV.9183 (France and United Arab Emirates).

¹¹⁹¹ See S/PV.9030.

¹¹⁹² See S/PV.9146.

¹¹⁹³ For more information on the imposition of sanctions by the Council, see part VII, sect. III.

¹¹⁹⁴ See S/PV.9146 (Albania, France, United Arab Emirates and Republic of Korea); S/PV.9183 (United Kingdom and United Arab Emirates); and S/PV.9197 (Ireland, Kenya and United Arab Emirates).

¹¹⁹⁵ See, for example, S/PV.9183 and S/PV.9197.

¹¹⁹⁶ Resolution 2627 (2022), para. 1.

¹¹⁹⁷ See S/PV.9004 (United States, Norway, China and Russian Federation).

Panel of Experts to investigate and report, in a timely manner, on incidents relating to the launch of ballistic missiles, in addition to its interim and final reports. Despite having voted in favour of the resolution, the representative of China expressed regret and discontent that the concerns of his delegation, which had been supported by a large number of Council members, had not been taken on board by the penholder.

On 26 May, the Council voted on a draft resolution¹¹⁹⁸ submitted by the United States. As penholder of the draft resolution, the representative of the United States made a statement before the vote, in which she affirmed that the launch of six intercontinental ballistic missiles since the beginning of 2022, including on 25 May, constituted a threat to the peace and security of the entire international community.¹¹⁹⁹ She noted that the Council had not issued a response to any of the six intercontinental ballistic missiles launches, despite the commitment made in resolution 2397 (2017). With regard to the argument by some Council members that a presidential statement was the appropriate response, she recalled that her delegation had proposed press elements and a statement to the press following many of those launches, but had been told that any such statement could lead to escalation or could destabilize the Korean peninsula. She argued that the exact opposite had happened, and that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had taken the Council's silence as a green light to act with impunity and escalate tensions on the peninsula. With the adoption of the draft resolution, a message could be sent to all proliferators that Council members would not stand for any actions aimed at undermining international peace and security. She added that, if adopted, the resolution would restrict the ability of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to advance its unlawful weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes, streamline sanctions implementation and further facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. The draft resolution was not adopted due to the negative vote of two permanent members.¹²⁰⁰

After the vote, 13 Council members made statements.¹²⁰¹ The representative of China stated that, with regard to the peninsula issue, the Council should play a positive and constructive role, and its actions should help to de-escalate the situation and prevent it from deteriorating and even spiralling out of control. He added that reliance on sanctions would not help to resolve the issue, as they would not only fail to resolve the problem but would lead to further negative consequences and an escalation of the confrontation. His delegation had repeatedly expressed the hope that the United States would consider issuing a presidential statement instead, as the best way to garner consensus among Council members and avoid confrontation. Explaining his country's vote, the representative of the Russian Federation said that the penholder had ignored the frequent clarifications made during the drafting process and that his delegation's appeals for it to be issued as a presidential statement instead had gone unheeded. According to the representative, strengthening the sanctions pressure on Pyongyang was not only futile, but extremely dangerous, considering the humanitarian consequences of such measures. The quest for mutually acceptable political and diplomatic solutions was the only possible way to reach a peaceful solution to the Korean peninsula question and establish robust security mechanisms in North-East Asia. Other speakers¹²⁰² stated that the continued launches by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of ballistic missiles, including of intercontinental range, had been a clear violation of Security Council resolutions and of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime and expressed regret that the draft resolution had not been adopted because of the veto by two permanent members. Some speakers¹²⁰³ expressed concern that the veto would send a wrong signal of impunity and embolden the authorities of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. In that connection, several Council members¹²⁰⁴ called for the swift issuance of a special report by the Council to the General Assembly explaining the veto, in accordance with Assembly resolution 76/262 of 26 April 2022.

¹¹⁹⁸ See S/2022/431.

¹¹⁹⁹ See S/PV.9048.

¹²⁰⁰ Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 76/262, the Council submitted a special report to the Assembly on the use of the veto at the meeting (see A/76/853). For more information on such reports, see part IV, sect. I.F.

¹²⁰¹ See S/PV.9048.

¹²⁰² Kenya, Mexico, Albania, Ireland, Ghana, Norway, Brazil, United Kingdom, Gabon, France, United States, Japan and Republic of Korea.

¹²⁰³ Brazil, United Kingdom, France, United States and Republic of Korea.

¹²⁰⁴ Mexico, Ireland and Norway.

**Part I. Consideration of questions under the responsibility of
the Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security**

Meetings: non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9004 25 March		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2022/263)	Japan, Republic of Korea	Under-Secretary- General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	All Council members, all invitees	Resolution 2627 (2022) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.9030 11 May			Japan, Republic of Korea	Assistant Secretary- General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.9048 26 May		Draft resolution submitted by United States (S/2022/431)	Japan, Republic of Korea		13 Council members, ^a all invitees	Not adopted 13-0-2 ^b
S/PV.9146 5 October			Japan, Republic of Korea	Assistant Secretary- General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.9183 4 November			Japan, Republic of Korea	Assistant Secretary- General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific	All Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.9197 21 November			Japan, Republic of Korea	Under-Secretary- General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs	All Council members, all invitees	

^a Albania, Brazil, China, France, Gabon, Ghana, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States.

^b For: Albania, Brazil, France, Gabon, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; against: China, Russian Federation; abstaining: none.

33. Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

During the period under review, the Council held two meetings under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace” which took the form of a briefing and an open debate.¹²⁰⁵ More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is provided in the table below.¹²⁰⁶ In 2022, no decisions were adopted in connection with this item.

On 27 July, the Council held its annual briefing to discuss the report of the Peacebuilding Commission. At the meeting, the Council heard briefings by the representative of Egypt in his capacity as former Chair of the Commission for 2021 and by the representative of Bangladesh, in his capacity as Chair of the Commission for 2022.¹²⁰⁷

¹²⁰⁵ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

¹²⁰⁶ See also [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 27.

¹²⁰⁷ See [S/PV.9101](#).