

## Meetings: the situation in Cyprus, 2022

Meeting record and date	Sub-item	Other documents	Rule 37 invitations	Rule 39 and other invitations	Speakers	Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)
<a href="#">S/PV.8956</a> 27 January	Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus ( <a href="#">S/2021/1109</a> )  Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus ( <a href="#">S/2021/1110</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/52</a> )				Resolution <a href="#">2618 (2022)</a> 15-0-0
<a href="#">S/PV.9102</a> 28 July	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus ( <a href="#">S/2022/533</a> )  Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus ( <a href="#">S/2022/534</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by United Kingdom ( <a href="#">S/2022/578</a> )				Resolution <a href="#">2646 (2022)</a> 15-0-0

## 18. Items relating to the situation in the former Yugoslavia

### A. The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

During 2022, the members of the Council held two meetings and adopted one resolution under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations in connection with the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The two meetings took the format of a debate.<sup>603</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is provided in the table below.<sup>604</sup>

At a meeting held on 11 May 2022,<sup>605</sup> the Council heard a briefing by the High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the outset of the meeting, prior to the briefing, the representatives of the Russian Federation and China asked to take the floor. The representative of the Russian Federation said that his delegation did not consider Christian Schmidt to be the legitimate High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the Council had not approved his appointment to that position. The argument that his appointment had allegedly taken place in accordance with the decision of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council did not stand up to criticism, and his delegation believed that the post of the High Representative remained vacant. In that connection, the Russian Federation saw no basis for inviting Mr. Schmidt to meetings of the Council as High Representative, and his presence in the Chamber in that capacity undermined the authority of the Council and of the United Nations in general. At the same time, the Council had a practice that allowed individuals to brief the Council in their personal capacity in order to determine whether their further participation was required, and that this was how his delegation viewed the presence of Mr. Schmidt at the meeting. The representative of China stated that, according to the Dayton Peace Agreement, the role of the Council in appointing a High Representative was indispensable and had been established practice. In the light of the fact that the appointment of Mr. Schmidt had not been endorsed by the Council, China believed that

<sup>603</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

<sup>604</sup> See also [A/77/2](#), part II, chap. 7.A.

<sup>605</sup> See [S/PV.9029](#).

it was inappropriate for him to brief the Council in the capacity as High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>606</sup>

In his briefing, the High Representative provided updates on developments in connection with his latest report.<sup>607</sup> At the outset, he noted that, as in the previous period, authorities of the Republika Srpska continued to embrace rhetoric and actions, including the adoption of legislation, that could undermine the constitutional framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>608</sup> In that regard, what the Republika Srpska authorities were pursuing through the unilateral withdrawal from agreements on the transfer of competencies to the State would, if followed through, achieve a de facto secession of the entity by opting out of the constitutional framework and assuming the competencies of a State. The entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina existed by virtue of the Constitution and were a constitutional part of the State, but they had no right to secede. Announced moves by the Republika Srpska authorities undermined the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and as a representative of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, he was committed to preserving the country's sovereignty and territorial integrity. In that regard, with the support of the Steering Board, he had used his executive authority as High Representative to issue decisions as a countermeasure to the illegal and destabilizing actions taken by the Republika Srpska authorities. If constitutional order was to be amended or improved, that must be done by elected representatives working to find a legal solution. While an agreement on electoral reforms had not been reached notwithstanding two years of negotiations, the elections could and would be held on schedule in October, just as general elections had been conducted on schedule in 2018, and the holding of regular, fair and free elections was a requirement under the General Framework Agreement for Peace. In addition, the High Representative reported having met with those responsible for Western Balkans policy in several capitals, especially those of the assembled members of the Steering Board, not only because of the urgency of the current situation but also because of the necessity of re-engaging the capitals in completing the tasks at hand. In that regard, he noted that the Russian Federation, as a member of the Peace Implementation Council, had suspended its participation. The fulfilment of the 5 plus 2 agenda and the European Union recommendations would not only resolve certain grievances but also contribute to lasting peace and stability.

During the discussion that ensued, Council members expressed concern with the continuing political stalemate and instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Speakers condemned in particular the deeply divisive ethnic rhetoric from political leaders and the increase in reported inter-ethnic tensions, fuelled by hate speech, genocide denial and glorification of war criminals. In that connection, several Council members<sup>609</sup> noted that the recent initiatives by the Republika Srpska leadership to withdraw from State-level institutions in violation of the national Constitution and the Dayton Agreement were likely to undermine the security and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, the representative of the United States noted that calls to obstruct elections or create a new territorial organization by Bosnian Croat leaders were also dangerous and could undermine peace and security in the region. In that context, a number of speakers<sup>610</sup> expressed support for the presence of the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea) in maintaining stability in the country. More specifically, the representatives of the United Kingdom and Norway welcomed the increased presence of EUFOR-Althea as a precautionary measure. The representative of the Russian Federation, on the other hand, noted with particular concern the increase of the EUFOR-Althea military contingent, which had been doubled in March. Such behaviour raised serious questions about the added value of the continued presence of EUFOR-Althea, which had gone from being a source of stability to an element of intimidation and political confrontation.

In view of the general elections scheduled for early October 2023, Council members expressed concern about the lack of progress on the electoral and constitutional reforms due to the political divergencies, as well as the fact that no government had been established in the Federation after the 2018 elections. In that context, several members<sup>611</sup> expressed support for the work of the High Representative

<sup>606</sup> For more information on the discussion concerning the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, see part II, sect. VII.

<sup>607</sup> [S/2022/374](#).

<sup>608</sup> See [S/PV.9029](#).

<sup>609</sup> Brazil, United Kingdom, Gabon, Albania, France, Mexico and United States.

<sup>610</sup> United Kingdom, Gabon, France, China, Norway, Mexico and European Union.

<sup>611</sup> United Kingdom, Ireland, Albania, France, Kenya, United Arab Emirates, India, Norway, and United States.

and called upon all the relevant actors to ensure dialogue, cooperation and full respect for national institutions. Some members<sup>612</sup> expressed support for the use of the executive powers attributed to the Office of the High Representative, as decided by the Peace Implementation Council. The representative of the Russian Federation, on the other hand, expressed the view that attempts to invoke the Bonn powers were unlawful and legally null and void, as there was no agreement on their use by the international community and because those emergency tools had been granted personally to the High Representative, whose post remained vacant. In that regard, a frank discussion was needed on practical ways to close the Office of the High Representative as soon as possible, as it had exhausted its positive functions. In that connection, some Council members<sup>613</sup> said that it was important that any disagreement among members of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council be resolved through consensus and constructive engagement, in line with the Peace Agreement. Furthermore, several Council members<sup>614</sup> called upon all Bosnian authorities to fulfil the 5 plus 2 agenda as a prerequisite for the closure of the Office of the High Representative.

On 2 November, the Council held its second semi-annual debate on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>615</sup> At the outset of the meeting, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2658 \(2022\)](#) under Chapter VII of the Charter. By the resolution, the Council renewed the authorization of EUFOR-Althea and the continued presence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the country for a period of 12 months, starting from the date of the adoption of the resolution.<sup>616</sup>

In the ensuing debate, Council members discussed the most recent report of the High Representative.<sup>617</sup> Council members welcomed the unanimous adoption of resolution [2658 \(2022\)](#) as well as the renewal of the mandate of EUFOR-Althea and stressed the importance of the role of the European Union military operation in maintaining post-conflict stability and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina.<sup>618</sup> In that regard, the representative of the Russian Federation said that, while her delegation was pleased that the document voted upon had been depoliticized and purely technical, it was concerned with the doubling of the size of the EUFOR-Althea contingent, especially as the command of the operation had stated that there were no immediate threats to peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the other hand, the representative of Ghana, stated that a substantive resolution would have better helped advance the peace agenda in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he called for the Council's future efforts in that direction.

The majority of speakers welcomed the successful holding of general elections on 2 October. At the same time, a number of speakers<sup>619</sup> acknowledged that the country still faced serious challenges, including the continuation of the ethnic-based and divisive rhetoric, and in that context, they called upon all political representatives to ensure the swift formation of a new Government in order to put an end to the political stalemate and paralysis of State institutions. The representative of the United States expressed deep concern about the allegations of fraud in the election, in particular in the Republika Srpska presidential race, and encouraged Bosnian institutions to fully address the shortcomings raised by election observers while urging all stakeholders and citizens to pursue any grievances through established channels. With regard to the outcome of the elections, the representative of the Russian Federation noted that an overwhelming majority of voters had opted for the ethnic-oriented and Dayton-based concept of statehood and its fundamental premise about the central role of the constituent peoples.

A number of speakers<sup>620</sup> expressed support for the mandate of the High Representative in overseeing the implementation of the civilian aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace. Some Council members<sup>621</sup> expressed further support for the use of the executive powers of the High Representative, should the situation require it. The representative of the Russian Federation, on the other

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<sup>612</sup> United Kingdom, Albania and Norway.

<sup>613</sup> Kenya and India.

<sup>614</sup> Brazil, Ireland, Albania, Kenya, India, Ghana, Norway, Mexico and United States.

<sup>615</sup> See [S/PV.9179](#).

<sup>616</sup> Resolution [2658 \(2022\)](#), paras.1 and 2.

<sup>617</sup> [S/2022/806](#).

<sup>618</sup> See [S/PV.9179](#).

<sup>619</sup> Ireland, Mexico, Norway, France, United States, Albania, Gabon, Brazil, United Kingdom, Ghana and European Union.

<sup>620</sup> Ireland, Norway, France, United States, Albania, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Ghana and European Union.

<sup>621</sup> United States, Albania and United Kingdom.

hand, stated that the increased activity of the Office of the High Representative posed additional threats to the peace and stability in the country, which was in direct contradiction to the tasks originally assigned to it. The representative of China also expressed concern that the use of the Bonn powers had become rather controversial and added that they were a special arrangement out of a specific era. In addition, the representative of India stated that the disagreement over the Office of the High Representative needed to be resolved through constructive engagement, in line with the Agreement for Peace. Finally, the President of the Council expressed regret about the inability of the High Representative to participate in the meeting owing to the lack of consensus on the matter. In that connection, he stated that the collaborative exchanges between the Council and the Office of the High Representative, through the briefings of the High Representative, helped members to better appreciate the complex political situation that pertained to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he expressed the hope that, in the future, the Council would be able to resume its established format for the meeting. Several speakers<sup>622</sup> encouraged the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to continue progress on the implementation of the 5 plus 2 agenda by which the Office of the High Representative could complete its mission and the international supervision of Bosnia and Herzegovina would be no longer needed.

### Meetings: the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2022

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9029</a> 11 May	Letter dated 3 May 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/374</a> )		Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia	High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations	All Council members, all invitees <sup>a</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9179</a> 2 November	Letter dated 25 October 2022 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council ( <a href="#">S/2022/806</a> )	Draft resolution submitted by Ireland ( <a href="#">S/2022/809</a> )	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia	Deputy Head of the Delegation of the European Union	All Council members, <sup>b</sup> all invitees	Resolution <a href="#">2658 (2022)</a> 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

<sup>a</sup> Bosnia and Herzegovina was represented by the Chair of its Presidency.

<sup>b</sup> Ireland was represented by its Minister of State for European Affairs.

## B. Security Council resolutions [1160 \(1998\)](#), [1199 \(1998\)](#), [1203 \(1998\)](#), [1239 \(1999\)](#) and [1244 \(1999\)](#)

In 2022, the Council held two meetings in connection with the item entitled “Security Council resolutions [1160 \(1998\)](#), [1199 \(1998\)](#), [1203 \(1998\)](#), [1239 \(1999\)](#) and [1244 \(1999\)](#)”. Both meetings took the form of briefings.<sup>623</sup> More information on the meetings, including on participants and speakers, is

<sup>622</sup> Ireland, Mexico, Norway, France, United Kingdom and Kenya.

<sup>623</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II.

given in the table below.<sup>624</sup> No decisions were adopted in connection with this item during the period under review.

Council members heard briefings by the newly appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo and Head of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK),<sup>625</sup> further to the reports of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 1244 (1999).<sup>626</sup> In line with established practice, statements were also delivered by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia and the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kosovo during the meetings.

At a meeting held on 20 April,<sup>627</sup> the Special Representative gave a briefing to the Council following the elections in Serbia conducted on 3 April, noting that developments in Ukraine had inevitably influenced and would continue to influence all issues of European security. Despite the international community urging the Pristina and Belgrade authorities to agree on modalities to facilitate eligible voters' participation in Kosovo, a solution had not been identified to permit that. The Special Representative expressed regret about the polarizing effects of that decision, since it had divided public opinion sharply along ethnic lines. Nevertheless, the election process had gone smoothly and without incident.

The Special Representative drew attention to the incidents of serious concern in northern Kosovo, with attacks directly targeting Kosovo police patrols, and called upon the leaders of both Pristina and Belgrade to be very judicious in their actions and their rhetoric at the political level and in the public arena, recalling that those leaders bore the main responsibility for reducing tensions. Even on extremely technical subjects, progress remained tentative and slow, and she reemphasized the principle that, however difficult the path towards agreements and solutions, unilateral actions by any side had the potential to damage the real interests of the people of both sides. Dramatic shocks to the economy of Kosovo and to other regional economies had been building up well before the onset of events in Ukraine. In that context, finding practical modes of economic cooperation among Belgrade, Pristina and all the neighbours of the region assumed greater urgency. Any region-wide initiatives that could help towards promoting that objective should be welcomed.

At the outset of her mandate, the Special Representative wished to clarify two important points. First, she indicated that her responsibility was to provide objective information to the Secretary-General and the Council, and in that regard, the contents of the Secretary-General's reports were not the subject of negotiation. Secondly, she referred to inaccurate perceptions regarding the mandate of UNMIK, namely that the Mission, in and of itself, represented either an obstacle or a vehicle for the outcome preferred by one or the other side or that the Mission harboured a particular agenda to forward or favour outside the bounds of its mandate. Neither of those inaccurate perceptions contained any demonstrable truth, yet both had too frequently been allowed to gain currency in local public discourse. Accordingly, the Mission would continue its work in the areas where it was genuinely able to help advance the common objectives held by the authorities, communities and institutions in Kosovo, and the Mission's legacy of institutional support, its trust among communities and political actors and its work with the full spectrum of multilateral and bilateral actors would drive the agenda. The Council's support to the Mission remained essential, as was its attention to the state of relations between Pristina and Belgrade.

Following the briefing by the Special Representative and the statements by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia and the representative of Kosovo, Council members discussed the latest developments as reported by the Secretary-General. Council members noted the slow progress in a constructive Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and urged all actors to engage fully and constructively. Most representatives expressed support and appreciation for the work of UNMIK and underlined its important role in promoting peace and security, stability and respect for human rights. Some Council members, however, differed in their views on the role of the Mission. The representative of Brazil underlined that substantial autonomy for Kosovo had been generally achieved, but the conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all communities in the region had not yet been accomplished, and the main objective of UNMIK remained unfulfilled. The representative of China said that, given the standstill in bilateral talks and the ongoing tensions on the ground, maintaining the Mission's presence was crucial. The representative

<sup>624</sup> See also [A/77/2](#), chap. 7.B.

<sup>625</sup> See [S/2021/963](#) and [S/2021/964](#).

<sup>626</sup> [S/2022/313](#) and [S/2022/739](#).

<sup>627</sup> See [S/PV.9019](#).

of the United Arab Emirates argued that the support for the important role played by the United Nations in Kosovo should continue, as it undertook many activities and projects that supported Government institutions as well as initiatives aimed at building trust between religious and ethnic communities and providing economic empowerment and support for the search for missing persons. Similar support to UNMIK was expressed by the representatives of Gabon, France and Ghana. Nevertheless, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that conditions on the ground were unrecognizable from 1999, and a review of the Mission's role and responsibilities was needed. The representative of Norway affirmed that, while the Mission pursued important work in various areas, his delegation would support a close look at possible efficiency improvements. Finally, the representatives of Albania and the United States expressed the view that UNMIK had already fulfilled its mandate. The representative of the United States added that it was time to reduce the frequency of briefings to an annual basis.

Following the statements by Council members, the representatives of the Russian Federation and Albania took the floor twice to make further statements. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia and the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kosovo took the floor three times.

At the meeting held on 18 October, the briefing of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was focused on the report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK and the latest developments on the ground.<sup>628</sup> She reported that there had been several escalations in political rhetoric between Pristina and Belgrade, as well as a few moments of acute tension on the ground. Amid all challenges, there had been positive examples of leadership and cooperation. Her goal was for UNMIK to focus on those areas where the continued presence, in concert with the entire United Nations family – as well as other partners in Kosovo – contributed consistently, with positive effects. That included participating in and promoting effective communication across ethnic and political lines at all levels of society, redoubling the Mission's commitment to supporting trust-building actors from across all parts of Kosovan society and helping to promote broad awareness about the interdependence and shared problems and interests of people across Kosovo and throughout the region.

Following the briefing by the Special Representative and the statements by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Serbia and the representative of Kosovo, Council members discussed the latest developments as reported by the Secretary-General. In their statements, many Council members focused on the increased tensions in northern Kosovo and reiterated their concern at the slow progress in dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia.

Several delegations<sup>629</sup> welcomed the meetings held between the parties in Brussels in August and the agreement reached on free movement between Kosovo and Serbia. The representative of Ireland added that the agreement was a positive step in the right direction and proof that acceptable, pragmatic solutions were possible when leaders engaged openly and constructively in the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue. The European Union-facilitated dialogue was the channel through which to resolve tensions between Serbia and Kosovo. Similarly, the representative of the United States underlined that the European Union-facilitated dialogue continued to be the principal mechanism for reconciling issues. The representatives of the United Kingdom and Kenya urged both parties to uphold their commitments made in the framework of the dialogue, while the representative of Ghana called upon both sides to recommit to the full implementation of their respective obligations under previous and future agreements to be reached in the context of the European Union-facilitated dialogue.

Concerning the role of UNMIK, Council members expressed overall praise and support for its work on different fronts and specifically on confidence and trust-building efforts,<sup>630</sup> women and peace and security and youth and peace and security agendas,<sup>631</sup> the return of missing persons,<sup>632</sup> strengthening of the rule of law<sup>633</sup> and the promotion of social cooperation and cohesion in Kosovo.<sup>634</sup> As in April, Council members discussed the continuity of the Mission and the continued value of its mandate.

<sup>628</sup> See [S/PV.9155](#). See also [S/2022/739](#).

<sup>629</sup> Ireland, Brazil, Ghana, India, China and France.

<sup>630</sup> Ireland, Kenya, Ghana and Gabon.

<sup>631</sup> Ireland, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Ghana and Gabon.

<sup>632</sup> Ireland, India and Gabon.

<sup>633</sup> Norway, Kenya, Brazil, France and Gabon.

<sup>634</sup> Ireland, United Arab Emirates and Ghana.

While representatives of Albania, the United Kingdom and the United States advocated a thorough review of UNMIK given the change of circumstances in Kosovo and its institutions, other Council members<sup>635</sup> supported the continuity of the Mission and its mandate. The representative of the United States expressed disappointment that the Council had not moved towards sunseting UNMIK, including by developing a plan to close the Mission. Briefings were no longer needed on a six-month basis and should be reduced to annual meetings, as the Council had far more pressing priorities to address, and its resources were limited. The representative of Albania also expressed the view that it was time to reduce Council meetings to only one a year in recognition of the progress made and as encouragement for the parties to pursue dialogue with more determination. By contrast, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed full support for UNMIK, as the most important guarantor of security in the province. While understanding the difficult circumstances in which the Mission must operate, his delegation expected UNMIK to make realistic rather than neutral rosy assessments of the situation in the province. The representative of China affirmed that the Special Representative and UNMIK should continue to work actively in accordance with resolution 1244 (1999), effectively carrying out its mandates and playing a constructive role in maintaining regional stability, promoting national reconciliation and facilitating dialogue between the two sides. Following the statements by Council members, the representatives of Serbia and Kosovo took the floor to make further statements.

**Meetings: Security Council resolutions 1160 (1998), 1199 (1998), 1203 (1998), 1239 (1999) and 1244 (1999), 2022**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.9019</a> 20 April	Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) ( <a href="#">S/2022/313</a> )		Serbia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo and Head of UNMIK, Donika Gërvalla-Schwarz	All Council members, all invitees <sup>a</sup>	
<a href="#">S/PV.9155</a> 18 October	Report of the Secretary-General on UNMIK ( <a href="#">S/2022/739</a> )		Serbia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Donika Gërvalla-Schwarz	All Council members, all invitees <sup>a</sup>	

<sup>a</sup> Serbia was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs.

## 19. Items relating to Ukraine

### A. Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))

During the period under review, the Council held eight meetings under the item entitled “Letter dated 28 February 2014 from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2014/136](#))” and adopted one resolution.<sup>636</sup> Resolution 2623 (2022) was the first resolution of the Council in 40 years in which the Council decided to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly.<sup>637</sup> In addition, the Council failed to adopt one draft

<sup>635</sup> Mexico, Russian Federation, Ghana and China.

<sup>636</sup> Resolution 2623 (2022).

<sup>637</sup> For more information regarding the relations between the Council and the General Assembly, see part IV, sect. I.C. For more details on the discussion, see part V, sect. I.