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**Part VIII**

**Regional arrangements**

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## **Introductory note**

### *Article 52*

- 1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.*
- 2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.*
- 3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.*
- 4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.*

### *Article 53*

- 1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.*
- 2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.*

*Article 54*

*The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.*

Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations provides the constitutional basis for the involvement of regional arrangements in the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>1</sup> While Article 52 encourages the engagement of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes prior to their referral to the Security Council, Article 53 allows the Council to utilize regional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority and with its explicit authorization. Article 54 stipulates that regional arrangements should inform the Council of their activities at all times.

During the period under review, in its decisions, the Council recognized that cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security could improve collective security. Specifically, the Council underlined the role of such cooperation, consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter, in contributing to international efforts to uphold the Charter and prevent famine and conflict-induced food insecurity and malnutrition, especially in situations of armed conflict. The Council specifically recognized the importance of enhancing international and regional cooperation to counter transnational organized crime, piracy and armed robbery at sea, and encouraged regional and subregional organizations to continue supporting Member States in preventing and countering transnational organized crime and terrorism. The Council also specifically urged regional organizations to publicly condemn violence, hate speech and extremism motivated by discrimination. Furthermore, while recalling its competence under Chapter VIII of the Charter to, where appropriate, utilize regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority, the Council agreed to consider on a case-by-case basis requests from the African Union Peace and Security Council seeking authorization for African Union-led peace support

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<sup>1</sup> Chapter VIII of the Charter refers to “regional arrangements or agencies”. For the purposes of the *Repertoire*, the term “regional arrangements” is understood to encompass regional and subregional organizations as well as other international organizations.

operations under Chapters VII and VIII of Charter to have access to United Nations assessed contributions.

In 2023, the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council held their eighth joint informal seminar and seventeenth annual joint consultative meeting in Addis Ababa on 5 and 6 October, respectively, during which they discussed the situation in the Sudan, the Sahel, Somalia, including the activities of the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), and in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.<sup>2</sup> In addition to the African Union, engagement with other regional organizations, such as the East African Community, Economic Community of Central African States, Economic Community of West African States, European Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, League of Arab States and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe featured prominently in Council discussions.

Discussions in the Council focused on various aspects of the cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, including on the role of the latter in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, counterterrorism and peacebuilding. Council members and other Member States further exchanged views on the principles underlying that cooperation, including complementarity, subsidiarity and the comparative advantage of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security, practical modalities for joint engagement and the need for predictable, sustainable and flexible funding for African Union-led peace support operations.

In connection with the pacific settlement of disputes, the Council highlighted in its decisions the important role played by regional and subregional organizations in the prevention and mediation of conflicts and the promotion of inclusive peace processes and reconciliation, including, among others, the African Union, Caribbean Community, East African Community, Economic Community of Central African States, Economic Community of West African States, Intergovernmental Authority on Development, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, League of Arab States and the Southern African Development Community. During their discussions, Council members exchanged views on the engagement of regional and subregional

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<sup>2</sup> See [S/2023/749](#) and [A/78/2](#). For more information on prior practice concerning the informal joint meetings of the Security Council and the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, see *Repertoire, Supplements 2008-2009 to 2022*, part II, sect. I.C.

organizations in addressing the situations, among others, in the Central African Republic, the Central African region, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, the Great Lakes region, Haiti, Kosovo, Libya, West Africa and the Sahel, the Sudan and South Sudan.

Concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional organizations, the Council renewed the authorization of ATMIS and authorized its gradual drawdown. The Council renewed the authorization for the deployment of the European Union Force-Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Council also made reference to the deployment of the East African Community-regional force to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic and discussed the mandate and reconfiguration of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel.

The Council authorized enforcement action by regional and subregional organizations beyond the framework of peacekeeping operations in Libya and continued to request reporting by regional organizations, particularly on the implementation of mandates of relevant regional peacekeeping operations and security forces and on cooperation with the United Nations.

The practice of the Council under Chapter VIII of the Charter in 2023 is set out in five sections. Each section covers both the decisions adopted by the Council and the discussions held during Council meetings. Section I contains an examination of the practice of the Council regarding cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security concerning items of a thematic nature. Section II is focused on the recognition by the Council of the efforts of regional organizations in the peaceful settlement of disputes, within the framework of Article 52 of the Charter. Section III covers the practice of the Council relating to its cooperation with regional organizations in the area of peacekeeping. Section IV contains a description of the practice of the Council in authorizing enforcement action by regional organizations outside the context of regional peacekeeping operations. Section V contains information on the reporting on the activities of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter, and also includes reference to relevant communications of the Council.

## **I. Consideration of the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations under thematic items**

### **Note**

Section I contains an examination of the practice of the Security Council in 2023 in cooperating with regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security, within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter, in connection with items of a thematic nature. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions on thematic issues relating to Chapter VIII, and subsection B covers discussions on thematic issues concerning the interpretation and application of Chapter VIII.

### **A. Decisions on thematic issues relating to Chapter VIII of the Charter**

During the period under review, the Council explicitly referred to Chapter VIII of the Charter in two decisions of a thematic nature. In a presidential statement adopted on 3 August under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the Council underlined the importance of the role of regional and subregional organizations and arrangements and of cooperation with them, consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter, with regard to maintaining international peace and security, contributing to international efforts to uphold the Charter and prevent famine, and conflict-induced food insecurity and malnutrition, especially in situations of armed conflict.<sup>3</sup>

Furthermore, in resolution [2719 \(2023\)](#), adopted on 21 December under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Council recalled Chapter VIII of the Charter and its competence under Article 53 (1) to, where appropriate, utilize regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority, as well as its oversight role under Article 54, recognizing that cooperation with regional and subregional organizations in matters relating to the maintenance of

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<sup>3</sup> [S/PRST/2023/4](#), fifth paragraph.

international peace and security could improve collective security.<sup>4</sup> The Council noted the ongoing efforts of the African Union and its subregional organizations to strengthen the implementation of the framework of the African Peace and Security Architecture to undertake peace support operations on the continent, consistent with the relevant provisions of Chapter VIII, and reaffirmed the significant contributions made by African Union peace support operations in maintaining regional and continental peace.<sup>5</sup> The Council also recognized the adverse impact that inadequate and unpredictable financing arrangements had on African Union-led peace support operations, authorized by the Council under Chapter VIII, underlining the need to address the financing challenges identified and to enhance the adequacy, predictability and sustainability of financing those operations.<sup>6</sup>

By the same resolution, the Council reaffirmed its determination to take effective steps to further enhance the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union, in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter, including forging greater regional and national ownership and underscored the oversight responsibilities of the Council for African Union-led peace support operations authorized by the Council.<sup>7</sup> The Council further agreed to consider on a case-by-case basis requests from the African Union Peace and Security Council seeking authorization from the United Nations Security Council for African Union-led peace support operations under Chapters VII and VIII to have access to United Nations assessed contributions consistent with Article 17 of the Charter as well as the financial regulations and rules of the United Nations, and under the direct, and effective command and control of the African Union on the terms further established in the resolution.<sup>8</sup>

While not making explicit reference to Chapter VIII of the Charter, the Council also referred to the role of regional and subregional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security in two other decisions. By resolution [2686 \(2023\)](#), adopted on 14 June under the agenda item “Maintenance of international peace and security”, the Council urged States and international and regional organizations to publicly condemn violence, hate speech and extremism motivated by

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<sup>4</sup> Resolution [2719 \(2023\)](#), second preambular paragraph.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, sixth preambular paragraph.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, fifteenth preambular paragraph.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, para 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 2. For more information on resolution [2719 \(2023\)](#) and the discussions in the Council regarding the financing of African Union-led peace support operations, see sect. III.

discrimination.<sup>9</sup> The Council further encouraged the Peacebuilding Commission to continue utilizing its role to convene United Nations bodies, Member States, national authorities and all other relevant stakeholders including regional and subregional organizations and international financial institutions to ensure an integrated, strategic, coherent, coordinated and gender-responsive approach to peacebuilding and sustaining peace and, in particular, to promote tolerance and address hate speech throughout the peace continuum in accordance with international law.<sup>10</sup>

Additionally, in a presidential statement adopted on 7 December under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security”, the Council recognized the importance of enhancing international and regional cooperation to counter transnational organized crime, piracy and armed robbery at sea.<sup>11</sup> The Council further encouraged regional and subregional organizations to continue their endeavours to provide technical assistance and capacity-building to Member States, to support them in preventing and countering transnational organized crime and terrorism, as well as to continue to prepare relevant reports.<sup>12</sup>

## **B. Discussion on thematic issues concerning the interpretation and application of Chapter VIII of the Charter**

In 2023, Council members and other Member States discussed the role of regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security under several thematic items, including “Briefing by the Chairperson-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe”,<sup>13</sup> “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”,<sup>14</sup> “Implementation of the note by the President of the Security Council ([S/2017/507](#))”,<sup>15</sup> “Maintenance of international peace and

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<sup>9</sup> Resolution [2686 \(2023\)](#), para. 2.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 13.

<sup>11</sup> [S/PRST/2023/6](#), seventh paragraph.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, fifteenth paragraph.

<sup>13</sup> See [S/PV.9316](#).

<sup>14</sup> See [S/PV.9268](#), [S/PV.9343](#), [S/PV.9435](#) and [S/PV.9518](#).

<sup>15</sup> See [S/PV.9410](#) and [S/PV.9410 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

security”,<sup>16</sup> “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”,<sup>17</sup> “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”,<sup>18</sup> “Promotion and strengthening of the rule of law”,<sup>19</sup> “Small arms”,<sup>20</sup> “Threats to international peace and security”,<sup>21</sup> “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”,<sup>22</sup> “United Nations peacekeeping operations”<sup>23</sup> and “Women and peace and security”.<sup>24</sup> The most extensive discussions were held in relation to cooperation with the European Union (see case 1), strengthening cooperation with regional organizations and mechanisms for countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism conducive to terrorism (see case 2), cooperation with the League of Arab States (see case 3), cooperation with the African Union (see case 4) and the contribution of regional, subregional and bilateral arrangements to the prevention and peaceful resolution of disputes (see case 5).

### **Case 1**

#### **Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security (European Union)**

On 23 February, the Council convened its annual briefing to discuss cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”.<sup>25</sup>

Opening the meeting, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy stated that the European Union had always been a strong supporter investing in the United Nations, both politically and financially.<sup>26</sup> He noted that all European Union crisis management operations worked with the United

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<sup>16</sup> See [S/PV.9285](#), [S/PV.9308](#), [S/PV.9308 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9421](#), [S/PV.9421 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9421 \(Resumption 2\)](#), [S/PV.9448](#), [S/PV.9448 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9482](#) and [S/PV.9482 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>17</sup> See [S/PV.9293](#).

<sup>18</sup> See [S/PV.9250](#), [S/PV.9250 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9315](#) and [S/PV.9315 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>19</sup> See [S/PV.9241](#) and [S/PV.9241 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>20</sup> See [S/PV.9509](#) and [S/PV.9509 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>21</sup> See [S/PV.9497](#) and [S/PV.9497 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>22</sup> See [S/PV.9296](#).

<sup>23</sup> See [S/PV.9413](#).

<sup>24</sup> See [S/PV.9276](#), [S/PV.9276 \(Resumption 1\)](#), [S/PV.9452](#), [S/PV.9452 \(Resumption 1\)](#) and [S/PV.9452 \(Resumption 2\)](#).

<sup>25</sup> See [S/PV.9268](#).

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

Nations as their partner, with their strategic partnership on peacekeeping and crisis management dating back at least two decades. He recalled the commitment of the European Union to continue supporting African Union-led peace support operations, as well as the ongoing discussions on using United Nations assessed contributions for operations authorized by the Council. The High Representative concluded by stating that regional organizations such as the African Union and the League of Arab States, together with the European Union, played a key role in preventing and addressing global crises.

In the subsequent discussion, Council members widely acknowledged the contribution of the European Union to the maintenance of international peace and security and multilateralism, in cooperation with the United Nations within the framework of Chapter VIII of the Charter.<sup>27</sup> They noted the joint actions of the two organizations in specific conflict situations and called for the strengthening of cooperation in the fields of conflict prevention, crisis management, humanitarian assistance, peace operations, climate and security, and the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda. Some Council members also recognized the success of the United Nations-European Union trilateral cooperation with the African Union in addressing cross-cutting peace and security issues, including in Somalia, the joint Global Terrorism Threats Facility and the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, and the work conducted through the African Peace Facility.<sup>28</sup>

The representative of Mozambique recalled that the Council was vested with the primary responsibility for maintaining global, regional and local peace and security and that Articles 52 to 54 of the Charter served as guidance to regional cooperation related to peace and security. The representative of Switzerland stated that the motto of the European Union, “united in diversity”, resonated with the fundamental values of the United Nations. Similarly, the Minister for Foreign and European Affairs and Trade of Malta and the representative of Ecuador highlighted that the European Union and the United Nations were natural partners, with aligned values, principles and objectives enshrined in the Charter, and that their complementary capacities, when properly coordinated, contributed to the

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<sup>27</sup> See [S/PV.9268](#) (Malta, Albania, Ghana, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan, Mozambique, Gabon, United States, Ecuador, Brazil, France and China).

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, (Malta, Albania, Ghana, Switzerland, Mozambique, Gabon and United States).

strengthening of multilateralism.<sup>29</sup> The Minister for Foreign and European Affairs and Trade of Malta further noted that the European Union's strategic relationship with the United Nations should continue to strengthen respect for the Charter and international law. The representative of France emphasized that the European Union was working with the United Nations in favour of the primacy of the rule of law over force and was at the forefront of the defence of the Charter.

With regards to peace operations, the Minister for Foreign and European Affairs and Trade of Malta stated that the existing comprehensive United Nations-European Union approach to crisis management, mediation and peace operations had helped several countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace. The representative of Gabon added that the partnership between the two organizations had been supported by a framework agreement on peace operations and crisis management since September 2020, promoting the needed joint action and alignment of their priorities.

The representative of Brazil noted that close and transparent cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union continued to be very beneficial to the multilateral system and could be further strengthened through dialogue with other Member States of the United Nations. Similarly, the representative of Gabon maintained that the partnership between the United Nations and the European Union had to be strengthened in order to be even more effective and that it should be based on optimal coordination and communication. The representative of China noted that the European Union should take the lead in practicing genuine multilateralism, abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter and maintain the multilateral system with the United Nations at its core. In that regard, he expressed hope that the European Union would adhere to the principles of sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of States, respect the social system and development path independently chosen by each country and actively cooperate with all parties within the framework of the United Nations.

The Minister for Foreign and European Affairs of Albania noted that her country supported every form of cooperation between the United Nations and the European Union regarding accountability for the crimes committed during the war in Ukraine. The representative of Ghana encouraged closer cooperation between the two

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<sup>29</sup> Ibid., (Ecuador and Malta).

organizations towards the immediate de-escalation of tensions and cessation of hostilities. The representative of China opined that the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United Nations should engage and hold dialogue with the Russian Federation to achieve common security on the European continent.

## Case 2

### Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts

On 28 March, at the initiative of Mozambique, which held the presidency for the month,<sup>30</sup> the Council held a high-level debate under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, focusing on countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism conducive to terrorism by strengthening cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations and mechanisms.<sup>31</sup> The Council was briefed by the Secretary-General and by the President of Comoros and Chairperson of the African Union.<sup>32</sup>

In his remarks, the Secretary-General highlighted the support provided by the United Nations to Africa to end the scourge of terrorism which, above all, included close collaboration with the African Union and regional and subregional African organizations.<sup>33</sup> He stated that the United Nations continued to tirelessly advocate for a new generation of robust peace enforcement missions and counter-terrorism operations, led by the African Union, with a Council mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter and with guaranteed, predictable funding, namely through assessed contributions, and urged Member States to support that vital work.

In his briefing, the President of Comoros and Chairperson of the African Union highlighted the efforts of the organization and the continent as a whole to address terrorism.<sup>34</sup> He urged the Council to redouble its efforts by strengthening United Nations-African Union collaboration in prevention through the use of platforms such as the United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism

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<sup>30</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 24 February ([S/2023/147](#)).

<sup>31</sup> See [S/PV.9296](#).

<sup>32</sup> For more information on the briefings, see part I, sect. 30.

<sup>33</sup> [S/PV.9296](#).

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*

and the African Union-United Nations Development Programme Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions. He also called for ensuring the mobilization of necessary funds for preventing and combating terrorism and ensuring predictable, flexible and sustained funding for African Union peace operations, as well as additional support for the implementation of the United Nations Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism and the African Union-United Nations Development Programme Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions. The Chairperson also noted the importance of establishing regional counter-terrorism centres to support national efforts.

In the discussion that followed, Council members and other delegations reiterated the importance of cooperation with regional organizations in countering terrorism. The President of Mozambique recalled that Chapter VIII of the Charter, including Articles 52 to 54, provided an appropriate framework for collaboration and the sharing of responsibilities among the United Nations and regional and subregional mechanisms in the area of international peacekeeping and security. He proposed strengthening cooperation among the Security Council, the African Union Peace and Security Council and regional blocs, prioritizing support for regional solutions arising from security pacts, as well as duly scrutinized bilateral mechanisms, and for more support to enhance the operational capacity of regional initiatives. The President of Ghana stressed that the Charter placed regional collaboration at the heart of the mandate of the United Nations and that such partnerships, outlined in Chapter VIII, had always been an important factor in preserving international peace and security and reinforcing shared aspirations for global peace and security. Recalling that Article 53 of the Charter allowed the Council to resort to regional arrangements for enforcement action under its security, the Secretary of State for Multilateral Political Affairs of the Ministry of External Relations of Brazil noted that this option favored the configuration of tailor-made solutions that reflected local realities and called for enhanced cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations to address the threat of terrorism in Africa. While recalling that Chapter VIII and many General Assembly and Council resolutions acknowledged that cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations had a fundamental role to play in the maintenance of international peace and security, the representative of Ecuador stated that such cooperation was even more important in countering the threat posed by

terrorism as its transnational nature made a coordinated and comprehensive response on the part of the international community imperative.

The President of the Swiss Confederation recalled that regional and subregional organizations were particularly important for understanding the dynamics on the ground and therefore encouraged closer cooperation with them, better coordinated initiatives and underlined the need to address the root causes of problems. Speaking on behalf of the President of her country, the Vice-President of Gabon stressed that the efforts of the international community had to be based on regional and subregional organizations which knew best the situation on the ground but could only be effective if they had adequate and predictable financial resources. Similarly, the President of Ghana stated that bolstering cooperation and collaboration between the United Nations and regional organizations should leverage existing strengths in order to enhance the development of a preventive approach, based on regional early-warning mechanisms.

Several speakers advocated for increased support in funding and capacity-building for regional initiatives to counter terrorism and violent extremism.<sup>35</sup> The President of Mozambique highlighted the success of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) mission in Mozambique, which was combined with the bilateral efforts of his country and Rwanda. He noted that such models were simple to monitor, allowed for easy communication and achieved success very quickly. The President of Ghana stated that defeating terrorist organizations and armed groups should be the Council's primary focus when addressing the security challenges facing Africa. He also called for reinforcing the capacity of regional organizations for early warning and conflict prevention. The representative of China emphasized the need for international support in terms of funding, equipment and intelligence to enhance the capacity of African countries to counter terrorism effectively. He also called on the Security Council to make full use of the annual consultation mechanism with the African Union Peace and Security Council to build synergies regarding counter-terrorism issues in Africa and that the Secretariat should pay great attention to the expectation of African countries to align peacekeeping operations with the needs of African countries. The representative of Ecuador opined

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid., (Mozambique, Gabon, Ghana, United Arab Emirates, China, Japan, France, Malta and Rwanda).

that the creation of regional and subregional strategies for combating terrorism should be promoted according to the model in Central Asia, which had adopted a joint plan on the implementation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

Several speakers underscored the need for counter-terrorism operations to ensure the protection of civilians and to respect the rule of law, international human rights and international humanitarian law.<sup>36</sup> The President of Ghana stated that partnerships with regional organizations should be based on mutual respect and should not attempt to impose preferred approaches on unique regional circumstances.

### Case 3

#### **Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security (League of Arab States)**

On 8 June, at the initiative of the United Arab Emirates, which held the presidency for the month,<sup>37</sup> the Council held its annual briefing on cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”.<sup>38</sup> The Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States and the Youth Envoy for the President of the twenty-seventh Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

In her statement, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs noted that, in his report dated 8 May 2023,<sup>39</sup> the Secretary-General recalled that cooperation with the League of Arab States, consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter, served to enhance collective security.<sup>40</sup> She highlighted multiple issues of common concern for the two organizations across the Arab region. With regard to cross-cutting issues, the Under-Secretary-General encouraged the member States of

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid., (Switzerland, United States, Brazil, United Kingdom, Albania and Malta).

<sup>37</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 5 June 2023 ([S/2023/407](#)).

<sup>38</sup> See [S/PV.9343](#).

<sup>39</sup> See [S/2023/331](#).

<sup>40</sup> [S/PV.9343](#).

the League to use the newly-developed Arab regional youth, peace and security strategy to guide the regional, subregional and national implementation of resolution [2250 \(2015\)](#) and other relevant aspects of the youth, peace and security agenda. She also noted that the United Nations continued to support, through its Liaison Office and in close cooperation with UN Women, the League's efforts to implement resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#), the Arab Women Mediators Network and the action plan for women and peace and security in the Arab region. She also recalled that the upcoming sixteenth United Nations – League of Arab States General Cooperation Meeting in 2024 to review their biennial framework, take stock of accomplishments and open new avenues for cooperation.

The Secretary-General of the League of Arab States stated that, while relations between the Council and Arab issues dated back to the inception of the United Nations, especially as regarding the Palestinian question, regrettably, in the past decade, numerous highly complex issues and dossiers from the region, found their way to the Council to be resolved.<sup>41</sup> He noted that to improve the standard of living of the Arab peoples and mitigate the effects of challenges on them they had to develop a strategic basis for cooperation, including sectorial cooperation, between both organizations. He further informed that, in continuation of the joint efforts between the League and the Council to support the participation of Arab women in the various stages of peace achievement, they had launched the Arab Women Peace Mediators Network, an initiative to support Arab women participation in peace efforts.

In the discussions following the briefings, Council members and the representative of Egypt, who spoke on behalf of the Group of Arab States, recognized the importance of cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States in accordance with Chapter VIII of the Charter. The representative of Mozambique expressed strong support for enhanced cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, anchored in Article 53 of the Charter. He stated that, in working together, the United Nations and the League of Arab States could give additional impetus to the existing local, national and international efforts to find peaceful and sustainable solutions to situations of instability in the Arab region. The representative of Gabon stressed that their partnership had to be based on complementarity and comparative advantages and, that

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid.

besides the advantage of having in-depth knowledge of their area, regional and subregional organizations could rapidly mobilize and deploy on the ground through their regional mechanisms. The representative of Brazil added that collaboration between the League and the United Nations on capacity-building should also bear in mind regional comparative advantages. The representative of Egypt stressed the need to unify the position of the Security Council on Arab issues, limiting the use of the veto and promoting Arab solutions to Arab problems.

In terms of areas of joint cooperation, the Minister of State of the United Arab Emirates and the representatives of Ecuador, France and Japan stated that the United Nations and the League of Arab States should strengthen their coordination in the area of counter-terrorism.<sup>42</sup> The representative of Japan considered poverty eradication and maritime security as other topics for potential cooperation. The representative of Albania noted the ever-growing demand for the United Nations and the League to respond to humanitarian challenges, natural disasters and the refugee crisis, while the representative of Mozambique commended their coordination in areas such as countering violent extremism, trafficking in small arms and light weapons and transnational organized crime. The representative of Malta held the view that cooperation between the two organizations on the promotion and protection of human rights was a requisite to build open and inclusive societies. The representative of Egypt advocated for enhanced institutional cooperation between the two organizations in all fields, in order to bolster preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding and peacekeeping mechanisms, promote the participation of women and youth and build the capacity of personnel in Member States and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States. He also highlighted the need to strengthen cooperation between the two organizations to effectively address the global economic crisis and its impact on Arab countries, as well as to provide humanitarian support to countries in need.

Several delegations argued that cooperation between the United Nations and the League of Arab States remained critical to addressing the effects of climate change on peace and security.<sup>43</sup> In that regard, the representative of France called on the member States of the League to join the United Nations Climate Security Mechanism. The representative of Ecuador encouraged enhanced coordination among

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., (United Arab Emirates, Japan, France and Ecuador).

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., (United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, Ghana, Albania and Malta).

the Working Group on Children in Armed Conflict, United Nations specialized agencies and the monitoring committee to stop violence against children in the member States of the League of Arab States. Most speakers emphasized the importance of joint efforts to ensure full participation of women in public life, peacebuilding and decision-making processes, as well as to foster youth capabilities across the Arab region.<sup>44</sup> Moreover, the representatives of Gabon, Ghana, Mozambique and the Russian Federation supported the strengthening of trilateral cooperation between the League of Arab States, the African Union and the United Nations.<sup>45</sup>

With regard to their modalities of cooperation, the Minister of State of the United Arab Emirates and the representative of Ghana called for strengthening the institutional relationship between the United Nations and the League of Arab States, including by enhancing the work of the United Nations Liaison Office to the League.<sup>46</sup> The representative of the Russian Federation noted that the Liaison Office should be effectively used and welcomed the holding of annual informal meetings of the Security Council with members of the Council of the League. In the same vein, the representative of Malta highlighted the key role that the Liaison Office played, as well as the importance of the Council's organization of informal interactive dialogues to develop closer coordination on regional issues of concern. The representative of Egypt suggested periodically following-up on the role of the Liaison Office to strengthen its role and provide it with the necessary support achieve the desired goals.

Multiple speakers underscored the need for special envoys and representatives of the Secretary-General to strengthen cooperation, communication and coordination with the League.<sup>47</sup> The representative of Gabon called for the establishment of consistent crisis management or resolution mechanisms, in which the tasks and responsibilities of the various players were clearly defined. The representative of Egypt called for intensified consultations between the two sides, whether at the level of the Secretaries-General or among the permanent representatives of the two

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid., (United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Switzerland, France, Ghana, Ecuador, Albania, Mozambique, Brazil, Malta and Egypt (on behalf of the Group of Arab States)).

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., (Ghana, Russian Federation, Mozambique and Gabon).

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., (United Arab Emirates and Ghana).

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., (United Arab Emirates, China, Russian Federation, Malta and Egypt (on behalf of the Group of Arab States)).

Councils, in addition to holding the annual regular meetings between the two organizations.

#### Case 4

### **Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security (African Union)**

On 12 October, the Council held a briefing under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” further to the annual report of the Secretary-General on strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa, including the work of the United Nations Office to the African Union.<sup>48</sup> The Council heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office to the African Union, the Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations and the Managing Director of Amani Africa.<sup>49</sup>

In his statement, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General recalled that the strategic United Nations-African Union partnership was based on the twin principles of complementarity and relative advantages, drawing on the strengths of each organization to more effectively achieve their shared goals of peace and stability in Africa.<sup>50</sup> He expressed encouragement with the convergence of perspectives and analysis by the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council on some of the key issues on their respective agendas, presenting an opportunity for even greater collaboration. He also commended the two Councils for endeavouring to hold monthly informal coordination meetings, which provided an opportunity to discuss priorities and programmes of work, promote synergies and share perspectives on issues of common interest, with a view to enhancing strategic coordination and complementarity.

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<sup>48</sup> See [S/PV.9435](#). See also [S/2023/629](#).

<sup>49</sup> For more information on the briefings, see part I, sect. 38.

<sup>50</sup> [S/PV.9435](#).

Speaking on behalf of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, the Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations welcomed the annual joint consultative meeting between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council, representing a platform for continued and strengthening cooperation between both Councils, and also called for strengthened collaboration in preventing conflicts, managing crises and state-building. Referring to innovations in peacemaking efforts, she suggested that, as they drew down, the logistical resources of United Nations peacekeeping operations could be made available to regional mechanisms to enhance regional efforts to take a more prominent lead in conflict management and resolution.

In his statement, the Managing Director of Amani Africa stated that deepening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union was a prerequisite for delivering on the peace and security and development objectives of the Charter. However, he pointed out that the state of their partnership was far from adequate for the African Union to effectively fill the critical gap in the global peace and security architecture. In that regard, he urged for the establishment of a systematic and institutionalized global arrangement to harness the full potential and role of the African Union, as the current mobilization of resources by the two organizations still largely reflected an ad hoc and case-by case basis approach. Moreover, he also stressed that the partnership should enhance its focus on the socioeconomic and development dimensions of the maintenance of international peace and security.

In the subsequent discussion, Council members welcomed the deepening relations between the United Nations and the African Union under Chapter VIII of the Charter, especially since the signing of the Joint Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security in 2017, as well as their cooperation on the implementation of the Silencing the Guns in Africa initiative, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the 2063 Agenda of the African Union. Council members also welcomed the holding of the seventeenth joint consultative meeting between the two Councils that had taken place the previous week, together with the adoption of a joint communiqué, reiterating the pivotal role played by both organs in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. The representative of Malta added that their joint endeavours in Addis Ababa further enhanced coordination between the two bodies, including on aspects relating to working methods.

The representative of Mozambique, also speaking on behalf of Gabon and Ghana, stated that each Member State of the United Nations and each region and organization were committed and duty-bound to fulfil the principle of maintenance of international peace and security, according to the spirit in which the letter of Article 53 was written. He expressed the belief that there was room for a quantitative and qualitative improvement in the relationship between both organizations. Similarly, the representative of the Russian Federation argued that the potential for cooperation between United Nations and the African Union had not yet been fully unlocked, noting the aspiration of her delegation that dialogue between the two Councils would be more substantive and animated, as well as to harmonize their agenda with issues plaguing Africa. The representative of the United Arab Emirates agreed that cooperation between both organizations should be strengthened. He further noted that it should encompass more regular engagements with high-level officials from the African Union Commission, as well as better information sharing between the Councils. In the same vein, the representative of Japan highlighted that more structured monthly coordination between the President of the Security Council and the Chair of the African Union Peace and Security Council could greatly contribute to facilitating further dialogue and cooperation between the two Councils.

The representative of Albania noted that cooperation between the United Nations and the African Union could play a pivotal role in preventing conflicts by supporting the capacities of States to detect and pre-empt them at the earliest signs. The representative of France stated that both organizations should deepen cooperation in the area of conflict prevention and encouraged the United Nations to strengthen its ties with the African Union to address the root causes of conflict. The representative of China argued that African Union and subregional peacekeeping operations had achieved widely acknowledged remarkable results. In that regard, he stated that the Council should continue to support the African Union in leveraging its advantages and enlarging its role and that United Nations peacekeeping operations should be informed by useful practices of the African Union and adapt to the changing situation on the ground, as required. He also reiterated that both organizations enjoyed an equal relationship of cooperation, without hierarchy in terms of leadership or command, and that so-called standards should not be imposed on Africa in the name of the United Nations to prevent interfering in Africa's internal affairs.

The representative of the Russian Federation welcomed what she described as the historic first visit of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa of the Security Council to Addis Ababa, from 3 to 4 October.<sup>51</sup> The representative of Ecuador noted the need to revitalize and continually improve the Working Group, as it served as a mechanism for regular exchanges between both Councils.<sup>52</sup> The representative of Japan agreed that the Working Group should be a platform to follow up on the common understanding of the two Councils articulated in the joint communiqué, including on working methods.<sup>53</sup> Finally, most Council members expressed their support for the adoption of a draft resolution on the sustainable financing of African Union-led peace support operations to maintain regional and continental peace and security, allowing greater ownership in peacekeeping efforts on the African continent.

## Case 5

### Maintenance of international peace and security

On 20 October, at the initiative of Brazil, which held the presidency for the month,<sup>54</sup> the Council held a high-level open debate under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” and sub-item entitled “Peace through dialogue: the contribution of regional, subregional and bilateral arrangements to the prevention and peaceful resolution of disputes”.<sup>55</sup> The Council was briefed by the Assistant Secretary-General for the Middle East, Asia and the Pacific in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, the former Presidents of Chile and South Africa, and the Director of the Peace Accords Matrix.<sup>56</sup>

In his introductory remarks, the Assistant Secretary-General emphasized the critical role of regional organizations and frameworks in maintaining global peace and security.<sup>57</sup> He noted that they could bring credibility and legitimacy for preventive

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<sup>51</sup> See also [S/2023/749](#). For more information on the Ad Hoc Working Group for Conflict Prevention in Africa, see part IX, sect. II.

<sup>52</sup> [S/PV.9435](#).

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 3 October 2023 ([S/2023/732](#)).

<sup>55</sup> See [S/PV.9448](#) and [S/PV.9448 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>56</sup> For more information on the briefings, see part I, sect. 37.

<sup>57</sup> [S/PV.9448](#).

diplomacy, helped increase trust and reduced misperceptions and enhanced mechanisms for crisis management. The Assistant Secretary-General further pointed out that strengthening, building or rebuilding regional frameworks and organizations was particularly important in regions where long-standing security architectures were collapsing, mired in stalemate or where they had never existed. He reiterated the importance of regional organizations and frameworks in promoting peace and security and emphasized the need for ongoing collaboration and partnership with the United Nations.

In her remarks, the former President of Chile noted that regional and subregional intergovernmental security mechanisms were fundamental and relevant but needed to be effective. She highlighted that Chapter VIII of the Charter contained provisions concerning regional arrangements and their role in maintaining peace and also pointed out the role of the United Nations in encouraging and promoting dialogue among its members to strengthen regional organizations and enable them to assist in maintaining international peace and security. The former President of Chile noted that, in his policy brief on the New Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General called for robust regional frameworks and organizations in the face of growing competition at the global level and increasingly transnational threats. In conclusion, she emphasized that regional frameworks and organizations should promote trust-building, transparency and *détente*, reiterating the importance of ongoing collaboration and partnership with the United Nations. The former President of South Africa emphasized that it was in the vital interests of the Council to ensure that its regional partners, such as the African Union, were strong enough to discharge their responsibilities as part of the global peace architecture. He also noted that it was important to reach an agreement for using United Nations resources to fund African Union-led peace operations, which would help elevate the practical importance of Chapter VIII of the Charter.

In their statements, Council members exchanged views on the importance of cooperation with regional and subregional organizations, as a tool provided under Chapter VIII of the Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security and particularly the peaceful settlement of disputes. The representative of China recalled that Chapter VIII encouraged the peaceful settlement of disputes through regional arrangements and that, over the years, various regional arrangements played

an active role in promoting the settlement of conflicts and disputes, maintaining international peace and stability. The representative of Gabon noted that, beyond the maintenance of peace and the use of force, the Charter offered a range of tools, enshrined in Chapters VI and VIII, the use of which should be explored in greater depth, especially in view of the rise in tensions in regions already weakened by recurring crises.<sup>58</sup> The representative of Ghana observed that while most preventive mechanisms remained largely effective, the gap between intentions and impact still required some bridging to reduce the number of instances in which disputes got out of control and became violent.<sup>59</sup> With reference to the various preventive and conflict resolution mechanisms in Africa, he added that additional resources in support of the effective functioning of such mechanisms could be useful to enable them to respond in a timely and effective manner on behalf of the international system, as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter. The representative of Denmark, also speaking on behalf of Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, encouraged more frequent use of Chapter VIII, including by deepening cooperation and information-sharing between the Council and regional organizations. The representative of Sierra Leone noted that the complexities and the current frequency of conflicts required actors at the regional, subregional and bilateral levels to take on a greatly enhanced role in the prevention of conflicts and conflict mediation, as provided for in Chapter VIII of the Charter.<sup>60</sup> The representative of Liechtenstein highlighted that the Charter demonstrated the mutually reinforcing nature of Chapters VI and VIII, emphasizing that Article 52 (3) requested the Council to encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements, and taking into account Article 52 (4), which was closely related to Chapter VI.<sup>61</sup>

Several speakers pointed to the comparative advantage of regional and subregional actors in conflict prevention and mediation, particularly given their knowledge of local dynamics and historical context.<sup>62</sup> The representative of Brazil

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<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12. For further information on the practice of the Council in connection with Chapter VI, see part VI.

<sup>59</sup> [S/PV.9448](#).

<sup>60</sup> [S/PV.9448 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.* For more information on the discussion at this meeting in connection with Chapter VI of the Charter, see part VI, sect. IV.

<sup>62</sup> [S/PV.9448](#), (United Arab Emirates, Malta, Russian Federation, Croatia (also on behalf of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect) and Republic of Korea); and [S/PV.9448 \(Resumption 1\)](#), (Ethiopia, Armenia, India and Algeria).

encouraged the Council to look to regional experiences in the peaceful settlement of disputes with a degree of humility and to actively learn from successful experiences elsewhere.<sup>63</sup> A number of delegations observed that regional and subregional organizations were well placed to promote confidence and trust-building.<sup>64</sup> The representative of the Russian Federation stated that regional organizations could serve as a bridge between national and international initiatives, ensuring more targeted and efficient conflict resolution.<sup>65</sup> The Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs expressed the view that regional and subregional organizations could play a pivotal role in ensuring that power politics do not hinder the pursuit of peace. The representative of Gabon stated that regional and subregional arrangements incorporated the specificities of each situation and grasped the real needs of stakeholders, especially women, young people and the most vulnerable communities, whose participation in the peace process was a crucial element.

Multiple delegations noted the importance of regional mechanisms in addressing the root causes of conflicts.<sup>66</sup> Some speakers specifically underlined that regional organizations were well positioned to understand and address conflict dynamics related to root causes of conflict such as poverty, inequality and political instability through long-term development initiatives.<sup>67</sup> The representative of Poland underscored the role of effective early warning systems, including those by regional organizations, in accurately identifying factors that could increase the risks of violence and atrocity crimes.<sup>68</sup>

Some delegations expressed the view that the work of the United Nations and regional organizations in this area should be complementary or mutually reinforcing.<sup>69</sup> Several speakers underscored the need for strong or enhanced coordination between United Nations and regional organizations in conflict

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<sup>63</sup> [S/PV.9448](#).

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, (Mozambique, China, Switzerland, Austria and Republic of Korea); and [S/PV.9448 \(Resumption 1\)](#), (Chile, Italy, Portugal, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Türkiye, Poland, Indonesia, Slovenia, Malaysia, Argentina, Bangladesh and Sierra Leone).

<sup>65</sup> [S/PV.9448](#).

<sup>66</sup> [S/PV.9448](#), (China and Republic of Korea); and [S/PV.9448 \(Resumption 1\)](#), (Armenia, Portugal, Kazakhstan, Poland, Qatar, Namibia, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka).

<sup>67</sup> [S/PV.9448](#), (Russian Federation, Croatia (also on behalf of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect) and Republic of Korea); and [S/PV.9448 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Poland, Argentina, Bangladesh, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka).

<sup>68</sup> [S/PV.9448 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>69</sup> [S/PV.9448](#), (Brazil, United Arab Emirates, Gabon, Japan, China, Ecuador, France and South Africa); [S/PV.9448 \(Resumption 1\)](#), (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Morocco, European Union, Poland, Liechtenstein, Indonesia, Argentina and Algeria).

prevention and mediation.<sup>70</sup> The Minister of State of the United Arab Emirates was of the view that the endorsement by the Council of initiatives and outcomes from mediation efforts at the regional and bilateral levels could go a long way towards peace.<sup>71</sup> The representative of France stated that complementarity was a condition for effectiveness and was in the spirit of Chapter VIII of the Charter. The representative of Morocco stressed that, to ensure the effectiveness of the efforts of the international community, regional and subregional mechanisms should in no way replace or collide with the efforts of the Council and had to obtain the prior agreement of the parties involved in the settlement process.<sup>72</sup> The representative of the United States stated that the Council had to be responsive to requests from regional organizations to help them address the conflicts they were working to resolve.<sup>73</sup>

Specifically regarding the working methods of the Council, the representatives of Ghana and Switzerland highlighted the importance of the Council's field visits and informal interactive dialogues with regional arrangements to strengthen coordination in conflict prevention.<sup>74</sup> The representative of the United Kingdom opined that the Security Council's annual dialogue with the African Union Peace and Security Council could be further deepened and extended, including through stronger linkages between early-warning mechanisms, better use of the wider United Nations and regional peacebuilding architectures and more coordinated support to nationally led prevention strategies. The representative of Egypt, while reaffirming that the Council should be able to benefit from regional initiatives and from important experiences of the countries concerned, stated that this depended on its ability to develop working mechanisms that allowed those countries to play a greater role in the Council's decision-making processes.

The representative of Switzerland stated that the Council had to ensure that regional arrangements were in line with universal norms, such as human rights. The representative of the Republic of Korea underscored that partnership with regional mechanisms had to always place people at the center so that diverse and unique voices from each and every corner of societies could enrich the path towards sustainable

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<sup>70</sup> [S/PV.9448](#), (United Arab Emirates, China and Egypt); and [S/PV.9448 \(Resumption 1\)](#), (Italy, Poland and Sierra Leone).

<sup>71</sup> [S/PV.9448](#).

<sup>72</sup> [S/PV.9448 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>73</sup> [S/PV.9448](#).

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, (Switzerland and Ghana).

peace and development. The representative of the Russian Federation stressed that the key to the success of regional organizations lied in their efforts to resolve emerging problems through political and diplomatic methods, in compliance with the norms of international law, on the basis of the principles of indivisibility of security, mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. Similarly, the representative of China stated that, in compliance with the Charter, regional mechanisms always had to abide by international law and the basic norms governing international relations, respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries and respect the will and choices of the people of the countries concerned. He added that any enforcement actions by regional organizations had to strictly comply with the authorization of the Council and that regional efforts had to be guided by openness and tolerance.

Multiple speakers noted the enhanced emphasis the New Agenda for Peace of the Secretary-General placed on the peaceful settlement of disputes and on the role of regional and subregional organizations in that regard.<sup>75</sup> For example, the representative of Spain underscored the comprehensive approach of the New Agenda for Peace, that incorporated recommendations for prevention strategies with cross-regional dimensions.<sup>76</sup> The representative of Egypt emphasized that by leveraging the resources and expertise of regional organizations, a more resilient and cooperative global security architecture could be built, supporting the emphasis of the New Agenda for Peace on preventive diplomacy and the role of regional mechanisms in conflict resolution.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> [S/PV.9448](#) (Albania, Malta, United States, Switzerland, France, Egypt, South Africa and Ukraine); and [S/PV.9448 \(Resumption 1\)](#) (Spain, Portugal, Malaysia, Qatar and Sierra Leone).

<sup>76</sup> [S/PV.9448 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

<sup>77</sup> [S/PV.9448](#).

## **II. Recognition of the efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes**

### **Note**

Section II deals with recognition by the Council of the efforts by regional and subregional organizations in the pacific settlement of local disputes, within the framework of Article 52 of the Charter. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes, and subsection B covers discussions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements.

### **A. Decisions concerning efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes**

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly refer to Article 52 of the Charter in any of its decisions. The Council, however, acknowledged and expressed support for the engagement of regional and subregional arrangements in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention, resolution and sustaining peace, as well as the implementation of peace agreements, political dialogue and transitions, reconciliation processes and addressing the root causes of conflict. The Council did so in relation to a variety of items on its agenda, as featured in more detail in table 1. The decisions are organized in alphabetical order by item.

**Table 1**  
**Decisions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements, 2023**

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Regional organizations mentioned</i>
The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution <a href="#">2693 (2023)</a> 27 July	Fourth preambular paragraph	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
	Resolution <a href="#">2709 (2023)</a> 15 November	Sixth and twelfth preambular paragraphs and para. 5	African Union, ECCAS, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	<a href="#">S/PRST/2023/3</a> 29 March	Sixth, seventh and eighth paragraphs	East African Community
	<a href="#">S/PRST/2023/5</a> 16 October	Tenth paragraph	African Union, East African Community, ECCAS, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, SADC
	Resolution <a href="#">2717 (2023)</a> 19 December	Paras. 10, 16 and 18	African Union, EAC, ECCAS, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, SADC
The question concerning Haiti	Resolution <a href="#">2692 (2023)</a> 14 July	Twentieth and twenty-first preambular paragraphs	CARICOM
	Resolution <a href="#">2699 (2023)</a> 2 October	Thirteen, fourteenth and fifteenth preambular paragraphs, para. 22	CARICOM
	Resolution <a href="#">2700 (2023)</a> 19 October	Fifteenth preambular paragraph	CARICOM
The situation in Libya	<a href="#">S/PRST/2023/2</a> 16 March	Fifth and ninth paragraphs	African Union, League of Arab States
	Resolution <a href="#">2702 (2023)</a> 30 October	para. 7	African Union, European Union, League of Arab States
The situation in Mali	Resolution <a href="#">2690 (2023)</a> 30 June	Fourth and sixth preambular paragraphs	African Union, ECOWAS
The situation in Somalia	Resolution <a href="#">2705 (2023)</a> 31 October	Twentieth preambular paragraph	African Union, IGAD
Reports of the Secretary-General on	Resolution <a href="#">2676 (2023)</a> 8 March	Eighth preambular paragraph	African Union, IGAD

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Regional organizations mentioned</i>
the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution <a href="#">2677 (2023)</a> 15 March	Eighth preambular paragraph and paras. 21, 22 and 24	African Union, IGAD
	Resolution <a href="#">2683 (2023)</a> 30 May	Fourth preambular paragraph	IGAD
	Resolution <a href="#">2715 (2023)</a> 1 December	Fifth preambular paragraph and para. 6	African Union, IGAD

*Abbreviations:* CARICOM, Caribbean Community; ECCAS, Economic Community of Central African States; ECOWAS, Economic Community of West African States; IGAD, Intergovernmental Authority on Development; SADC, Southern African Development Community.

## **B. Discussions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements**

During the period under review, Council members discussed the role of multiple regional and subregional organizations in the peaceful settlement of disputes. For example, in relation to the Central African region, Council members highlighted the support provided by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) for facilitating political transitions in the subregion, work on addressing climate-related risks to conflict, fostering regional security cooperation, preventing and combating hate speech and supporting enhancing inclusivity and the political participation of women in these processes.<sup>78</sup> In relation to the situation in the Central African Republic, Council discussions referred to the good offices and mediation efforts of the African Union, ECCAS and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to support the implementation of the 2019 Political Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation and the Luanda 2021 joint road map.<sup>79</sup>

Regarding the situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Great Lakes region, Council members discussed the work of the regional and subregional organizations, including the African Union, the East African Community, ECCAS, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), to prevent conflict in support of the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the

<sup>78</sup> For more information, see part I, sect. 6.

<sup>79</sup> For more information, see part I, sect. 5.

Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region.<sup>80</sup> They also discussed the regional mediation efforts, notably the involvement of the East African Community, ECCAS, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), under the auspices of the African Union, to achieve a cessation of hostilities and disarmament of armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo through the Nairobi and Luanda processes.

In relation to Haiti, Council members noted the support of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), particularly through its Eminent Persons Group, for a Haitian-led and Haitian-owned political dialogue to find a solution to the political and security crisis in the country.<sup>81</sup> Council members further highlighted the European Union-facilitated dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, including the signing and implementation of the Brussels and Ohrid agreements between the two sides.<sup>82</sup>

Regarding the situation in Libya, Council members discussed the role of the African Union and the League of Arab States in supporting the national reconciliation process in the country.<sup>83</sup> In relation to the Sudan, following the outbreak of conflict between the Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces across the country, Council members discussed and expressed support for the mediation of international and regional stakeholders, including the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the League of Arab States.<sup>84</sup> They also continued to express support for the work of the African Union, IGAD and the revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission on the implementation of the key benchmarks 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan in preparation for elections scheduled to take place in December 2024.

In connection with peace and security in Africa, Council members discussed regional cooperation on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea and the role of regional arrangements and organizations in that context, including ECCAS, ECOWAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> For more information, see part I, sects. 3 and 4.

<sup>81</sup> For more information, see part I, sect. 12.

<sup>82</sup> For more information, see part I, sect. 19. B.

<sup>83</sup> For more information, see part I, sect. 10.

<sup>84</sup> For more information, see part I, sect. 7.

<sup>85</sup> For more information, see part I, sect. 9.

Regarding West Africa and the Sahel, Council discussions referred to the engagement of ECOWAS in the context of the political crises and transitions in the region, including in Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea.<sup>86</sup> Specifically, regarding Mali, Council members exchanged views on the implementation of the political transition in accordance with the timetable agreed between the transitional authorities and ECOWAS.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> For more information, see part I, sect. 8.  
<sup>87</sup> For more information, see part I, sect. 11.

### **III. Peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements**

#### **Note**

Section III contains a description of the practice of the Security Council in connection with the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations pursuant to Chapter VIII of the Charter in the area of peacekeeping. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements, and subsection B covers discussions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements.

#### **A. Decisions concerning peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements**

Subsection A covers decisions concerning peacekeeping operations and security forces led by regional arrangements and is organized into two separate subheadings covering peacekeeping operations and security forces led by regional arrangements authorized by the Council and other peacekeeping operations and security forces.

##### **(i) Peacekeeping operations and security forces led by regional arrangements authorized by the Security Council**

In 2023, the Council renewed the authorization of the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR-Althea)<sup>88</sup> and the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS).<sup>89</sup> The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led Kosovo Force, established by resolution [1244 \(1999\)](#), continued to operate and no decisions were taken with respect to its mandate.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Resolution [2706 \(2023\)](#), para. 1. In addition to the authorization of EUFOR-Althea, the Council renewed its authorization provided by paragraph 11 of resolution [2183 \(2014\)](#) to maintain a presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the form of a NATO Headquarters (see resolution [2706 \(2023\)](#), para. 2).

<sup>89</sup> Resolutions [2687 \(2023\)](#), paras. 17-19 and [2710 \(2023\)](#), paras. 1-3.

<sup>90</sup> For more information on the international security presence in Kosovo, see *Repertoire, Supplement 1996-1999*, chapter VIII, sect. F.

## **1. Peacekeeping operations led by regional arrangements authorized by the Security Council**

### **African Union Transition Mission in Somalia**

In 2023, the Council adopted resolutions [2687 \(2023\)](#) of 27 June, [2710 \(2023\)](#) of 15 November, and [2713 \(2023\)](#) of 1 December addressing the mandate of ATMIS.

In resolution [2687 \(2023\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council recalled paragraph 22 of resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#) and paragraph 1 of resolution [2670 \(2022\)](#) regarding the mandate of ATMIS, and extended its authorizations for the deployment of the Mission for six months, until 31 December 2023.<sup>91</sup> The Council recalled the strategic objectives and tasks of ATMIS and requested it to prioritize: (a) maintaining enabling support for peace and security in Somalia, including for the political processes at all levels, including stabilisation efforts, reconciliation and peacebuilding, to ensure a sustainable transition; (b) supporting the Federal Government of Somalia-led operations against Al-Shabaab, including by securing vital routes between secured areas across the country; and (c) preparing for its smooth drawdown and exit from Somalia as planned.<sup>92</sup>

By the same resolution, the Council reduced the number of authorized ATMIS uniformed personnel from 19,262 to 17,626 until 30 September 2023, and to 14,626 personnel from 1 October 2023 to 31 December 2023.<sup>93</sup> The Council requested the African Union to implement the Phase 2 drawdown to 14,626 personnel jointly with the Government of Somalia as informed by the findings of the joint technical assessment requested in paragraph 40 of the resolution, and ensuring that the drawdown was strategic, reflecting the Government's overarching security transition objectives and the security situation in each ATMIS sector, and had taken into

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<sup>91</sup> [Resolution 2687 \(2023\)](#), para. 17. In resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#), the Council authorized authorized the member States of the African Union to take all necessary measures to: (i) carry out its mandate to reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab; (ii) support the capacity-building of the integrated Somali security and police forces; (iii) conduct a phased handover of security responsibilities to Somalia; and (iv) support peace and reconciliation efforts in Somalia, in line with the Somalia Transition Plan and National Security Architecture, in support of the development of a stable, federal, sovereign and united Somalia.

<sup>92</sup> Resolution [2687 \(2023\)](#), para. 18 (a) - (c).

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 19.

account measures for ATMIS force protection, and the need to maintain the hard-won gains across its area of operations.<sup>94</sup>

The Council requested the Government of Somalia and the African Union, in consultation with the United Nations and international partners, to conduct a joint technical assessment by 31 August 2023 to evaluate Phase 1 drawdown and identify lessons, as well as the implications of the revised National Security Architecture and force generation, to inform planning for the remaining phases of ATMIS drawdown and further requested an update by 15 September 2023 from the African Union and the Government of Somalia on their preparations for Phase 2 drawdown, taking into account the lessons identified from Phase 1, and setting out a clear plan and timescale for Phase 2 drawdown.<sup>95</sup> The Council also requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide a logistical support package and, in consultation with the African Union and the Government of Somalia, to update the logistical support plan as appropriate, in full compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Plan, through the United Nations Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS) for ATMIS uniformed personnel and up to 85 ATMIS civilians.<sup>96</sup> The Council further underlined the need to enhance the predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing for the African Union-led support peace operations authorized by the Council under its authority consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter, and encouraged the Secretary-General, the African Union and Member States to continue efforts to explore in earnest funding arrangements for ATMIS, bearing in mind the full range of options available to the United Nations, African Union, European Union and other partners, and considering the limitations of voluntary funding, in order to establish secure future funding arrangements for ATMIS.<sup>97</sup>

By resolution [2710 \(2023\)](#), the Council acknowledged the effective completion of Phase 1 drawdown of 2,000 ATMIS personnel and noted the requests from the Government of Somalia and the African Union Peace and Security Council to extend Phase 2 of the drawdown and to delay the drawdown of 3,000 personnel until 31 December 2023.<sup>98</sup> Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council further extended its authorisations of ATMIS under resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#) until 30

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<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 21.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 40 and 41.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 24.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 35.

<sup>98</sup> Resolution [2710 \(2023\)](#), seventh, eighth and ninth preambular paragraphs.

June 2024.<sup>99</sup> The Council further amended the schedule of the drawdown as provided by resolution [2687 \(2023\)](#) and authorized the member States of the African Union to deploy up to 17,626 uniformed personnel, including of 1,040 police personnel, to ATMIS until 31 December 2023 and to complete the Phase 2 drawdown of 3,000 ATMIS personnel by that date.<sup>100</sup> Furthermore, the Council authorized the deployment of 14,626 uniformed personnel, inclusive of 1,040 police personnel, from 1 January to 30 June 2024, and to complete the Phase 3 drawdown of 4,000 ATMIS personnel by that date.<sup>101</sup>

The Council requested the Government of Somalia and the African Union, in consultation with the United Nations, the European Union and international partners, to conduct a joint technical assessment by 31 March 2024 to evaluate Phase 2 drawdown and identify lessons to inform planning for the remaining phases of ATMIS drawdown.<sup>102</sup> It further requested an update by 30 April 2024 from the African Union and the Government of Somalia on their preparations for Phase 3 drawdown of 4,000 troops by 30 June 2024, taking into account the lessons identified from Phases 1 and 2, and setting out a clear plan and timescale for Phase 3 drawdown.<sup>103</sup> While again authorizing the support of UNSOS to support ATMIS uniformed and civilian personnel, the Council expressed its intention to commission a strategic review of UNSOS, after the completion of the joint technical assessment of Phase 2.<sup>104</sup> Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to keep the Council regularly informed on the implementation of the resolution and decided to review it no later than 30 June 2024.<sup>105</sup>

In resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council reiterated its request to the Government of Somalia, Federal Member States, ATMIS and other partners to share information with the Panel of Experts on Somalia regarding the conduct of activities, in particular on illicit flows of finances, weapons, ammunition and military equipment by Al-Shabaab and other actors intent on undermining peace and security in Somalia and the region.<sup>106</sup> The Council further

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<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 1.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 2.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 3.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 11.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 12.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 6 and 13.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, paras. 14 and 15.

<sup>106</sup> Resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#), para. 27 (a) - (c).

reiterated its request for ATMIS to support and assist Somalia in implementing the charcoal ban and facilitate regular access for the Panel to charcoal exporting ports.<sup>107</sup>

### **Operation Althea of the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

By resolution [2706 \(2023\)](#) of 2 November, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council renewed its authorization of EUFOR-Althea for a period of 12 months.<sup>108</sup> The Council reiterated its authorization to Member States to take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with annexes 1-A and 2 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and stressed that the parties would be held equally responsible for compliance with those annexes and would be subject to such enforcement action by EUFOR-Althea and the NATO presence as might be necessary.<sup>109</sup> The Council also authorized Member States to take all necessary measures, at the request of either EUFOR-Althea or NATO Headquarters, in defence of EUFOR-Althea or the NATO presence, respectively, and to assist both organizations in carrying out their missions. In addition, the Council recognized the right of EUFOR-Althea and the NATO presence to take all necessary measures to defend themselves from attack or threat of attack.<sup>110</sup>

## **2. Other peacekeeping operations and security forces led by regional arrangements**

### **East African Community Regional Force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo**

In a presidential statement adopted on 29 March, the Council acknowledged the deployment of the East African Community-regional force to the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and recognized the efforts of its troop-contributing countries.<sup>111</sup> The Council encouraged support to the regional force, as appropriate, to

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid., para. 15.

<sup>108</sup> Resolution [2706 \(2023\)](#), para. 1. For information on the establishment of EUFOR-Althea, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2004-2007*, chap. XII, part III. C.

<sup>109</sup> Resolution [2706 \(2023\)](#), para. 3.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid., para. 4. For further information on the authorization of the use of force in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, see part VII, sect. IV.

<sup>111</sup> [S/PRST/2023/3](#), seventh paragraph.

promote regional peace and security and called for complementary efforts to ensure that these initiatives were mutually reinforcing, including with support from the Secretary-General, MONUSCO and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region.<sup>112</sup>

In resolution [2717 \(2023\)](#) of 15 December, by which it extended the mandate of MONUSCO, the Council encouraged support to regional forces, as appropriate, and expressed its intention to consider, upon clear and detailed request from the host country and the organization concerned, the conditions under which limited logistical and operational support may be provided by MONUSCO to an African Union mandated regional force deployed within the area of MONUSCO's deployment, in furtherance of MONUSCO's mandate.<sup>113</sup> The Council further recalled that any such support should be in strict compliance with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy and called upon Member States contributing to regional forces to ensure the highest standards of transparency, conduct and discipline for their contingents, and for regional forces to implement a robust compliance framework, in accordance with the African Union Compliance Framework, and further requested relevant United Nations entities, consistent with their respective mandates, to support its implementation.<sup>114</sup>

### **European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic**

By resolution [2709 \(2023\)](#) of 15 November, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council maintained the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) to provide strategic and technical advice to the authorities of the Central African Republic to implement the National Strategy on Security Sector Reform and the National Defence Plan, in close coordination with, inter alia, the European Union Training Mission in the Central African Republic (EUTM-RCA), the European Union Advisory Mission in the Central African Republic (EUAM-RCA), the African Union

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> Resolution [2717 \(2023\)](#), para. 20. For more information on the mandate of MONUSCO, see part X, sect. I.

<sup>114</sup> Resolution [2717 \(2023\)](#), paras. 20 and 21.

Observer Mission in the Central African Republic and other international partners.<sup>115</sup> The Council also decided that the mandate of MINUSCA included taking a leading role in supporting the Central African Republic authorities in enhancing the capacities of the Internal Security Forces, particularly its command and control structures and oversight mechanisms, and to coordinate the provision of technical assistance and training between the international partners in the Central African Republic, in particular with EUTM-RCA and EUAM-RCA, in order to ensure a clear distribution of tasks in the field of security sector reform.<sup>116</sup>

## **B. Discussion concerning peacekeeping operations and security forces led by regional arrangements**

During the period under review, the Council discussed the role of peacekeeping operations and security forces led by regional arrangements such as EUFOR-Althea,<sup>117</sup> ATMIS,<sup>118</sup> the East African Community regional force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,<sup>119</sup> the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel<sup>120</sup> and the NATO-led Kosovo Force.<sup>121</sup> Discussions of relevance for the interpretation of Chapter VII of the Charter in the context of the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the area of peacekeeping were held under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”, at a meeting focused on the restructuring of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and its counter-terrorism efforts (see case 6). Under the items entitled “Peace and security in Africa” (see case 7) and “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” (see case 8), the Council discussed the financing of African Union peace support operations authorized by the Council through the use of United Nations assessed contributions.

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<sup>115</sup> Resolution [2709 \(2023\)](#), para. 37 (c) (i). For more information on the mandate of MINUSCA, see part X, sect. I.

<sup>116</sup> Resolution [2709 \(2023\)](#), para. 37 (c) (iii).

<sup>117</sup> See [S/PV.9268](#), [S/PV.9319](#) and [S/PV.9466](#).

<sup>118</sup> See [S/PV.9267](#), [S/PV.9268](#), [S/PV.9356](#), [S/PV.9359](#) and [S/PV.9446](#).

<sup>119</sup> See [S/PV.9298](#), [S/PV.9358](#), [S/PV.9427](#), [S/PV.9440](#) and [S/PV.9500](#).

<sup>120</sup> See [S/PV.9296](#), [S/PV.9322](#), [S/PV.9365](#), and [S/PV.9384](#).

<sup>121</sup> See [S/PV.9312](#) and [S/PV.9450](#).

## **Case 6**

### **Peace and security in Africa**

At a meeting held on 16 May under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”, the Council discussed the mandate and operations of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and its cooperation with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) further to the report of the Secretary-General.<sup>122</sup> The Council was briefed by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, the Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel, and the Coordinator of the Climate Action Network for West and Central Africa, a civil society organization.<sup>123</sup>

The Assistant Secretary-General opened her briefing providing an overview of what she described as a worrisome security situation in the Sahel.<sup>124</sup> She noted that terrorists and violent extremist groups frequently targeted border areas, in particular the tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, and that this security crisis was exacerbating an already dire humanitarian situation in the region. She reported that, notwithstanding the steady progress made in its operationalization, the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel was being restructured in response to strategic and operational shifts in the Sahel, which included the reconfiguration of the European and French forces, the withdrawal of Mali from the Group, and the intensification of threats in the border area. She further noted that the reconfiguration had resulted in the cessation of major military operations by the Joint Force since January. Furthermore, with regard to external support, she noted that the tripartite agreement between the European Union, the Group of Five for the Sahel and the United Nations was expected to end in June, which would also entail the cessation of the logistical and operational support provided to the Force by MINUSMA. Nevertheless, the Assistant Secretary-General expressed the view that the end of the tripartite agreement presented an opportunity to reflect on how the international community should renew its approaches to supporting regional security mechanisms, including as

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<sup>122</sup> See [S/PV.9322](#). See also [S/2023/328](#).

<sup>123</sup> For more information on the briefings, see part I, sect. 9.

<sup>124</sup> [S/PV.9322](#).

part of the deliberations on the financing of African Union peace support operations mandated by the Council. While noting the importance of the human rights compliance framework established within the Joint Force, the Assistant Secretary-General stated that the Group of Five for Sahel countries had to ensure that their military strategies to counter terrorism and violent extremism were fully anchored in the respect for human rights and placed the protection of civilians at their core.

The Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel noted in his briefing that since its establishment in 2017, the Joint Force had been unable to be truly operational because of a lack of sustainable funding and of aircraft and intelligence equipment.<sup>125</sup> He recalled that, at their sixth extraordinary summit, held on 20 February, the Heads of State of the Group of Five for the Sahel reaffirmed their readiness to preserve and strengthen the Group of Five for the Sahel and expressed their willingness to support the new configuration of the Joint Force through the implementation of the *État-major de Coordination de la Force Conjointe du G-5 Sahel*, with Niamey as its headquarters. He also informed that the new concept of operations would be submitted to the African Union Peace and Security Council for endorsement, before being transmitted to the Security Council. He underlined, however, that in order to be as effective as possible, the Joint Force needed sustainable funding and equipment.

Following the briefings, multiple Council members underscored the continued relevance of the Joint Force and welcomed its reconfiguration, as well as the efforts to revitalize the Group of Five for the Sahel.<sup>126</sup> The representative of Ecuador expressed appreciation for the progress in reforming the structure of the Joint Force and revitalizing its security architecture and hope that these efforts would result in greater effectiveness in its operations. The representative of Brazil highlighted that the reform of the Joint Force had brought about the cessation of military operations, which he noted was one more instance of how political factors could hamper efforts to combat violence and terrorism. The representative of China stated that, in response to the needs of regional counter-terrorism operations in terms of equipment, logistics and funding, the European Union and other major donors should maintain their level of

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid., (France, United States, China, Ecuador, Albania, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique) and United Arab Emirates).

assistance, while the United Nations and the Council should actively explore new ways to provide support.

Regarding international and regional support, the representative of Ghana, also speaking on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique, called for coordinated action to provide the Joint Force with the support it required to operate effectively and to address the humanitarian crisis in the region. Noting that terrorism and violent extremism had reached unprecedented levels, risking spillover to coastal States and threatening regional stability, the representative of Albania underscored the vital need for sustained counter-terrorism initiatives, operations and security cooperation. The representative of China underscored the importance of supporting regional efforts to combat terrorism and maintain stability, calling for more targeted international assistance. Similarly, the representative of Brazil underscored the importance of regionally based responses to address violence and terrorism, in particular the creation of the Joint Military Staff Committee of the Sahel Region, the establishment of the Multinational Joint Task Force of the Accra Initiative, and the standby force of ECOWAS. The representative of the United Kingdom also agreed that regionally led solutions were the most effective way to create lasting peace and stability, citing the Accra Initiative as a promising example.

Several speakers addressed the need for regional counter-terrorism operations to comply with international human rights and international humanitarian law. The representative of the United Kingdom welcomed the reaffirmed commitment of the Group of Five for the Sahel to the compliance framework under its new structures and its ongoing work with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Moreover, the United Kingdom continued to urge further progress towards the implementation of human rights due diligence mitigation measures. Similarly, the representative of the United States urged Sahelian states to enhance governance, strengthen democratic institutions, improve access to services and justice, and respect human rights and the rule of law in its approaches, citing the State-led military operations in Mali and Burkina Faso that led to large-scale civilian casualties and reports of human rights violations. In contrast, the representative of China underscored that counter-terrorism operations were fundamentally about safeguarding human security and that human rights should not be used to interfere with such operations, much less coupled with the provision of support.

Several Council members highlighted the importance of addressing the root causes of instability in the Sahel, such as poverty, governance deficits and climate change.<sup>127</sup> While noting respect for the need for Sahelian States to address terrorism and other violence within their borders, the representative of the United States urged them to recognize the limitations of militarized approaches and to redouble efforts to address the structural drivers of instability. The representative of Ecuador stressed the need to address the root causes of conflict to complement security responses, as well as to strengthen State presence across all territories and throughout the region. In that context, he welcomed the written advice of the Peacebuilding Commission, while underscoring the role of the G-5 Sahel Joint Force in combating groups operating across porous borders. The representative of France emphasized the need for a sustainable, collective, and substantial response to terrorism, including strengthening national armed forces and enhancing regional cooperation through mechanisms such as the Accra Initiative and the Multinational Joint Task Force. Several Council members welcomed the joint strategic assessment of security and development in the Sahel undertaken by the United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS and the Group of Five for the Sahel.<sup>128</sup> The representative of China expressed the view that the assessment should focus on the challenges faced by countries in the region regarding logistics, funding, and capacity-building, and put forward realistic solutions.

## Case 7

### Peace and Security in Africa

On 25 May, the Council held a meeting under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa” to discuss the report of the Secretary-General on implementation of resolutions [2320 \(2016\)](#) and [2378 \(2017\)](#) and considerations related to the financing of African Union peace support operations mandated by the Security Council.<sup>129</sup> The Council heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs,

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<sup>127</sup> Ibid., (Albania, Brazil, China, Ecuador, Switzerland and United Arab Emirates).

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., (France, United States and China).

<sup>129</sup> See [S/PV.9329](#) and [S/2023/303](#).

Peace and Security, and the Program Director of the non-governmental organization Amani Africa.

In her remarks, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs presented the report of the Secretary-General, including his recommendations on securing predictable, sustainable and flexible resources for African Union-led peace support operations.<sup>130</sup> In that regard, she noted that the African Union had made significant progress to fulfil the commitments set out in resolutions [2320 \(2016\)](#) and [2378 \(2017\)](#), including working to address the financial challenges of its operations by committing to increase its own financial contributions by revitalizing the African Union Peace Fund. The African Union also moved to develop and operationalize a compliance framework to meet international human rights and humanitarian law obligations, as well as conduct and discipline standards. While noting that the report of the Secretary-General presented the joint mission model and the support packages delivered by the United Nations as the two most practical operations for ensuring the funding that African Union-led operations needed, the Under-Secretary-General stated that the case for adequately financing those operations was beyond solid and expressed hope that the Council would agree to provide its backing, including by allowing access to United Nations assessed contributions.

The African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security underscored the need for a paradigm shift from traditional peacekeeping to peace enforcement due to the complex nature and scope of conflicts in Africa.<sup>131</sup> While also highlighting the efforts made by the African Union to ensure African ownership and mainstreaming and implementing compliance frameworks, he called for innovative and concrete actions to ensure predictable and sustainable funding for African Union-led peace support operations, adding that they would serve as a global good for the benefit of the preservation of peace and security worldwide. In her remarks, the Program Director of Amani Africa emphasized that conflicts in various parts of Africa required the use of a combination of peace enforcement, stabilization and peacebuilding instruments and that African Union peace support operations financed through United Nations assessed contributions could be the necessary alternative to United Nations peacekeeping.<sup>132</sup> She added that the use of assessed contributions

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<sup>130</sup> See [S/PV.9329](#).

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*

offered the best framework for the role of the African Union in the maintenance of international peace and security to be one that met the expectations of the Charter.

Following the briefings, many Council members welcomed the recommendations of the Secretary-General and expressed support for the use of United Nations assessed contributions for African Union-led peace operations.<sup>133</sup> A number of delegations also underscored the need for adequate burden-sharing between the United Nations and the African Union, with some of them welcoming the African Union consensus paper on predictable, adequate and sustainable financing for African Union peace and security activities and the revitalization of the Peace Fund.<sup>134</sup> The representative of the United Kingdom emphasized the need for practical steps to address funding gaps and capability shortfalls, calling for early Council involvement in determining the scope of joint United Nations-African Union assessments and planning, effective implementation of compliance frameworks, and clear financial burden-sharing arrangements. Some members also underscored the importance of budgetary oversight of the use of United Nations assessed contributions in this context.<sup>135</sup> More generally, the Vice-President of the Swiss Confederation called for clearly delineating the roles and responsibilities of each organization. Some delegations underscored the importance of comprehensive approaches to addressing the root causes of conflicts in Africa based on the primacy of politics and investing in conflict prevention.<sup>136</sup> Several Council members also acknowledged the progress made by the African Union in strengthening its human rights and international humanitarian law compliance frameworks.<sup>137</sup>

The representative of China emphasized that African Union peace support operations should be fully African-led and African-owned and that this was a question of resolving funding issues, not turning African Union forces into United Nations peacekeeping forces, and that once political decisions were made, procedural formalities should be minimized. Furthermore, while noting that human rights protection was part of the mandates of those operations, the representative of China

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<sup>133</sup> Ibid., (Switzerland, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), Japan, France, United Kingdom, United States and United Arab Emirate).

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., (Switzerland, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), Japan, United Kingdom, United States, Malta and United Arab Emirates).

<sup>135</sup> Ibid., (Switzerland, Brazil, Japan and United States).

<sup>136</sup> Ibid., (Brazil and Japan).

<sup>137</sup> Ibid., (Ecuador, France, Ghana (also speaking on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), Japan, Malta, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States).

stressed that human rights accountability provisions should not be used to indefinitely delay the discussion of funding options and defer decisions thereon. Also speaking on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique, the representative of Ghana noted that, having received a mandate from the African Union Peace and Security Council to resume consultations towards the adoption of a framework resolution on the financing of African Union-led peace support operations, the African members of the Security Council would seek to bridge the gap in understanding what existed between African Union ambitions and the expectations of other members of the Security Council.

### Case 8

#### **Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security (Financing of African Union-led Peace Support Operations)**

At a meeting held on 21 December under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2719 \(2023\)](#) by which it agreed to consider, on a case-by-case basis, requests from the African Union Peace and Security Council seeking authorisation from the Security Council for African Union-led peace support operations under Chapters VII and VIII of the Charter to have access to United Nations assessed contributions.<sup>138</sup> Prior to the adoption of the resolution, the Council adopted an oral amendment proposed by the United States which provided that African Union-led peace support operations that were authorized by the Council would have access to funding from the United Nations assessed contributions not exceeding 75 per cent of their annual budgets.<sup>139</sup>

In the subsequent discussion, the representative of Gabon stated that, with the adoption of resolution [2719 \(2023\)](#), Africa would finally be able to legitimately harbour the same aspirations for security and dignity, which implied an equitable role in dealing with threats to peace in a manner commensurate with the provisions of the

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<sup>138</sup> See [S/PV.9518](#).

<sup>139</sup> Resolution [2719 \(2023\)](#), para. 6. The oral amendment was adopted with nine votes in favour, no votes against and six abstentions. *For*: Albania, Brazil, Ecuador, Japan, Malta, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: none; *abstaining*: China, France, Gabon, Ghana, Mozambique, Russian Federation. For more information, see part II, sect. VIII.

United Nations, in particular the assessed contributions of its regular budget.<sup>140</sup> While underscoring the need to give appropriate responses to the growing and evolving security challenges in Africa, the representative of Mozambique noted that the three co-penholders of the resolution, namely, Gabon, Ghana and Mozambique, embarked on that action with the conviction that enforcement action taken by the African Union would be undertaken on behalf of the Council, whose primary responsibility, as the Charter prescribed, was the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>141</sup>

The representative of the United States highlighted a few key elements of resolution [2719 \(2023\)](#). He mentioned that the resolution (i) underscored the primacy of politics and the need for a coherent political strategy to guide operations; (ii) noted that any support to African Union peace support operations had to be in full compliance with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy; (iii) emphasized that those operations had to include appropriate safeguards for the protection of civilians; (iv) outlined that any peace support operation receiving United Nations assessed contributions would be authorized by and, ultimately accountable to, the Council, for the implementation of its mandate, and to the General Assembly, for the appropriate and reasonable use of funds; and (v) specified a burden-sharing agreement, namely, that United Nations contributions to African Union peace support operations would be no more than 75 per cent of the cost of the operation's annual budget.<sup>142</sup> While welcoming the fact that the resolution provided timely clarification on the type of operations that would be deployed and a clear and reasonable decision-making mechanism, the representative of France opined that his delegation would have liked the text to be more precise about the share of funding that would be assumed by the African Union and its member States. Noting that discussions on a case-by-case basis would most likely take place in emergency situations, the representative of France added that a unanimous agreement on more precise cost-sharing terms would have spared Council members from further discussions, which would undoubtedly be sensitive when the time came. The representative of the United Kingdom recognized that more work would be needed to ensure that any future African Union-led operation could access the sustainable and predictable financing it needed, and that the Council had to be fully involved and consulted from the outset in

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<sup>140</sup> [S/PV.9518](#).

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*

the development of any peace operation. She added that this would help the Council work hand in hand with the African Union Peace and Security Council to design accountable, effective and efficient missions of the future.

The representative of Malta stressed that the responsibility of funding of missions should not rest with one country or one regional group alone and that contributions had to come from all actors, as stated in the resolution. The representative of Brazil noted that in a challenging moment for the multilateral system, especially regarding peacekeeping operations, the resolution offered an innovative approach that could inspire the search for more solutions to the many international security crises.

## **IV. Authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements**

### **Note**

Section IV concerns the practice of the Council in utilizing regional and subregional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority, as provided for in Article 53 of the Charter. The present section is focused on the authorization of enforcement action by regional and other organizations, with the exception of authorizations to use force for regional peacekeeping operations, which are covered in section III above.<sup>143</sup> Cooperation with regional arrangements in the implementation of measures adopted by the Council under Chapter VII not involving the use of force is also covered in the present section.<sup>144</sup> The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements, and subsection B covers discussions concerning the authorization of enforcement action and the implementation of other Chapter VII measures by regional arrangements.

### **A. Decisions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements**

In 2023, the Council made one explicit reference to Article 53 of the Charter in its decisions. In resolution [2719 \(2023\)](#), adopted under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Council recalled Chapter VIII of the Charter and its competence under Article 53 (1) to, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter.<sup>145</sup> The Council also authorized the use of force by regional arrangements beyond the context of regional peacekeeping operations.

Concerning the situation in Libya, in resolution [2684 \(2023\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the authorizations as set out in

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<sup>143</sup> For more information on measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in accordance with Article 42 of the Charter, see part VII, sect. IV.

<sup>144</sup> For more information on measures to maintain or restore international peace and security in accordance with Article 41 of the Charter, see part VII, sect. III.

<sup>145</sup> Resolution [2719 \(2023\)](#), second preambular paragraph.

resolution [2635 \(2022\)](#) for Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, to inspect vessels they had reasonable grounds to believe were carrying arms or related materiel to or from Libya in order to ensure implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya, and to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections.<sup>146</sup> By resolution [2698 \(2023\)](#), acting under Chapter VII, the Council renewed the authorizations to Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, set out in paragraphs 7 to 10 of resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#), to inspect on the high seas off the coast of Libya vessels believed to be used for migrant smuggling and human trafficking from Libya, seize those that were confirmed as being used for those purposes, and authorized Member States to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances in confronting migrant smugglers or human traffickers in carrying out the aforementioned activities.<sup>147</sup>

Also acting under Chapter VII, the Council adopted several decisions not involving the use of force, such as requesting the support of regional and subregional organizations in the implementation of sanctions measures or calling for their cooperation with sanctions committees and panels of experts, particularly those concerning the Central African Republic, Haiti and South Sudan, as outlined in table 2.

**Table 2**

**Decisions by which the Council requested the cooperation of regional arrangements in the implementation of enforcement action, 2023**

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>
The situation in the Central African Republic	Resolution <a href="#">2693 (2023)</a> 27 July	para. 10
The question concerning Haiti	Resolution <a href="#">2700 (2023)</a> 19 October	para. 22
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution <a href="#">2677 (2023)</a> 15 March	Nineteenth preambular paragraph and para. 23
	Resolution <a href="#">2683 (2023)</a> 30 May	paras. 18 and 21

<sup>146</sup> Resolution [2684 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

<sup>147</sup> Resolution [2698 \(2023\)](#), para. 3.

## **B. Discussions concerning the authorization of enforcement action and implementation of other Chapter VII measures by regional arrangements**

In 2023, there were three explicit references to Article 53 of the Charter made during meetings of the Council. At the debate held on 28 March under the item entitled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, the representative of Brazil recalled that Article 53 of the Charter allowed the Council to resort to regional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority.<sup>148</sup> He added that this option favored tailor-made solutions that reflected local realities and called for enhanced cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations to address the threat of terrorism in Africa.

At the meeting held on 8 June under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations”, focusing on cooperation with the League of Arab States, the representative of Mozambique stated that his country strongly supported and advocated for an enhanced cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, as anchored in Article 53 of the Charter.<sup>149</sup> In that regard, he acknowledged that the cooperation was achieving tangible results in many domains, including in the promotion of peace and security, while noting however that even more could be done to make full use of the potential offered by regional organizations.

At a meeting held under the same item on 12 October under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations” focusing on cooperation with the African Union, the representative of Mozambique stated that each Member State of the United Nations and each region and organization were committed and duty-bound to fulfil the purpose of maintenance of international peace and security, adding that the Charter established a universal system of collective security that stood as a shared common good of humankind.<sup>150</sup> He also noted that this was the spirit in which the letter of Article 53 was written. In this regard, the representative stated that after the adoption of the United Nations-African Union Joint Framework for an Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security,

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<sup>148</sup> See [S/PV.9296](#).

<sup>149</sup> See [S/PV.9343](#).

<sup>150</sup> See [S/PV.9435](#).

the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council developed a unique partnership based on shared goals, mutual respect and African ownership.

In 2023, Council members and other speakers also referred to the role of regional organizations in connection with enforcement action other than the use of force of relevance for the application and interpretation of Article 53.

In connection with the situation in the Central African Republic, at a meeting held on 20 June, the African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security reiterated the call of the African Union for the complete lifting of the arms embargo imposed on the country, noting that this would enable the armed forces to effectively carry out their mandate of defending the country and protect its citizens, particularly given the potential spillover of the crisis from the Sudan into the Central African Republic.<sup>151</sup> Furthermore, multiple delegates noted the 13 June communiqué of the African Union Peace and Security Council, along with the support of the ICGLR and ECCAS, for the total lifting of the arms embargo.<sup>152</sup> Participating in the meeting under rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, the representative of Equatorial Guinea stated that it was time for the Council to heed the legitimate requests for the elimination of the arms embargo.

Subsequently, at a meeting held on 27 July, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolution [2693 \(2023\)](#), extending the sanctions measures on the Central African Republic, and decided that the arms embargo and the notification requirements as set out in paragraph 1 of resolution [2648 \(2022\)](#) would no longer apply to the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related material for the provision of assistance, advice and training to the Central African Republic security forces.<sup>153</sup> The resolution was adopted with 13 votes in favour and abstentions by China and the Russian Federation.<sup>154</sup> Speaking after the vote, the representative of China explained that his delegation had abstained in the vote because of the progress that the Central African Republic had made on the security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, stating that the arms embargo impeded the country's efforts to enhance its security capacity and to

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<sup>151</sup> See [S/PV.9352](#).

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, (Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Mozambique), China, Russian Federation, Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Burundi).

<sup>153</sup> Resolution [2693 \(2023\)](#), paras. 1 and 3.

<sup>154</sup> See [S/PV.9388](#). *For*: Albania, Brazil, Ecuador, France, Gabon, Ghana, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States; *against*: none; *abstaining*: China, Russian Federation.

maintain its national security and stability. He further noted that the Central African Republic had repeatedly called for the complete lifting of the arms embargo, which received the support of the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the countries of the region. The representative of Ghana, despite voting in favour of the resolution, recalled that the African Union and subregional organizations had consistently called for lifting the arms embargo in the Central African Republic, to enable its armed forces to defend the country and protect its citizens. He added, however, that with the adoption of resolution [2693 \(2023\)](#), those calls were met in an important way.

With regard to Libya, the Council discussed the activities of European Union military Operation in the Mediterranean (Operation IRINI) and its role in supporting the implementation of the arms embargo off the coast of Libya and measures to prevent migrant smuggling and human trafficking from Libya. At a meeting held on 18 April under the item entitled “The situation in Libya”, the representative of the United States expressed concern with the uptick in trafficking illicit petroleum and arms, commending Operation IRINI for the diversion of vessels found to contain arms and related material that could enable renewed conflict in the country.<sup>155</sup> The representative of France called on all countries operating in the Mediterranean to cooperate with IRINI and abide by Council resolutions. At the meeting held on 2 June, following the adoption of resolution [2684 \(2023\)](#), by which the Council extended the authorizations for Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, to inspect vessels in support of the arms embargo off the coast of Libya, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed the view that the opportunities offered by the special inspection regime had become effectively locked up by one regional organization: the European Union.<sup>156</sup> The Russian Federation, moreover, noted that the activities of Operation IRINI had not brought practical results in terms of stabilizing the situation on the ground and that there was a selective nature to the inspections, as a result of which potential violators of the embargo had little to fear from its naval presence. The representative emphasized the need for

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<sup>155</sup> See [S/PV.9306](#).

<sup>156</sup> See [S/PV.9335](#). The resolution was adopted with fourteen votes in favour, no votes against and one abstention. *For*: Albania, Brazil, China, Ecuador, France, Gabon, Ghana, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: none; *abstaining*: Russian Federation.

genuinely multilateral approaches to arrive at sustainable solutions to the pressing issues of Libya and the Mediterranean region as a whole and committed to closely monitoring the work of Operation IRINI, particularly its compliance with the law of the sea and relevant Council resolutions.

With regard to the prevention of human trafficking and migrant smuggling from Libya, at a meeting held on 28 September under the item entitled “Maintenance of international peace and security” the representative of the United States stated that Operation IRINI was a key component to international efforts to alleviate the human tragedy of migrant deaths on the high seas.<sup>157</sup> Furthermore, he commended the attention the European Union had given to ensuring that the operation placed a primary focus on the human rights of the migrants. On 29 September, following the adoption of resolution [2698 \(2023\)](#), by which the Council renewed the authorizations as set out in resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#), the representative of the Russian Federation underscored that, based on the report of the Secretary-General, the contribution of the European Union to rescues at sea was very modest and criticized the approach taken by the European Union with regard to migrants and refugees in the Mediterranean.<sup>158</sup>

In connection with the situation in South Sudan, on 30 May, at a meeting held under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, the Council adopted resolution [2683 \(2023\)](#) by which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, it renewed sanctions measures on the country, with the abstention of five Council members.<sup>159</sup> In his remarks after the vote, the representative of China noted that his country abstained in the voting because the sanctions had a bearing on South Sudan’s long-term peace and stability, adding that the desire to see them lifted was shared by the countries of the region, with both IGAD and the African Union Peace and Security Council calling for lifting the arms embargo and other sanctions on South Sudan. Echoing this view, the representative of Ghana noted that the efforts of the three African members of the Council and other delegations to introduce language from the African Union resolution, adopted during the thirty-sixth ordinary

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<sup>157</sup> See [S/PV.9428](#).

<sup>158</sup> See [S/PV.9429](#). The resolution was adopted with fourteen votes in favour, no votes against and one abstention. *For*: Albania, Brazil, China, Ecuador, France, Gabon, Ghana, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against*: none; *abstaining*: Russian Federation. See also [S/2023/640](#).

<sup>159</sup> See [S/PV.9332](#). *For*: Albania, Brazil, Ecuador, France, Japan, Malta, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States; *against*: none; *abstaining*: China, Gabon, Ghana, Mozambique, Russian Federation.

session of the Assembly of the Union, were not incorporated in the text. He underscored that the resolution expressed concern about the socioeconomic impact of sanctions as one of the main obstacles impeding the implementation of the African Union Agenda 2063 and the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The representative of the United Arab Emirates noted that her delegation felt that it was crucial for regional perspectives, including most importantly those of South Sudan, and consistently sought amplify those perspectives, as put forward by the three African members of the Council.

## **V. Reporting by regional arrangements on their activities in the maintenance of international peace and security**

### **Note**

Section V contains an examination of the reporting by regional arrangements on their activities in the maintenance of international peace and security within the framework of Article 54 of the Charter. The section is divided into three subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning reporting by regional arrangements, subsection B covers discussions concerning reporting by regional arrangements, and subsection C covers communications concerning reporting by regional arrangements.

#### **A. Decisions concerning the reporting by regional arrangements**

During the period under review, the Council made one explicit reference to Article 54 of the Charter in its decisions and requested reporting from regional organizations on peacekeeping operations led by them, either directly or through the Secretary-General, as well as on maritime enforcement actions undertaken further to relevant resolutions of the Council, as described in further detail below and summarized in table 3.

By resolution [2719 \(2023\)](#), adopted on 19 December under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the Council recalled its oversight role under Article 54 and determined that the process for mandate authorization of African Union-led peace support operations would encompass a joint strategic assessment conducted through a consultative planning and decision-making process undertaken by the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General.<sup>160</sup> Moreover, the process would be guided by joint African Union-United Nations planning as well as regular joint review and reporting processes to ensure oversight by the Council of all authorized operations that access United Nations assessed contributions pursuant to its role and prerogatives as set out in Chapter VIII of the Charter. The Council further requested the Secretary-General, in consultations with

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<sup>160</sup> Resolution [2719 \(2023\)](#), second preambular paragraph and para. 3(ii).

the Chairperson of the African Union Commission, to submit a joint report every six months on the status of the implementation of the mandate that the Council authorizes for the conduct of any African Union-led Peace Support Operation.<sup>161</sup>

With regard to the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in resolution [2717 \(2023\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to report by 30 June 2024 on possible logistical and operational support the United Nations could provide to regional forces present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo at the request of the host country and the organization concerned.<sup>162</sup>

Concerning Libya, in resolution [2684 \(2023\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to report in six and 11 months on the implementation of the authorizations set out in resolution [2635 \(2022\)](#) for Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations concerning the implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya.<sup>163</sup> In addition, in resolution [2698 \(2023\)](#), the Council renewed the reporting requests set out in paragraph 17 of resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#), requiring Member States acting nationally or through regional organisations, to inspect on the high seas off the coast of Libya vessels believed to be used for migrant smuggling and human trafficking from Libya.<sup>164</sup> The Council further requested the Secretary-General to report 11 months after the adoption of the resolution on its implementation.<sup>165</sup>

In relation to Somalia, in resolution [2687 \(2023\)](#), the Council requested the African Union and the Government of Somalia, in consultation with the United Nations and international partners, to conduct a joint technical assessment to evaluate Phase 1 of the ATMIS drawdown by 31 August, and requested an update on preparations and timescale for Phase 2 by 15 September.<sup>166</sup> The Council also requested the United Nations to work with Somalia and the African Union to conduct an independent assessment, by 30 September, of Somalia's stabilisation needs and efforts and to suggest recommendations for future consideration.<sup>167</sup> In resolution [2710](#)

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<sup>161</sup> Ibid., para. 15.

<sup>162</sup> Resolution [2717 \(2023\)](#), para. 48.

<sup>163</sup> Resolution [2684 \(2023\)](#), para. 2. See also reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolutions [2635 \(2022\)](#) and [2684 \(2023\)](#), (S/2022/910 and S/2023/936).

<sup>164</sup> Resolution [2698 \(2023\)](#), para. 3. See also report of the Secretary-General dated 30 August 2023 pursuant to resolution [2652 \(2022\)](#), (S/2023/640).

<sup>165</sup> Resolution [2698 \(2023\)](#), para. 6.

<sup>166</sup> Resolution [2687 \(2023\)](#), paras. 40 and 41.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid., para. 42.

(2023), the Council requested the African Union and the Government of Somalia, in consultation with the United Nations, the European Union and international partners, to conduct a joint technical assessment by 31 March 2024 to evaluate Phase 2 of the ATMIS drawdown and to inform planning for the remaining phases.<sup>168</sup> The Council also requested an update by 30 April 2024 from the African Union and the Government of Somalia on their preparations for Phase 3 drawdown of 4,000 troops by 30 June 2024.<sup>169</sup>

In connection with South Sudan under the item entitled “Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan”, in resolution [2677 \(2023\)](#), the Council encouraged the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to share reports of fighting and violations of the 2017 Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities and the permanent ceasefire provisions of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan.<sup>170</sup> In the same resolution, the Council invited the African Union to share information on progress made in the establishment of the Hybrid Court for South Sudan with the Secretary-General.<sup>171</sup> Similarly, in resolution [2683 \(2023\)](#), the Council invited the Revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission to share relevant information with the Council on its assessment of the implementation by the parties of the Revitalized Agreement, adherence to the cessation of hostilities and the facilitation of unhindered and secure humanitarian access.<sup>172</sup>

In 2023, the Council also continued to receive reports on the activities of the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina<sup>173</sup> and the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel which were transmitted by letters of the Secretary-General to the president of the Security Council.<sup>174</sup>

**Table 3**  
**Decisions concerning the reporting of activities by regional arrangements, 2023**

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<sup>168</sup> Resolution [2710 \(2023\)](#), para. 11.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 12.

<sup>170</sup> Resolution [2677 \(2023\)](#), eleventh preambular paragraph.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 24.

<sup>172</sup> Resolution [2683 \(2023\)](#), para. 24.

<sup>173</sup> See [S/2023/466](#).

<sup>174</sup> See [S/2023/328](#) and [S/2023/865](#).

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decisions</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Reporting from</i>
Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security	Resolution <a href="#">2719 (2023)</a> 21 December	para. 3(ii), 15	Secretary-General, African Union Commission Chairperson
The situation concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Resolution <a href="#">2717 (2023)</a> 19 December	para. 48, 49	Secretary-General
The situation in Libya	Resolution <a href="#">2684 (2023)</a> 2 June	para. 2	Secretary-General
Maintenance of international peace and security	Resolution <a href="#">2698 (2023)</a> 29 September	para. 6	Secretary-General
The situation in Somalia	Resolution <a href="#">2687 (2023)</a> 27 June	para. 40, 41, 42, 44	Secretary-General, African Union
	Resolution <a href="#">2710 (2023)</a> 15 November	para. 11, 12, 14	Secretary-General, African Union, European Union
Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Resolution <a href="#">2677 (2023)</a> 15 March	Eleventh preambular paragraph, para. 24	Secretary-General, African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
	Resolution <a href="#">2683 (2023)</a> 30 May	para. 24	Revitalized Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC)

## **B. Discussion concerning the reporting by regional arrangements, 2023**

During the period under review, Article 54 of the Charter was explicitly referenced in the discussions of the Council on two occasions, albeit not expressly in connection with reporting by regional arrangements. Specifically, at the meeting held on 23 February under the item entitled, “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations”, the representative of Mozambique recalled that the Council was vested with the primary responsibility for maintaining global, regional and local peace and security and that Articles 52 to 54 of Chapter VIII of the Charter served the purpose of guiding that regional cooperation related to peace and security.<sup>175</sup> Similarly, at a meeting held on 28 March under the item entitled, “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, the representative of Mozambique also recalled that Chapter VIII of the Charter, namely Articles 52 to 54,

<sup>175</sup> See [S/PV.9268](#).

provided an appropriate framework for collaboration and the sharing of responsibilities and the United Nations and regional and subregional mechanisms in the area of international peacekeeping and security.<sup>176</sup>

Beyond explicit references to Article 54, at the meeting held on 21 December under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”, the representative of Ghana noted that the draft resolution [S/2023/999](#), submitted by Gabon, Ghana and Mozambique, and subsequently adopted as resolution [2719 \(2023\)](#), had set out the commitments of the African Union in complying with expected standards, the decision-making process, the financial arrangements and the oversight and reporting requirements to address the question of adequate, predictable and sustainable financing of African Union peace support operations.<sup>177</sup>

### **C. Communications concerning the reporting by regional arrangements**

In letters addressed to Secretary-General and the President of the Council, the representatives of Algeria<sup>178</sup> and Morocco,<sup>179</sup> in their respective capacities as Chairs of the Council of the League of Arab States, and citing Article 54 of the Charter, transmitted resolutions adopted by the Council of the League with the request that they be circulated as documents of the General Assembly and the Council in connection with items on their respective agendas.

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<sup>176</sup> See [S/PV.9296](#).

<sup>177</sup> See [S/PV.9518](#).

<sup>178</sup> See [S/2023/153](#).

<sup>179</sup> See [S/2023/762](#).