

2. The situation in Somalia

In 2023, the Council held 12 meetings and adopted six decisions on the situation in Somalia, five of which were under Chapter VII of the Charter. Six meetings took the form of briefings, five were convened to adopt decisions and one was held in private.¹⁷ More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcomes, is provided in the table below. Council members also held informal consultations of the whole to discuss the situation in Somalia.¹⁸

During the period under review, the Council lifted the arms embargo initially imposed on Somalia in 1992,¹⁹ and renamed the Committee and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) to the Committee and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#).²⁰ The Council further extended its authorization for the deployment of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and adjusted the schedule for its gradual drawdown.²¹ Finally, the Council also extended the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) and took note of the decision of the Secretary-General to appoint a new Special Representative for Somalia and Head of the Mission.²²

In its public meetings, in connection with the reports of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia,²³ the Council heard three briefings from the representatives of UNSOM and the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and Head of ATMIS. The Council also heard briefings by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Al-Shabaab,²⁴ the Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women),²⁵ and the Executive

¹⁷ For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

¹⁸ Council members held informal consultations in connection with this item on 22 February, 7 September and 19 October. See [A/78/2](#), part II, chap. 5.

¹⁹ For more information, see part VII, sect. III.

²⁰ For more information, see part IX.

²¹ For more information on the mandate of ATMIS, see part VIII, sect. III.

²² See [S/2023/313](#) and [S/2023/314](#). For more information on the mandate of UNSOM, see part X, sect. II. See also [S/2023/128](#) and [S/2023/129](#), regarding the appointment by the Secretary-General of the Head of the United Nations Support Office for Somalia.

²³ See [S/2023/109](#), [S/2023/443](#) and [S/2023/758](#).

²⁴ See [S/PV.9271](#), [S/PV.9349](#) and [S/PV.9441](#).

²⁵ See [S/PV.9267](#).

Director of the World Food Programme.²⁶ In addition to the public meetings, the Council heard briefings by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and Head of ATMIS and the European Union Special Representative for the Horn of Africa at a private meeting held on 27 March further to resolution [2670 \(2022\)](#) on the transition in Somalia.²⁷ Representatives of Somalia, including its President on one occasion, participated in nine of the meetings held under this item. In addition to Somalia, the representatives of Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda participated at the private meeting held on 27 March.

Regarding political developments in Somalia, at the briefing held on 22 February, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General reported that, in December 2022, through the National Consultative Council, the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member state leaders, with the exemption of Puntland, had agreed a federated model regarding the allocation of powers and on justice, both of which were key elements for the completion of the constitutional review.²⁸ On 22 June, in her first briefing to the Council, the newly appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSOM stated that the March and May 2023 meetings of the National Consultative Council had resulted in the proposals for the revision of the national security architecture, a model for fiscal federalism and an electoral model.²⁹ She noted that, while the aspect on one-person, one-vote elections at all Government levels had been well received, other elements of the proposed electoral model, including a shift to a presidential system and a move to two political parties, had received mixed reactions. On 19 October, the Special Representative indicated that the proposals for a future electoral system continued to dominate the political debate, with the proposed change to a presidential system and the proposed synchronization of the election schedules for federal member states, remaining contentious.³⁰ She urged the Puntland state government, which had remained outside of the National Consultative Council process, and the Federal Government of Somalia to seek compromise and pursue dialogue to enable the constitutional review process to move ahead, as it was key to reaching an agreement on federalism in the country.

²⁶ See [S/PV.9356](#).

²⁷ See [S/PV.9294](#).

²⁸ See [S/PV.9267](#).

²⁹ See [S/PV.9356](#).

³⁰ See [S/PV.9446](#).

On 22 February, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General welcomed the launch of Somalia's national action plan on resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) and noted that enhancing women's political participation remained critical, including by codifying the 30 per cent women's quota in the relevant legal and electoral frameworks and ensuring its safeguarding by all entities.³¹ At the same meeting, the Executive Director of UN Women cautioned that the displacement of people from due to the fighting in Laascaanood, compounded by the ongoing drought, had exacerbated gender-based violence. She stated that cruel violence against women and girls in Somalia was also linked to the conflict, both with Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State, and to inter-clan disputes. The Executive Director further recalled that none of the listings of the Somalia sanctions regime had mentioned sexual violence or women's rights since 2014 and continued to be gender-blind, despite the prevalence of sexual violence and targeted attacks on women in public life in Somalia. She asked Council members to demand the meaningful participation of women and to specify that participation included not only elections, but also the stabilization agenda, civil service, the constitutional review, judicial and security sector reform and all efforts related to peacebuilding, State-building, preventing violent extremism, early warning, transitional justice and humanitarian aid.

On the security front, Council members were briefed on the continued threat posed by Al-Shabaab, further compounded by the escalation of the conflict in Laascaanood. On 22 February, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General reported that the Somali security forces, reinforced by local militias, had conducted successful operations against Al-Shabaab in Hirshabelle and Galmudug states. In parallel, the Federal Government continued with efforts on generating forces to gradually assume security responsibilities in line with the Somalia Transition Plan. As funding remained a critical challenge, the Deputy Special Representative reiterated previous calls by the Secretary-General to ensure predictable and sustainable funding to ATMIS and adequate resourcing for Somali security forces. On 22 June, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General expressed grave concern about the ongoing conflict in Laascaanood following violent clashes between "Somaliland" forces and local Dhulbahante clan militia.³² In that context, she underscored that, following the press statement issued by the

³¹ See [S/PV.9267](#).

³² See [S/PV.9356](#).

Council on 7 June, UNSOM good offices were at the disposal of all parties to help agree on a peaceful way forward. The Special Representative stated that, while Al-Shabaab had been degraded militarily and dislodged from a number of areas, it remained a significant threat. She noted that the next phase of operations against Al-Shabaab would take place against a resurgence in the scale, tempo and geographic distribution of attacks, more challenging politics and clan dynamics further south, and the concurrent drawdown of ATMIS. On 19 October, the Special Representative pointed out that early data indicated that 2023 was likely to see the same trend as 2022, which saw the largest increase in civilian casualties since 2017, partly attributable to Al-Shabaab attacks, but also to the conflict in Laascaanood.³³

Concerning the humanitarian situation, on 22 February, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General stated that nearly half of Somalia's estimated population required assistance and protection in 2023, with needs more pronounced among minorities and marginalized groups.³⁴ On 22 June, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General noted that out of more than 2.6 billion dollars needed to address the precarious humanitarian situation, less than a third was funded, with Somalia also requiring large-scale climate finance for resilience and adaptation.³⁵ At the same meeting, the Executive Director of the World Food Programme reported that the violence and instability had destroyed much of the infrastructure needed to support food production and distribution and that, what had not been wrecked by conflict, had been consumed by Somalia's climate crisis. Food insecurity was spiralling across Somalia with over 6.6 million people — one third of the population — expected to face crisis or worse levels of hunger, including 40,000 people fighting for survival in famine-like conditions and 1.8 million children expected to suffer acute malnutrition. The Executive Director proposed a five-pronged plan to address the emergency in Somalia, which included: (i) a call to Member States to immediately contribute to the humanitarian response plan which was seriously underfunded; (ii) working together to ensure humanitarian assistance reaches the people of Somalia and ensuring operations were run with maximum efficiency; (iii) matching food assistance with investments to rebuild livelihoods, strengthen resilience and support climate-

³³ See [S/PV.9446](#).

³⁴ See [S/PV.9267](#).

³⁵ See [S/PV.9356](#).

adaptation programmes; (iv) for the Council to spearhead efforts to secure unimpeded humanitarian access to all vulnerable communities; and (v) working together to find political solutions to create stability and peace in Somalia. On 19 October, with the humanitarian crisis remaining deeply concerning and projected to deteriorate further, the Special Representative underscored the need to scale up programmes that tackled the underlying drivers and integrate the humanitarian response with longer-term climate adaptation.³⁶

With regard to ATMIS and the Somalia Transition Plan, the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and Head of ATMIS noted on 22 February that, together with the Somali security forces, the Mission had contributed to the offensive to degrade Al-Shabaab in line with the agreed joint Federal Government of Somalia-ATMIS concept of operations of 2022.³⁷ He added that the troop-contributing countries had already committed to deploying critical force enablers, such as attack and utility helicopters, and were seeking robust long-range intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Expressing confidence that Somalia was on track to assume security responsibility from ATMIS by December 2024, the Special Representative also reflected on the adjustment of the timeline of phase one of the drawdown, initially due to take place by 31 December 2022, and noted that the six-month extension would provide the Federal Government of Somalia and ATMIS the space to complete important mandated tasks. On 22 June, he reported on the implementation of the drawdown of 2,000 ATMIS troops, in accordance with resolutions [2628 \(2022\)](#) and [2670 \(2022\)](#) and that, with the completion of phase one, ATMIS could create quick reaction forces and mobile forces.³⁸ He also anticipated the deployment of key enablers, which would enhance the Mission's operational capability. Finally, on 19 October, the Special Representative reported that the joint tripartite committee, consisting of ATMIS, the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and the Federal Government of Somalia, had completed the drawdown of 2,000 ATMIS troops in June and had begun activities for the phase two drawdown, initially due to take place by 30 September and which had been paused for three months upon request from the Federal

³⁶ See [S/PV.9446](#).

³⁷ See [S/PV.9267](#).

³⁸ See [S/PV.9356](#).

Government of Somalia.³⁹ According to the Special Representative, it remained vital that the drawdown of ATMIS troops be informed and guided by a careful assessment of the prevailing security situation and the capability of the Somali security forces to be able to take over security responsibilities, while also undertaking its offensive against Al-Shabaab.

In 2023, the Council also heard three briefings by the Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Al-Shabaab on the activities of the Committee in the reporting period.⁴⁰ Notably, on 15 June, the Chair reported that the Committee had agreed to take certain follow-up actions in relation to four recommendations contained in a thematic report on humanitarian matters by the Panel of Experts, including a recommendation for the Council to mandate the Panel to monitor and report on the unintended humanitarian consequences of the sanctions regime and a to request the Emergency Relief Coordinator to report on impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance, the provision of services and the safety of humanitarian workers.⁴¹ On 17 October, the Chair indicated that the Secretary-General had appointed the humanitarian expert for the Panel of Experts, a position that had been vacant since the beginning of the mandate, and that the Panel was at its full authorized strength of six experts.⁴² The Chair also stressed the need to ensure the safety of the Panel members for the full implementation of their mandate.

During their discussions in 2023, Council members paid particular attention to the security concerns emanating from the escalation of violence in Laascaanood and the continued terrorist attacks carried out by Al-Shabaab. They also discussed the political situation in the country, including the consultations on the federal governance and electoral models, as well as the deterioration of humanitarian conditions.

³⁹ See [S/PV.9446](#). See also letter dated 28 September 2023 from the President of the Council addressed to the Secretary-General ([S/2023/750](#)), in which the Council referred to a request from Somalia for a technical pause in the planned drawdown of 3,000 ATMIS troops, which was due to take place by 30 September, and had agreed, *inter alia*, to continue its authorization, in paragraph 19 of resolution [2687 \(2023\)](#), of the deployment of 17,626 uniformed personnel to ATMIS during the pause. See also letter dated 10 October 2023 from the representative of Mozambique addressed to the President of the Council ([S/2023/751](#)), in which he transmitted the communiqué adopted by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, regarding the request by the Federal Government of Somalia for a technical pause, for three months, in the second phase of the drawdown of 3,000 uniformed personnel of ATMIS.

⁴⁰ See [S/PV.9271](#), [S/PV.9349](#) and [S/PV.9441](#).

⁴¹ See [S/PV.9349](#).

⁴² See [S/PV.9441](#). See also [S/2023/613](#).

On the security front, Council members voiced concern about the surge of violence in Laascaanood, while also calling for dialogue and the protection of civilians and expressing support for the de-escalation efforts of the Federal Government of Somalia in that regard.⁴³ Throughout the year, Council members also discussed the continuing terrorist threat posed by Al-Shabaab and the operations conducted by the Somali security forces and ATMIS against the group.⁴⁴ Council members also deliberated on the security transition and gradual handover of security responsibilities in light of the planned drawdown and eventual withdrawal of ATMIS by the end of 2024, with some speakers highlighting the lifting of the arms embargo as an important step in helping Somalia in its fight against Al-Shabaab.⁴⁵

With regard to the political situation, Council members addressed the dialogue on power-sharing and constitutional review in the framework of the National Consultative Council and emphasized the importance of an inclusive process with the involvement of all federal member states.⁴⁶ In the context of these discussions, several Council members also raised the question of ensuring meaningful participation of women in political processes in Somalia.⁴⁷ Council members also continued to discuss the deteriorating humanitarian situation, in particular as regards a protracted drought and subsequent heavy rainfall leading to flooding, resulting in more displacement and food insecurity. Some Council members pointed out the impact of the

⁴³ See [S/PV.9267](#) (United Kingdom, China, United Arab Emirates, United States, France, Albania and Switzerland); [S/PV.9356](#) (United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, Brazil, Albania, Japan, United States, Malta, Switzerland and France); [S/PV.9446](#) (United States, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), Malta, Albania, China, France, Switzerland, Russian Federation and Brazil).

⁴⁴ See [S/PV.9267](#) (United Kingdom, China, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), United Arab Emirates, United States, France, Albania, Switzerland, Brazil, Japan, Russian Federation, Ecuador and Malta); [S/PV.9356](#) (United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Russian Federation, China and Mozambique (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana)); [S/PV.9446](#) (United Kingdom, United States, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), Malta, Ecuador, Albania, China, Japan, United Arab Emirates, France, Switzerland, Russian Federation and Brazil).

⁴⁵ See [S/PV.9267](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique)); [S/PV.9356](#) (China and Mozambique (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana)); [S/PV.9359](#) (Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana Mozambique)); [S/PV.9446](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), China, United Arab Emirates and Russian Federation); [S/PV.9463](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique)); [S/PV.9491](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), Russian Federation, Japan, China and United Arab Emirates).

⁴⁶ See [S/PV.9267](#) (United Kingdom, China, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), Albania, Switzerland, Brazil, Russian Federation and Ecuador); [S/PV.9356](#) (United Arab Emirates, Russian Federation, China, Mozambique (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), United States, Ecuador, Malta and Switzerland); [S/PV.9446](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), China, France, Russian Federation and Brazil).

⁴⁷ See [S/PV.9267](#) (United Kingdom, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), France, Albania, Switzerland, Ecuador and Malta); [S/PV.9356](#) (Albania, Ecuador, Malta, Switzerland and France); [S/PV.9446](#) (Malta, Ecuador, Albania, France and Switzerland).

worsening humanitarian conditions, in particular on women and children,⁴⁸ while some raised the issue of climate change as a factor contributing to the dire humanitarian conditions in Somalia.⁴⁹

In their statements in 2023, the representatives of Somalia reported on the outcomes of the meetings of the National Consultative Council with a focus on deepening federalism and enhancing cooperation on State-building priorities.⁵⁰ Addressing the Council on 22 June, the President of Somalia indicated that six such meetings had been held since he took office in May 2022, resulting in consensus agreements with the federal member states on the allocation of power, the judicial model, fiscal federalism, the national security architecture and the electoral model, which paved the way for a more inclusive and representative governance system in Somalia.⁵¹ With regard to sanctions, the representatives of Somalia continued to call for the full lifting of the arms embargo on the Federal Government, while keeping the focus of the sanctions measures on those who posed a threat to peace and security in Somalia.⁵² In particular, at the meeting held on 22 June, the President of Somalia advocated for the total lifting of the 31-year arms embargo that had limited the country's ability to protect its citizens, enforce the rule of law and secure its borders, and in that context, opined that it was crucial to reassess the situation in the light of the progress made towards establishing an effective weapons and ammunition management system in line with the benchmarks set in resolutions [2607 \(2021\)](#) and [2662 \(2022\)](#).⁵³ On security issues, the representatives of Somalia continued to report on the efforts of the Somali security forces in degrading Al-Shabaab⁵⁴ and expressed commitment to assuming full security responsibility from ATMIS by the end of 2024.⁵⁵

⁴⁸ See [S/PV.9267](#) (United Kingdom, France, Albania, Switzerland, Brazil and Malta); [S/PV.9356](#) (United Arab Emirates, Albania and Malta); [S/PV.9446](#) (Albania and Switzerland).

⁴⁹ See [S/PV.9267](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), Switzerland and Japan); [S/PV.9356](#) (United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Mozambique (also on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Albania and Switzerland); [S/PV.9446](#) (Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), Malta, Albania, Japan, United Arab Emirates and Switzerland).

⁵⁰ See [S.PV.9267](#) and [S/PV.9446](#).

⁵¹ See [S/PV.9356](#).

⁵² See [S.PV.9271](#), [S/PV.9349](#), [S/PV.9359](#) and [S/PV.9446](#).

⁵³ See [S/PV.9356](#).

⁵⁴ See [S.PV.9267](#), [S/PV.9356](#) and [S/PV.9446](#).

⁵⁵ See [S.PV.9271](#), [S/PV.9349](#), [S/PV.9359](#) and [S/PV.9491](#).

With regard to its decisions, on 27 June, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2687 \(2023\)](#) and extended its authorizations for the deployment of ATMIS until 31 December 2023.⁵⁶ The Council recalled the strategic objectives and tasks of the Mission as defined in resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#) and requested it to prioritize: (a) maintaining enabling support for peace and security in Somalia, including for the political processes at all levels, including stabilisation efforts, reconciliation and peacebuilding, to ensure a sustainable transition; (b) supporting Federal Government of Somalia-led operations against Al-Shabaab, including by securing vital routes between secured areas across the country; and (c) preparing for its smooth drawdown and exit from Somalia as planned.⁵⁷ By the resolution, the Council reduced the number of authorized uniformed personnel from 19,262 to 17,626 until 30 September 2023, and to 14,626 personnel from 1 October to 31 December 2023, and affirmed its readiness to review those figures in light of the proposal requested from the African Union and the Government of Somalia in paragraph 41 of the resolution.⁵⁸ The Council further requested the African Union to implement the phase two drawdown to 14,626 personnel jointly with the Government of Somalia as informed by the findings of the joint technical assessment requested in paragraph 40 of the resolution in each ATMIS sector.⁵⁹ The Council also requested the United Nations to begin consultations with the African Union, troop- and police-contributing countries, donors and the Government of Somalia on the implications of ATMIS drawdown for in-country military and police equipment and potential options for disposal, extraction or transfer thereof.⁶⁰

By resolution [2710 \(2023\)](#), adopted unanimously on 15 November, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council acknowledged the effective completion of phase one drawdown of 2,000 ATMIS personnel and noted the requests from the Federal Government of Somalia and of the African Union to delay phase two.⁶¹ The Council extended its authorization to ATMIS

⁵⁶ Resolution [2687 \(2023\)](#), para. 17.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 18.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, para. 19. In paragraph 41, the Council requested an update by 15 September 2023 from the African Union and the Government of Somalia on their preparations for phase two drawdown, taking into account the lessons identified from phase one, and setting out a clear plan and timescale for phase two drawdown.

⁵⁹ Resolution [2687 \(2023\)](#), para. 21. In paragraph 40, the Council requested the Government of Somalia and the African Union to conduct a joint technical assessment by 31 August 2023 to evaluate phase one drawdown and identify lessons, as well as the implication of the revised national Security Architecture and force generation, to inform planning for the remaining phases of the ATMIS drawdown.

⁶⁰ Resolution [2687 \(2023\)](#), para. 27.

⁶¹ Resolution [2710 \(2023\)](#), seventh, eighth and ninth preambular paragraphs.

until 30 June 2024, maintained the level of authorized uniformed personnel until 31 December 2023, and authorized Member States of the African Union to complete the phase two drawdown of 3,000 ATMIS personnel by that date and thereby amended paragraph 19 of resolution [2687 \(2023\)](#).⁶² Further, the Council also decided to reduce the troop ceiling to 14,626 uniformed personnel, inclusive of 1,040 police personnel, from 1 January 2024 until 30 June 2024, and to complete phase three drawdown of 4,000 ATMIS personnel by the latter date.⁶³ Concerning the security transition, the Council encouraged the Government of Somalia to present a proposal for post-ATMIS security arrangements by 31 March 2024 and requested the Government and the African Union, in consultation with the United Nations, the European Union and international partners, to conduct a joint technical assessment by 31 March 2024 to evaluate phase two drawdown and identify lessons to inform planning for the remaining phases of ATMIS drawdown.⁶⁴ It also requested an update by 30 April 2024 from the African Union and the Government on their preparations for phase three drawdown of 4,000 troops by 30 June 2024, taking into account the lessons identified from phases one and two, and setting out a clear plan and timescale for phase three drawdown.⁶⁵ The Council also expressed its intention to commission a strategic review of UNSOS, through a letter from its President, after the completion of the actions set out in paragraphs 10–11.⁶⁶ Finally, the Council encouraged traditional donors to ATMIS to continue supporting the Mission until its planned exit by 31 December 2024, and called for the enlargement and diversification of the donor base to provide the necessary funding for the Mission and for the UNSOS-administered Somalia Trust Fund.⁶⁷

With respect to the drawdown of ATMIS and post-ATMIS transition process, several Council members shared their views in the explanation of their votes on the two resolutions concerning the Mission's mandate. Following the adoption of resolution [2687 \(2023\)](#) on 27 June, the representative of Gabon, also speaking on behalf of Ghana and Mozambique, stated that to ensure a well-coordinated and reality-based drawdown, the lessons learned from phase one

⁶² Ibid., paras. 1-2.

⁶³ Ibid., para. 3.

⁶⁴ Ibid., paras. 10-11.

⁶⁵ Ibid., para. 12.

⁶⁶ Ibid., para. 13.

⁶⁷ Ibid., para. 9.

should consequently inform the Council's action.⁶⁸ He added that the African members welcomed the increased support for enablers and force multipliers, and called for the necessary funding for ATMIS to enable it to achieve its mandate, including ensuring a smooth transfer of responsibilities to Somali security forces. The representative of the Russian Federation stated that the withdrawal of the African peacekeeping mission from Somalia should not be rushed, should be carried out depending on the real state of affairs on the ground and that creating a security vacuum was unacceptable. On 15 November, following the adoption of resolution [2710 \(2023\)](#) and the extension of the mandate of ATMIS until 30 June 2024, the representative of Ghana, also speaking on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique, expressed support for the extension of phase two and a delay in the drawdown of 3,000 ATMIS personnel until 31 December 2023, which would allow for a thoughtful transition plan and safeguard the progress achieved thus far in Somalia.⁶⁹ He further underlined the need for predictable, sustainable and flexible funding for ATMIS and other African Union-led peace support operations. The representative of the United States noted that his delegation accepted the necessity of delaying the second ATMIS troop reduction from 30 September to 31 December but noted its concern that slow progress in meeting mandate objectives over the past year would hamper efforts to complete the transition by the end of 2024. He added that coordination between the Federal Government of Somalia and ATMIS was vital, and that ATMIS troop reductions had to be based on operational necessity, taking into account changes to the security situation and strategic planning by the Federal Government of Somalia and the African Union. Noting that continued progress towards a Somali-led security sector as it related to the transition from ATMIS was needed, the representative of the United States urged the international community to continue to work with Somalia to support the development of a truly integrated Somali security sector, the key element of a sustainable transition of security responsibilities envisioned in the resolution.

With regard to UNSOM, by resolution [2705 \(2023\)](#) of 31 October, the Council extended the mandate of the Mission, as set out in resolutions [2158 \(2014\)](#) and [2592 \(2021\)](#), for a period of one year, until 31 October 2024.⁷⁰ The Council encouraged UNSOM to continue to coordinate

⁶⁸ See [S/PV.9359](#).

⁶⁹ See [S/PV.9477](#).

⁷⁰ Resolution [2705 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

United Nations efforts, maximize joint approaches and joint programming to support Somalia in relevant areas outlined in the resolution, including advancing State-building and supporting the conduct of free and fair elections.⁷¹ In addition, the Council recalled its press statement of 7 June and paragraph 6 (b) of resolution [2592 \(2021\)](#) and requested UNSOM to continue to provide support to efforts undertaken by the Federal Government of Somalia to pursue inter- and intra-clan reconciliation at the local, regional and national level towards the peaceful resolution of the dispute in Laascaanood and the surrounding areas, including through engaging with all parties where necessary.⁷² On the political front, the Council encouraged the Federal Government of Somalia and the federal member states to deepen cooperation and collaboration at all levels to, inter alia, make progress towards finalizing the constitution, prepare for national and local elections, implement the national security architecture and justice model, deliver the Somalia Transition Plan, advance reconciliation, create a conducive political and security environment for more inclusive democratic processes, including through full, equal and meaningful participation of women, inclusion of persons belonging to minority clans, youth and persons with disabilities, and to uphold the rights of freedom of expression, association, peaceful assembly and movement.⁷³ Finally, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide regular updates on the situation in Somalia and implementation of UNSOM's mandate, including on the benchmarks outlined in the strategic review as well as on the progress made in implementing the recommendations set out in the strategic review.⁷⁴

Concerning the sanctions measures related to Al-Shabaab, the Council unanimously adopted several resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter, including one resolution under the item entitled "Peace and security in Africa".⁷⁵ On 7 September, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2696 \(2023\)](#) in which it recalled paragraph 36 of resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), took note of the proposal presented by the Federal Government of Somalia to the Committee established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) for the one-off, complete disposal of the charcoal stockpile by export, and authorized the Federal Government of Somalia to implement that

⁷¹ Ibid., para. 3(a)-(f).

⁷² Ibid., para. 4.

⁷³ Ibid., para. 6.

⁷⁴ Ibid., para. 14. See also [S/2022/716](#).

⁷⁵ Resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#). For more information, see part I, sect. 9.

proposal as a one-off exemption to the ban on the import and export of charcoal from Somalia, as set out in paragraph 22 of its resolution [2036 \(2012\)](#), and paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution [2182 \(2014\)](#).⁷⁶ The Council also directed the Committee to follow up on the above decision and the implementation of the Federal Government of Somalia's proposal.⁷⁷ On 15 November, by resolution [2711 \(2023\)](#), the Council reaffirmed resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#), renewed the provisions set out in paragraphs 15 and 17 of resolution [2182 \(2014\)](#), and expanded by paragraph 5 of resolution [2607 \(2021\)](#) to cover improvised explosive device components, until 1 December 2023.⁷⁸ The Council further renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 31 December 2023, while expressing its intention to review the mandate and take appropriate action regarding any extension and modification of that mandate, no later than 1 December.⁷⁹ Finally, by resolution [2714 \(2023\)](#) of 1 December, the Council recognized the progress made against the benchmarks endorsed in resolution [2662 \(2022\)](#) and decided to lift the arms embargo established in resolution [733 \(1992\)](#) as amended.⁸⁰ The Council further emphasized, for the avoidance of doubt, that there was no arms embargo on the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia and recalled resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#) which had established a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Al-Shabaab in Somalia.⁸¹

Meetings: The situation in Somalia, 2023

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9267 22 February 2023	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2023/109)		Somalia	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of the African Union Transition	13 Council members, ^a all invitees	

⁷⁶ Resolution [2696 \(2023\)](#), paras. 1-2.

⁷⁷ Ibid., para. 3.

⁷⁸ Resolution [2711 \(2023\)](#), paras. 1-3.

⁷⁹ Ibid., para. 3.

⁸⁰ Resolution [2714 \(2023\)](#), para. 1.

⁸¹ Ibid., fourth preambular paragraph and para. 2.

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
				Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), Executive Director of the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women)		
S/PV.9271 27 February 2023			Somalia		One Council member (Japan), ^b Somalia	
S/PV.9294 27 March 2023 (closed)			Six Member States ^c	Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of ATMIS, Special Representative of the European Union for the Horn of Africa	Council members, all invitees	
S/PV.9349 15 June 2023			Somalia		One Council member (Japan), ^b Somalia	
S/PV.9356 22 June 2023	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2023/443)		Somalia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSOM, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of ATMIS, Executive Director of the World Food Programme	13 Council members, ^d all invitees ^e	
S/PV.9359 27 June 2023		Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (S/2023/474)	Somalia		Two Council members (Gabon ^f and Russian Federation), Somalia	Resolution 2687 (2023) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.9412 7 September 2023		Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (S/2023/652)				Resolution 2696 (2023) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.9441 17 October 2023	Letters dated 29 September 2023 from the Chair of the Security Council				One Council member (Japan) ^b	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
	Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) concerning Al-Shabaab addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2023/720 and S/2023/724)					
S/PV.9446 19 October 2023	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2023/758)		Somalia	Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNSOM, Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia and Head of ATMIS	13 Council members, ^a all invitees	
S/PV.9463 31 October 2023	Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia (S/2023/758)	Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (S/2023/807)	Somalia		Three Council members (China, Ghana ^g and Russian Federation), Somalia	Resolution 2705 (2023) 15-0-0
S/PV.9477 15 November 2023		Draft resolutions submitted by the United Kingdom (S/2023/871 and S/2023/872)			Two Council members (Ghana ^g and United States)	Resolution 2710 (2023) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)
S/PV.9491 1 December 2023		Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (S/2023/938)	Somalia		Five Council members, ^h Somalia	Resolution 2711 (2023) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII) Resolution 2714 (2023) 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII)

^a Albania, Brazil, China, Ecuador, France, Ghana (also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), Japan, Malta, Russian Federation, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States.

^b The representative of Japan spoke in his capacity as Chair of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#) concerning Al-Shabaab.

^c Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Uganda.

^d Albania, Brazil, China, Ecuador, France, Japan, Malta, Mozambique (also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Ghana), Russian Federation, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. The United Arab Emirates was represented by its Minister of State.

^e Somalia was represented by its President.

^f The representative of Gabon also spoke on behalf of Ghana and Mozambique.

^g The representative of Ghana also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique.

^h China, Ghana (also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), Japan, Russian Federation and United Arab Emirates.