

9. Peace and security in Africa

In 2023, the Council held five meetings and adopted one resolution under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”. Three of the meetings took the form of briefings, one was held as an open debate and one was convened for the adoption of a resolution.³⁰² More information on the meetings, including on participants, speakers and outcome, is provided in the table below. In addition to meetings, Council members held informal consultations of the whole in connection with this item.³⁰³

In 2023, the Council held a high-level open debate under the sub-item entitled “The impact of development policies in the implementation of the Silencing the Guns initiative”.³⁰⁴ The Council also discussed the operations of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel, the implementation of resolutions [2320 \(2016\)](#) and [2378 \(2017\)](#) related to the financing of African Union peace support operations mandated by the Council, and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.³⁰⁵ Furthermore, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#), by which it established an arms embargo against Al-Shabaab.³⁰⁶

At the high-level open debate held on 30 March at the initiative of Mozambique, which held the presidency for the month,³⁰⁷ the Council heard briefings by the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Africa, the African Union High Representative for the Silencing the Guns Initiative and the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Mozambique.³⁰⁸ In her remarks, the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General recalled that the African Union Master Roadmap of practical steps to silence the guns in Africa, also known as the Lusaka Roadmap, underscored the relevance of development policies and the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and the African Union Agenda 2063 for achieving peace and security on the continent.³⁰⁹ As African policymakers had acknowledged in the Lusaka Roadmap, development policies played a

³⁰² For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. I.

³⁰³ Council members held informal consultations in connection with this item on 28 July to discuss the situation in Niger. See [A/78/2](#), part II, chap. 35.

³⁰⁴ See [S/PV.9299](#) and [S/PV.9299 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

³⁰⁵ See [S/PV.9322](#), [S/PV.9329](#) and [S/PV.9355](#).

³⁰⁶ See [S/PV.9490](#).

³⁰⁷ A concept note was circulated by a letter dated 24 February 2023 ([S/2023/148/Rev.1](#)).

³⁰⁸ See [S/PV.9299](#) and [S/PV.9299 \(Resumption 1\)](#).

³⁰⁹ See [S/PV.9299](#).

substantial role in supporting conflict prevention and resolution, while the absence of development policies that delivered inclusive development could act as a root cause of conflicts. She emphasized the need to address both external and internal root causes of conflicts and that sustainable development was the only effective solution to conflicts on the continent. The Special Representative highlighted the peace process in Mozambique as an example of the effective implementation of development policies in support of a peace and security objective. She further opined that such an effective combination of peace and development tools would enable African countries to silence the guns in the continent and achieve durable peace.

The African Union High Representative for the Silencing the Guns Initiative noted that Africa faced multiple challenges that put the attainment of the initiative's objectives at risk and that the causes of those challenges were historical, constitutional, institutional, economic, social and cultural, and also related to the impact of climate change.³¹⁰ He stressed the importance of people-centred recovery and transformation in Africa, calling for investments in areas such as education and science, technology and innovation, health, employment and gender equality and youth empowerment, as well as the need to secure abundant financial resources. The High Representative also stressed the importance of digital technologies, the development of agricultural parks aimed at making Africa food secure, sustainable industrialization, the promotion of the African Continental Free Trade Area market and improved disbursement methods for climate financing instruments. He underscored that silencing the guns required ownership by subregional bodies, national Governments and, above all, by the African peoples and active civil society, as well as the support of multilateral and bilateral partners.

The Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Mozambique elaborated on the reasons for the success of the Maputo Accord for Peace and National Reconciliation, namely, national ownership, building trust, remaining flexible and ensuring a human-centred process.³¹¹ According to him, the combination of these factors had created commitment to continuity and enabled sustained implementation, so that the Maputo Accord was taking ever deeper roots.

In his remarks after the briefers, the President of Mozambique noted that the triad of peace, development and human rights guided the Silencing the Guns by 2030 agenda. Moreover,

³¹⁰ Ibid.

³¹¹ Ibid.

drawing from Mozambique's own history, he emphasized the importance of dialogue in ending conflicts and discussed ongoing efforts to address terrorism and violent extremism in the country, with a focus on developing human capital as a long-term solution for peace. Council members and other Member States expressed their support for African initiatives on peace and development and highlighted the crucial role played by the African Union and other subregional organizations in that regard. Most speakers noted the importance of efforts to address the root causes of conflict. Several speakers noted the connections between security and development and emphasized the importance and potential of development as means to address drivers of conflicts and extremism, including poverty, social exclusion and inequality.³¹² Multiple speakers also underscored the importance of promoting the participation and inclusion of women and young people in peace and decision-making processes and economic activities,³¹³ and highlighted the links between climate change and conflict.³¹⁴ Various speakers recognized the need to strengthen the partnerships between regional organizations in Africa and the United Nations, with some addressing the possible use of United Nations assessed contributions to fund African-led peace support operations.³¹⁵ Member States also addressed the role and work of the Peacebuilding Commission, including the need to enhance the coordination of the Peacebuilding Commission with other United Nations entities,³¹⁶ and discussed strengthening the role of international financial institutions in tackling peace and security challenges.³¹⁷

³¹² Ibid., Mozambique, Brazil, United Arab Emirates, China, Gabon, Malta, United Kingdom, Ghana, Switzerland and Portugal; and [S/PV.9299 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Thailand, Poland, Egypt, Morocco, Italy, Republic of Korea, Austria, Slovenia, European Union, Namibia, Qatar, Sierra Leone, Ireland, Czechia, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Argentina.

³¹³ See [S/PV.9299](#), Mozambique, Japan, Malta, Ecuador, Ghana, France, Albania, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago and Germany; and [S/PV.9299 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Morocco, Italy, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, European Union, Costa Rica, Croatia (on behalf of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect), Namibia, Qatar, Denmark (on behalf of the Nordic countries), Greece, Ireland, Romania, Czechia, Nigeria, Ukraine, Spain and Indonesia.

³¹⁴ See [S/PV.9299](#), Mozambique, Malta and Switzerland; and [S/PV.9299 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Poland, Egypt, Morocco, Republic of Korea, Austria, Slovenia, Director General of the International Organization of Migration, Croatia, Namibia, Ireland and Czechia.

³¹⁵ See [S/PV.9299](#), China, France, United Kingdom, Ghana, Albania and Germany; and [S/PV.9299 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Thailand, Egypt, Republic of Korea, Slovenia, European Union, Costa Rica, Namibia, Denmark, Nigeria, India, Indonesia and Argentina.

³¹⁶ See [S/PV.9299](#), Brazil, Japan, Malta, Ecuador, United Kingdom, Ghana and Albania; and [S/PV.9299 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Thailand, Republic of Korea and Indonesia.

³¹⁷ See [S/PV.9299](#), Gabon, Ecuador and Ghana; and [S/PV.9299 \(Resumption 1\)](#), Thailand, India and Indonesia.

At the meeting held on 16 May, the Council discussed the operations of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel further to the report of the Secretary-General.³¹⁸ The Council was briefed by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, the Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel and the Coordinator of the Climate Action Network for West and Central Africa. In her remarks, the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa stated that the security situation in the Sahel remained very worrisome, with non-State actors continuing to carry out attacks against civilian and military targets and engaging in confrontations over access to resources, territorial control and influence, and exacerbating an already dire humanitarian situation.³¹⁹ She noted steady progress in the operationalization of the Joint Force, including through its restructuring to new realities against the background of strategic and operational shifts in the Sahel such as the reconfiguration of the European and French forces, the withdrawal of Mali from the Group of Five for the Sahel and the intensification of threats in the border area. The Assistant Secretary-General noted, however, that despite those efforts, insecurity in the tri-border area of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger continued to grow. Moreover, the tripartite agreement between the European Union, the Group of Five for the Sahel and the United Nations would expire in June and thereby end the support provided by the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) to the Group of Five for the Sahel. She described this as an opportunity for the three parties to reflect on how the international community should renew its approaches to supporting regional security mechanisms. Regardless of what support was extended, the Assistant Secretary-General asserted that stabilizing the region hinged on aligning policies and approaches and putting the people of the region at the forefront of efforts, including by addressing the underlying governance, development, human rights and humanitarian challenges.

In his statement, acknowledging that the security situation in the Sahel continued to deteriorate, the Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel questioned whether these problems could have been avoided if the calls for stepping up the operationalization and response

³¹⁸ See [S/PV.9322](#). See also [S/2023/328](#).

³¹⁹ See [S/PV.9322](#).

of the Joint Force had been listened to.³²⁰ He noted that, since its establishment in 2017, the Joint Force had been unable to be truly operational, owing to a lack of sustainable funding and equipment. The Executive Secretary recalled that, at their sixth extraordinary summit held on 20 February, the Heads of State of the Group of Five for the Sahel reaffirmed their readiness to preserve and strengthen the organization and welcomed the new structure of the Joint Force and its adaptation to the current environment, including through a new concept of operations, which would be submitted to the African Union Peace and Security Council and the United Nations Security Council. He underscored that it was vital that support be provided for the operationalization of the Joint Force including through sustainable funding and equipment. Given that the fight could not be won by weapons alone, the Executive Secretary noted that the Group of Five for the Sahel was also working on other aspects of the issue, such as development, the prevention of violent extremism and climate change. He concluded by underscoring the need to address the root causes of the crisis and expressed hope that the recommendations of the Independent High-Level Panel on Security and Development in the Sahel would receive the necessary attention and support from the international community.

The Coordinator of the Climate Action Network for West and Central Africa briefed Council members on the linkages between climate change and security in the Sahel.³²¹ According to the Coordinator, competition over access to water or natural resources was a source of tension among communities and created a potential recruiting ground for terrorist organizations. In addition, a reduction in the percentage of fertile land was fuelling conflicts between farmers and herders. She called for multisectoral responses, built with and by affected communities, while providing the necessary climate financing to facilitate adaptation in the region.

In their discussions, Council members exchanged views on the status and challenges of the Joint Force, the importance of sustained support for regional counter-terrorism operations and the need for those operations to be conducted in accordance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law.³²² Most Council members also addressed the importance

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² For more information on the discussion, see part VIII, sect. III.

of tackling the root causes of conflict, fostering good governance and democratic institutions, enhancing the participation of women and young people and addressing the effects of climate change.

On 25 May, the Council held a meeting further to the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolutions [2320 \(2016\)](#) and [2378 \(2017\)](#) and considerations related to the financing of African Union peace support operations mandated by the Council.³²³ At the meeting, Council members heard briefings by the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs and the Program Director for Amani Africa.³²⁴ In her statement, the Under-Secretary-General presented the report of the Secretary-General, including his recommendations on securing predictable, sustainable and flexible resources for African Union-led peace support operations.³²⁵ In that regard, she stated that the case for financing African Union-led peace support operations was solid and expressed hope that the Council would agree to provide its backing, including by allowing access to United Nations assessed contributions. Citing the complex nature and scope of the conflicts in Africa, the African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs called for a paradigm shift from peacekeeping to peace enforcement.³²⁶ He further called on the Council to decide on the issues and modalities for financing of African Union peace support operations included in the consensus paper and the report of the Secretary-General. In her remarks, the Program Director for Amani Africa stressed that the conflicts in Africa required the combination of peace enforcement, stabilization and peacebuilding instruments and that African Union peace support operations financed through United Nations assessed contributions could be the necessary alternative to United Nations peacekeeping.³²⁷ Following the briefings, Council members generally welcomed the recommendations of the Secretary-General and exchanged views on the

³²³ See [S/PV.9329](#). See also [S/2023/303](#).

³²⁴ On 21 December, the Council adopted resolution [2719 \(2023\)](#) on the financing of African Union peace support operations under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security”. See part I, sect. 38.

³²⁵ See [S/PV.9329](#).

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Ibid.

conditions and modalities for the use of assessed contributions for African Union led peace support operations.³²⁸

At the meeting held on 21 June, Council members were briefed on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, the President of the Commission of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the President of the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission.³²⁹ In her statement, the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa reported that instances of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Gulf of Guinea had continued to steadily decrease due to the efforts of national authorities and the support of regional and international partners.³³⁰ While noting that the ongoing operationalization of the interregional maritime security mechanism, the Yaoundé Architecture, had significantly increased maritime security cooperation, resulting in enhanced information-sharing and the effective pooling of resources, she underscored the need for increased support to address challenges holding back its full operationalization.

The President of the ECCAS Commission noted that there had been a reduction in instances of piracy and hostage-taking in the Central African region of the Gulf of Guinea since 2021, which, according to him, was explained by the presence of international vessels and greater information-sharing among States.³³¹ He further noted that ECCAS member States had committed to coordinating their efforts to combat maritime security challenges, including through the establishment of a security strategy and the formalization of cooperation and coordination with ECOWAS through the Yaoundé Architecture. The President of the ECOWAS Commission highlighted counter-piracy efforts at the national, regional and continental level, particularly underscoring the success of increased information-sharing and cooperation between ECOWAS and ECCAS.³³² Support by the international community for operations and exercises in the Gulf of Guinea had also led to an improved maritime-security situation in the region. He

³²⁸ Ibid. For more information on the briefings and discussion, see also part VIII, sect. III.

³²⁹ See [S/PV.9355](#).

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ Ibid.

³³² Ibid.

stressed the importance of reviewing the Yaoundé Code of Conduct with a view to transforming it into a legally binding framework. The Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission elaborated on the efforts of the countries in the region, as well as the significant results achieved.³³³ He also addressed challenges in the Gulf of Guinea, particularly emphasizing the limited implementation and ratification of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct by Member States and the lack of resources and funding.

During the ensuing discussion, most Council members welcomed or noted the progress achieved in tackling maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea and the decline in incidents of piracy. Most Council members acknowledged the role played by regional organizations, including the African Union, ECCAS, ECOWAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission, and stressed the importance of sustaining or strengthening efforts to address maritime insecurity, with some emphasizing the need for continued support by the international community.³³⁴ Council members also highlighted the positive impact of the Yaoundé Code of Conduct and the Yaoundé Architecture, as well as the need for the further operationalization of the mechanism. Most Council members also discussed efforts related to capacity-building in the countries of the region and strengthening judicial processes and legal frameworks. With regard to the latter, several Council members emphasized that all efforts to tackle piracy and armed robbery must comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.³³⁵ Several Council members further emphasized the importance of tackling root causes of piracy, including high levels of poverty, youth unemployment and the impacts of climate change.³³⁶ Some speakers also advocated for a holistic, integrated or whole-of-society approach to address the multifaceted drivers of piracy.³³⁷

With regard to decisions adopted during the period under review, on 1 December, the Council adopted resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#), by which it recalled its decisions in resolution [1844 \(2008\)](#), to impose targeted sanctions and resolutions [2002 \(2011\)](#), [2093 \(2013\)](#) and [2662 \(2022\)](#), expanding the listing criteria and establishing an arms embargo against Al-Shabaab in Somalia,

³³³ Ibid.

³³⁴ Ibid., Ghana, Japan, France, Gabon, Russian Federation, Ecuador, Switzerland, Mozambique, China and United Arab Emirates.

³³⁵ Ibid., Japan, Brazil, United Kingdom, Albania and Malta.

³³⁶ Ibid., Ghana, Japan, Brazil, France, Gabon, United Kingdom, Albania, Malta and Mozambique.

³³⁷ Ibid., Ghana, United Kingdom, Albania and Malta.

with exemptions and exceptions for other actors in Somalia.³³⁸ The Council further reaffirmed the ban on the import and export of Somali charcoal as set in paragraph 22 of resolution [2036 \(2012\)](#) and paragraphs 11 to 21 of resolution [2182 \(2014\)](#) and recalled its decision in resolution [2696 \(2023\)](#) to authorize a one-off disposal of charcoal stockpiles in and around Kismayo.³³⁹ The Council also decided to renew the implementation measures related to the ban on components of improvised explosive devices.³⁴⁰ Furthermore, the Council renewed the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 15 January 2025 and renamed the Panel to the Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#).³⁴¹ The Council also decided that the Committee should cease being described as “pursuant to resolution [751 \(1992\)](#)” and instead be described as “pursuant to resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#)”.³⁴²

Resolution [2713 \(2024\)](#) was adopted with fourteen votes in favour and one abstention by France.³⁴³ Speaking after the vote, the representative of France expressed support for the lifting of the embargo on weapons and military equipment destined for the Somali authorities, but expressed regret that the reference to the territorial dispute between Djibouti and Eritrea, which had made it possible to maintain the attention of the Council on the matter, had not been included.³⁴⁴ The representative of the Russian Federation expressed hope that the measures in the resolution would provide substantial assistance to Mogadishu to overcome its difficulties in combating Al-Shabaab.³⁴⁵ The representative of the United States welcomed the adopted measures, stating that they would help limit the influence of groups like Al-Shabaab and address the drivers of conflict in Somalia.³⁴⁶ However, he also expressed disappointment over the omission of language related to Djibouti and Eritrea, noting that there had been no noticeable progress on the issues between the two countries.

³³⁸ See resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#), paras. 4, 14, 33 (a)-(d), 34 (a)-(c), 35 (a)-(b), 36, 44 (a)-(c). Also on 1 December, acting under Chapter VII, the Council adopted resolution [2714 \(2023\)](#) under the item entitled “The situation in Somalia” by which it decided to lift the arms embargo on Somalia established in resolution [733 \(1992\)](#) as amended. For more information, see part I, sect. 2.

³³⁹ Resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#), paras. 14 and 17.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., para. 18.

³⁴¹ Ibid., para. 25.

³⁴² Ibid., paras. 25 and 31. For more information on the mandate of the Committee and Panel of Experts pursuant to resolution [2713 \(2023\)](#), see part IX, sect. I.

³⁴³ See [S/PV.9490](#).

³⁴⁴ Ibid.

³⁴⁵ Ibid.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

Meetings: Peace and security in Africa, 2023

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9299 and S/PV.9299 (Resumption 1) 30 March 2023	The impact of development policies in the implementation of the Silencing the Guns initiative Letter dated 24 February 2023 from the Permanent Representative of Mozambique to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2023/148/Rev. 1)		33 Member States ^a	Special Adviser on Africa to the United Nations Secretary-General, African Union High Representative for the Silencing the Guns Initiative, Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Mozambique, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations, Director General of the International Organization for Migration	All Council members ^b , all invitees ^c	
S/PV.9322 16 May 2023	Report of the Secretary-General on the operationalization of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel (S/2023/328)			Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, Executive Secretary of the Group of Five for the Sahel, representative of Enda Energy and Coordinator of the Climate Action Network for West and Central Africa	13 Council members ^d , all invitees ^e	
S/PV.9329 25 May 2023	Report of the Secretary-General on implementation of Security Council resolutions 2320 (2016) and 2378 (2017) and			Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and	13 Council members ^f , all invitees ^g	

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for-against-abstaining)</i>
S/PV.9355 21 June 2023	considerations related to the financing of African Union peace support operations mandated by the Security Council (S/2023/303)			Security, Program Director, Amani Africa		
				Assistant Secretary-General for Africa, Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, President of the Commission of the Economic Community of Central African States, President of the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States, Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission	All Council members, all invitees ^h	
S/PV.9490 1 December 2023		Draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom (S/2023/937)	Somalia		Four Council members (France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States)	Resolution 2713 (2022) 14-0-1 ⁱ (Chapter VII)

^a Argentina, Austria, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, the Republic of Korea, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago and Ukraine.

^b Mozambique was represented by its President.

^c Brazil was represented by its Secretary of State for Multilateral Political Affairs of the Ministry of External Relations. Trinidad and Tobago was represented by its Minister for Foreign and Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Affairs. Germany was represented by its Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office. Portugal was represented by its Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation. The representative of Croatia spoke on behalf of the Group of Friends of the Responsibility to Protect. The representative of Denmark also spoke on behalf of Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.

^d Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ecuador, Ghana, Japan, Malta, Russian Federation, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. The representative of Ghana also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique.

^e The representative of Enda Energy and the Executive Secretary of the G5 Sahel participated in the meeting via video-teleconference.

^f Albania, Brazil, China, France, Ecuador, Ghana (also on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique), Japan, Malta, Russian Federation, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom and United States. The representative of Ghana also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Mozambique. Switzerland was represented by the Vice-President of the Swiss Confederation.

^g The African Union Commissioner participated in the meeting via videoconference.

^h The Presidents of the Commissions of ECCAS and ECOWAS and the Executive Secretary of the Gulf of Guinea Commission participated in the meeting via videoconference.

ⁱ *For:* Albania, Brazil, China, Ecuador, Gabon, Ghana, Japan, Malta, Mozambique, Russian Federation, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States; *against:* none; *abstained:* France.