informed the Council that, due to the circumstances prevailing in Somalia, he had decided that the political office for Somalia would continue to operate out of Nairobi. He had further decided to reduce the staff of that office. By a letter dated 2 June 1995,<sup>113</sup> the President informed the Secretary-General that his letter had been brought to the attention of the members of the Council and that they had agreed with the decision contained therein.

<sup>113</sup> S/1995/452.

#### 7. Letters dated 20 and 23 December 1991 from France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America

# Decision of 8 April 1993: statement by the President

On 8 April 1993, after consultations among the members of the Council, the President issued the following statement on behalf of the Security Council:<sup>1</sup>

The members of the Security Council held informal consultations on 8 April 1993 pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992, by which the Council decided to review every 120 days or sooner, should the situation so require, the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

After hearing all the opinions expressed in the course of consultations, the President of the Council concluded that there was no agreement that the necessary conditions existed for modification of the measures of sanctions established in paragraphs 3 to 7 of resolution 748 (1992).

### Decision of 13 August 1993: statement by the President

On 13 August 1993, after consultations among the members of the Council, the President issued the following statement on behalf of the Security Council:<sup>2</sup>

The members of the Council held informal consultations on 13 August 1993 pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992, by which the Council decided to review every 120 days or sooner, should the situation so require, the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

After hearing all the opinions expressed in the course of consultations, the President concluded that there was no agreement that the necessary conditions existed for modification of the measures of sanctions established in paragraphs 3 to 7 of resolution 748 (1992).

<sup>1</sup> S/25554.

### Decision of 11 November 1993 (3312th meeting): resolution 883 (1993)

At its 3312th meeting, on 11 November 1993, the Security Council included the item entitled "Letters dated 20 and 23 December 1991 from France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America" in its agenda and considered it at the same meeting.<sup>3</sup> The Council invited the representatives of Egypt, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Sudan, at their request, to participate in the discussion without the right to vote. The President (Cape Verde) then drew the attention of the members of the Council to the text of a draft resolution submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States.<sup>4</sup> He also drew their attention to several other documents.<sup>5</sup>

The representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya challenged the fact that the Security Council was meeting to consider a matter that threatened international peace and security. In his view, the Council was meeting to consider a draft resolution that sought to intensify sanctions against his country, under the pretext that it had not complied with resolution 731 (1992). The truth of the matter was that his

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> S/26303.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The Council had agreed, in prior consultations, that the current formulation of the agenda item would overtake the earlier two formulations under which the item had been previously discussed; accordingly, they were deleted from that list (see PV/3312; see also chapter II).
<sup>4</sup> S/26701.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Letters dated 13 August 1993 from the representative of France (S/26304) and 22 September and 1, 18 and 22 October 1993 from the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (S/26500, S/26523, S/26604 and S/26629), all addressed to the Secretary-General.

Government had fully responded to that resolution, except in regard to the demand by the United States and the United Kingdom that the two alleged suspects be extradited. That problem had not yet been solved because of a legal wrangle over which country had the competence to try those individuals. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had submitted to the Secretary-General, on 11 September 1993, a memorandum that contained points relating to its legal position vis-à-vis resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992).<sup>6</sup> In that memorandum, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had asked questions based on the assumption that the two accused would challenge the charges levelled at them and voluntarily agree to stand trial before a foreign court. The memorandum also asked for clarification and safeguards relating to the foreign country concerned. On 24 September 1993, his Government had received the Secretary-General's answers to some of the questions raised7 and had notified him on 29 September 1993 that the two suspects had been given the relevant replies.8 The Secretary-General had also been given confirmation that the safeguards he had offered were sufficient and acceptable, and that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya would not object to the appearance of the two suspects before the Scottish judiciary and would even urge them to appear before the Scottish courts. Furthermore, assurances had also been given that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya would deal with the French demands with the same determination with which it had been dealing with the American and British demands. The speaker further indicated that the two suspects had not disagreed as to the principle of the trial, but had insisted that it be conducted in a place where neutrality and fairness could be guaranteed and where the proper procedures and arrangements for such a trial could be made. As part of the efforts of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to find a solution, the Government of Switzerland had been contacted for permission to hold the trial on its soil. He also recalled that his country had responded positively to the request made to pay

appropriate compensation, by declaring its readiness to pay if it was proven responsible for the downing of Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772.

The Libyan position, he argued, had been extremely flexible whereas the other side had adopted a rigid and intransigent position based on the logic of force. He contended that the sanctions imposed on his country had severely hurt the Libyan people and had had a negative impact on its development plans. More specifically, the prohibition on the export to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya of spare parts, engineering services and maintenance required for Libyan aircraft and their components had had adverse effects on a vital sector of the economy. He also charged that the United States and the United Kingdom had been trying, under the auspices of the Committee of the Security Council established under resolution 748 (1992), to widen the scope of the sanctions using "transparent pretexts" and "rigid positions". He warned that the tightening of sanctions would not solve the problem but rather complicate it.

Turning to the draft resolution, he stated that it repeated the same "grave legal mistake" of previous resolutions by linking the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to international terrorism on no other basis but the suspicions regarding two Libyan nationals based on reports by intelligence agencies, which were an a priori judgement that had not yet been substantiated by any evidence. He recalled, in that regard, that his country had declared, on 14 May 1992, in a letter to the Secretary-General,9 its unequivocal condemnation of international terrorism, had affirmed that there were no terrorist training camps or terrorist organizations or groups on its soil, and had invited the United Nations to verify it. He further stated that the draft resolution constituted a "blatant violation" of the provisions of the Charter and the norms of international law, because it dealt with a legal dispute under Chapter VII instead of Chapter VI of the Charter. Finally, there was no justification for the draft resolution since the parties were approaching the final phase in the settlement of the dispute. In that regard, he reiterated the commitment of his Government to find a solution to the problem that arose from the demands of the United States and the United Kingdom within the framework of international law. As for the French demands, he affirmed that they did not contain anything that ran

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Letter dated 22 September 1993 from the representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the Secretary-General, transmitting a letter dated 11 September 1993 from the Secretary-General of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, addressed to the Secretary-General, and enclosure, containing a memorandum (undated) to the Secretary-General (S/26500).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Not issued as a document of the Security Council.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> S/26523.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> S/23918.

counter to the law. He believed that had the French judge not attempted to come to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on a military destroyer, his country's response to the French demands would have had encouraging results.<sup>10</sup>

The representative of the Sudan, speaking on behalf of the League of Arab States (LAS), pointed out that the crisis between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, on one hand, and the United States, France and the United Kingdom, on the other hand, was a legal dispute which should be dealt with on the basis of Article 33, Chapter VI, and not under Chapter VII of the Charter which addressed threats to international peace and security. It should be settled in a court of law, and specifically by the International Court of Justice, and not in the Security Council, which was not mandated by the Charter to exercise judicial functions. Noting that the matter before the Council concerned a State member of LAS, he pointed out that LAS had expressed its willingness to provide its good offices and to cooperate with the Secretary-General and the Security Council. In that context, it had established a seven-member committee entrusted with following developments and finding a just and peaceful solution to the conflict, in conformity with the rules of international law, justice and the relevant international treaties. In dealing with the crisis, the League had based itself on the Charter of the United Nations, which stipulated that all international disputes should be settled by peaceful means and without endangering international peace and security, and especially on Article 52 of the Charter. He contended that the draft resolution before the Council was not the best way to end the dispute. Moreover, it could have negative results and shake the confidence of smaller countries in the legal settlement of such disputes and the Council's neutrality. The interpretation of legal texts, especially the Charter, should be carried out only by judicial organs, and no other body could arrogate that competence for itself. He also warned that the impact of the sanctions had gone beyond the people of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and had affected neighbouring countries. In that context, Article 50 of the Charter could be of only minimal help to those who were suffering as a result of the impositions of sanctions.11

The draft resolution was thereupon put to the vote and was adopted by 11 votes in favour to none against, with 4 abstentions (China, Djibouti, Morocco and Pakistan) as resolution 883 (1993), which reads:

#### The Security Council,

*Reaffirming* its resolutions 731 (1992) of 21 January 1992 and 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992,

Deeply concerned that after more than twenty months the Libyan Government has not fully complied with these resolutions,

Determined to eliminate international terrorism,

*Convinced* that those responsible for acts of international terrorism must be brought to justice,

*Convinced also* that the suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which States are directly or indirectly involved, is essential for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Determining, in this context, that the continued failure by the Libyan Government to demonstrate by concrete actions its renunciation of terrorism, and in particular its continued failure to respond fully and effectively to the requests and decisions in resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992), constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Taking note of the letters to the Secretary-General dated 29 September and 1 October 1993 from the Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation of Libya and his speech in the general debate at the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly in which Libya stated its intention to encourage those charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 to appear for trial in Scotland and its willingness to cooperate with the competent French authorities in the case of the bombing of Union de Transports Aériens flight 772,

*Expressing its gratitude* to the Secretary-General for the efforts he has made pursuant to paragraph 4 of resolution 731 (1992),

*Recalling* the right of States, under Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations, to consult the Council where they find themselves confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of preventive or enforcement measures,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

1. *Demands* once again that the Libyan Government comply without any further delay with resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992);

2. *Decides*, in order to secure compliance by the Libyan Government with the decisions of the Council, to take the following measures, which shall come into force at 0001 hours eastern standard time on 1 December 1993 unless the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> S/PV.3312, pp. 3-26.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Ibid., pp. 30-39.

Secretary-General has reported to the Council in the terms set out in paragraph 16 below;

3. *Decides also* that all States in which there are funds or other financial resources (including funds derived or generated from property) owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by:

(a) The Government or public authorities of Libya; or

(b) Any Libyan undertaking;

shall freeze such funds and financial resources and ensure that neither they nor any other funds and financial resources are made available, by their nationals or by any persons within their territory, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of the Government or public authorities of Libya or any Libyan undertaking, which for the purposes of this paragraph, means any commercial, industrial or public utility undertaking which is owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by:

(i) The Government or public authorities of Libya,

(ii) Any entity, wherever located or organized, owned or controlled by the Government or public authorities of Libya, or

(iii) Any person identified by States as acting on behalf of the Government or public authorities of Libya or by any entity, wherever located or organized, owned or controlled by the Government or public authorities of Libya for the purposes of the present resolution;

4. Further decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 3 above do not apply to funds or other financial resources derived from the sale or supply of any petroleum or petroleum products, including natural gas and natural gas products, or agricultural products or commodities, originating in Libya and exported therefrom after the time specified in paragraph 2 above, provided that any such funds are paid into separate bank accounts exclusively for these funds;

5. Decides that all States shall prohibit any provision to Libya by their nationals or from their territory of the items listed in the annex to this resolution, as well as the provision of any types of equipment, supplies and grants of licensing arrangements for the manufacture or maintenance of such items;

6. *Also decides* that, in order to make fully effective the provisions of resolution 748 (1992), all States shall:

(*a*) Require the immediate and complete closure of all Libyan Arab Airlines offices within their territories;

(b) Prohibit any commercial transactions with Libyan Arab Airlines by their nationals or from their territory, including the honouring or endorsement of any tickets or other documents issued by that airline;

(c) Prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, the entering into or renewal of arrangements for:

(i) The making available, for operation within Libya, of any aircraft or aircraft components, or

(ii) The provision of engineering or maintenance servicing of any aircraft or aircraft components within Libya;

(d) Prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, the supply of any materials destined for the construction, improvement or maintenance of Libyan civilian or military airfields and associated facilities and equipment, or of any engineering or other services or components destined for the maintenance of any Libyan civil or military airfields or associated facilities and equipment, except emergency equipment and equipment and services directly related to civilian air traffic control;

(e) Prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, any provision of advice, assistance, or training to Libyan pilots, flight engineers, or aircraft and ground maintenance personnel associated with the operation of aircraft and airfields within Libya;

(f) Prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, any renewal of any direct insurance for Libyan aircraft;

7. *Confirms* that the decision taken in resolution 748 (1992) that all States shall significantly reduce the level of the staff at Libyan diplomatic missions and consular posts includes all missions and posts established since that decision or after the coming into force of the present resolution;

8. Decides that the Governments of all States, and the Government of Libya, shall take the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at the instance of the Government or public authorities of Libya, or of any Libyan national, or of any Libyan undertaking as defined in paragraph 3 above, or of any person claiming through or for the benefit of any such person or undertaking, in connection with any contract or other transaction or commercial operation where its performance was affected by reason of the measures imposed by or pursuant to the present resolution or related resolutions;

9. Instructs the Committee of the Security Council established by resolution 748 (1992) to draw up expeditiously guidelines for the implementation of paragraphs 3 to 7 above, and to amend and supplement, as appropriate, the guidelines for the implementation of resolution 748 (1992), especially its paragraph 5 (a);

10. *Entrusts* the Committee of the Security Council established by resolution 748 (1992) with the task of examining possible requests for assistance under the provisions of Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations and making recommendations to the President of the Council for appropriate action;

11. Affirms that nothing in the present resolution affects Libya's duty scrupulously to adhere to all of its obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debt;

12. *Calls upon* all States, including States not members of the United Nations, and all international organizations, to act

strictly in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into or any licence or permit granted prior to the effective time of the present resolution;

13. *Requests* all States to report to the Secretary-General by 15 January 1994 on the measures they have instituted for meeting the obligations set out in paragraphs 3 to 7 above;

14. *Invites* the Secretary-General to continue his role as set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 731 (1992);

15. *Calls again upon* all Member States individually and collectively to encourage the Libyan Government to respond fully and effectively to the requests and decisions in resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992);

16. Expresses its readiness to review the measures set forth above and in resolution 748 (1992) with a view to suspending them immediately if the Secretary-General reports to the Council that the Libyan Government has ensured the appearance of those charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 for trial before the appropriate United Kingdom or United States court and has satisfied the French judicial authorities with respect to the bombing of Union de Transports Aériens flight 772, and with a view to lifting them immediately when Libya complies fully with the requests and decisions in resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992), and requests the Secretary-General, within ninety days of such suspension, to report to the Security Council on Libya's compliance with the remaining provisions of its resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992) and, in the case of non-compliance, expresses its resolve to terminate immediately the suspension of these measures;

17. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

#### Annex

#### List of items referred to in paragraph 5 of the present resolution:

- I. Pumps of medium or large capacity whose capacity is equal to or larger than 350 cubic metres per hour and drivers (gas turbines and electric motors) designed for use in the transportation of crude oil and natural gas.
- II. Equipment designed for use in crude oil export terminals:
  - Loading buoys or single point moorings (spm);
  - Flexible hoses for connection between underwater manifolds (plem) and single point mooring and floating loading hoses of large sizes (from 12 to 16 inches);
  - Anchor chains.
- III. Equipment not specially designed for use in crude oil export terminals but which because of their large capacity can be used for this purpose:

- Loading pumps of large capacity (4,000 cubic metres per hour) and small head (10 bars);
- Boosting pumps within the same range of flow rates;
- In-line pipeline inspection tools and cleaning devices (i.e. pigging tools) (16 inches and above);
- Metering equipment of large capacity (1,000 cubic metres per hour and above).
- IV. Refinery equipment:
  - Boilers meeting American Society of Mechanical Engineers 1 standards;
  - Furnaces meeting American Society of Mechanical Engineers 8 standards;
  - Fractionation columns meeting American Society of Mechanical Engineers 8 standards;
  - Pumps meeting American Petroleum Institute 610 standards;
  - Catalytic reactors meeting American Society of Mechanical Engineers 8 standards.
  - Prepared catalysts, including the following:

Catalysts containing platinum and those containing molybdenum.

V. Spare parts destined for the items in I to IV above.

Speaking after the vote, the representative of the United States said that the resolution just adopted demonstrated that the Council was steadfast in its opposition to international terrorism which presented a challenge to every nation in the world. Her Government was determined to pursue justice, and that pursuit must, when necessary, include sanctions of the Security Council. The resolution was "balanced and precisely targeted". Its hallmarks were an assets freeze, a limited equipment embargo against the Libyan oil industry, and the tightening of earlier sanctions. She stressed that the resolution was directed at Libya, and Libya alone, and the Libyan Government knew what it must do. The Council awaited the turnover of those indicted for the bombing of Pan Am 103; the Libyan Government's cooperation with the French judiciary; compensation for the victims of Libyan terrorism; and its clear and confirmed renunciation of terrorism.12

The representative of France regretted that the Council had found it necessary to reinforce sanctions against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. His Government, as well as the Governments of the United Kingdom and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Ibid., pp. 40-42.

the United States, had given that country a final chance to prove its good will by complying with its obligations before 1 October 1993. Unfortunately, the Libyan authorities had continued to delay and obstruct the Rejecting allegation process. the that the aforementioned Governments had a "hidden agenda" against the Libyan regime, he affirmed that if the Libyan Government cooperated effectively with the French judicial authorities in the UTA 772 case, and handed over to the competent courts the two suspects in the attack on Pan Am 103, the Council would immediately suspend all sanctions.13

The representative of the United Kingdom said that the new resolution had adopted a carefully balanced approach. Thus, in addition to the "stick" of further sanctions there was also a "carrot": if the Secretary-General reported to the Council that the Libyan Government had ensured the appearance of those charged with the Lockerbie bombing before the appropriate United States or Scottish court and had satisfied the French judicial authorities with respect to the bombing of UTA 772, then the Security Council would review the sanctions with a view to suspending them immediately. The suspension of the sanctions was to be seen as preliminary to their being lifted immediately after the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya had complied fully with resolutions 731 (1992) and 748 (1992). That new element was designed to make it clear that sanctions were not intended to punish, but rather to bring the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to compliance. The resolution also contained a grace period before the sanctions came into effect. He concluded by saying that it was important not only to secure justice for the victims, but also to send a clear message to current and would-be terrorists and sponsors of terrorism that the international community would neither condone nor tolerate it, and that it was not cost-free.14

The representative of Brazil said that his country's support for the resolution just adopted was an expression of its commitment to eradicating international terrorism. He made it clear, however, that Brazil understood that the action taken by the Council was aimed exclusively at addressing a political problem involving a threat to international peace and security and that it could not be construed in a manner inconsistent with the presumption of innocence.15 Furthermore, efforts to combat and prevent acts of international terrorism must be based on relevant principles of international law and the existing international Conventions. As provided for in Article 24 (2) of the Charter, the Council was bound to discharge its responsibilities in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, and therefore its decisions, including those under Chapter VII, had to be construed in the light of those purposes and principles, which, inter alia, required respect for the principles of justice and international law. Finally, he stated that his delegation attached great importance to operative paragraph 10 of the resolution, on possible requests for assistance under Article 50 of the Charter. It also believed that, as there were an increasing number of cases in which sanctions were applied, there was a proportionate need to examine ways in which the United Nations could ensure a more effective application of Article 50 beyond that particular case.16

The representative of China contended that the disputes between States, no matter how complicated, should be settled peacefully by diplomatic and political means. The Chinese delegation had previously opposed the imposition of sanctions on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and under the changing circumstances, was still not in favour of maintaining, let alone intensifying, those sanctions. In that context, regional organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity, LAS and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, were in a better position to promote the settlement of the question. He urged the parties concerned to adopt a flexible and compromising attitude in order to create the necessary conditions for a final settlement.<sup>17</sup>

The representative of the Russian Federation stated that his country was anxious to cooperate with the world community in putting an end to acts of international terrorism which was essential for the maintenance of international peace and security. His delegation attached particular importance to paragraph 11 of the resolution just adopted, the purpose of which was to ensure that, as a result of the additional sanctions imposed on the Libyan Arab

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., pp. 42-44.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Ibid., pp. 44-46.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> This view was shared by Spain; see S/PV.3312,

pp. 56-59.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> S/PV.3312, pp. 47-51.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Ibid., pp. 52-54.

Jamahiriya, the interests of other States would be harmed as little as possible.<sup>18</sup>

During the course of the debate, a number of speakers reiterated their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and urged the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to comply fully with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. Some also called upon the Secretary-General, the regional organizations and interested governments to continue their efforts in order to find a peaceful solution to the dispute.<sup>19</sup>

#### Decision of 10 December 1993: statement by the President

On 10 December 1993, after consultations among the members of the Council, the President issued the following statement on behalf of the Security Council:<sup>20</sup>

The members of the Council held informal consultations on 10 December 1993 pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992, by which the Council decided to review every 120 days or sooner, should the situation so require, the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

After hearing all the opinions expressed in the course of consultations, the President concluded that there was no agreement that the necessary conditions existed for modification of the measures of sanctions established in paragraphs 3 to 7 of resolution 748 (1992).

#### **Decision of 8 April 1994: statement by the President**

On 8 April 1994, after consultations among the members of the Council, the President issued the following statement on behalf of the Security Council:<sup>21</sup>

The members of the Security Council held informal consultations on 8 April 1994 pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992, by which the Council decided to review every one hundred and twenty days or sooner, should the situation so require, the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

After hearing all the opinions expressed in the course of the consultations, the President concluded that there was no agreement that the necessary conditions existed for modification of the measures of sanctions established by paragraphs 3 to 7 of resolution 748 (1992).

#### **Decision of 5 August 1994: statement by the President**

On 5 August 1994, after consultations among the members of the Council, the President issued the following statement on behalf of the Security Council:<sup>22</sup>

The members of the Security Council held informal consultations on 8 April 1994 pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992, by which the Council decided to review every one hundred and twenty days or sooner, should the situation so require, the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

After hearing all the opinions expressed in the course of the consultations, the President concluded that there was no agreement that the necessary conditions existed for modification of the measures of sanctions established by paragraphs 3 to 7 of resolution 748 (1992).

#### Decision of 30 November 1994: statement by the President

On 30 November 1994, after consultations among the members of the Council, the President issued the following statement on behalf of the Security Council:<sup>23</sup>

The members of the Security Council held informal consultations on 30 November 1994 pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 748 (1992) of 31 March 1992, by which the Council decided to review every one hundred and twenty days or sooner, should the situation so require, the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

After hearing all the opinions expressed in the course of the consultations the President concluded that there was no agreement that the necessary conditions existed for modification of the measures of sanctions established in paragraphs 3 to 7 of resolution 748 (1992).

## Decision of 30 March 1995: statement by the President

On 30 March 1995, after consultations among the members of the Council, the President issued the following statement on behalf of the Security Council:<sup>24</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Ibid., pp. 54-55.

 <sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Ibid., pp. 56-59 (Spain); pp. 59-60 (Hungary); pp. 61-62 (Venezuela); and pp. 62-63 (Japan).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> S/26861.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> S/PRST/1994/18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> S/PRST/1994/41.

<sup>23</sup> S/PRST/1994/76.

The members of the Security Council held informal consultations on 30 March 1995 pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 748 (1992), by which the Council decided to review every one hundred and twenty days or sooner, should the situation so require, the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

After hearing all the opinions expressed in the course of consultations, the President concluded that there was no agreement that the necessary conditions existed for modification of the measures of sanctions established in paragraphs 3 to 7 of resolution 748 (1992).

## Decision of 28 July 1995: statement by the President

On 28 July 1995, after consultations among the members of the Council, the President issued the following statement on behalf of the Security Council:<sup>25</sup>

The members of the Security Council held informal consultations on 28 July 1995 pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 748 (1992), by which the Council decided to review every one hundred and twenty days or sooner, should the situation so require, the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

After hearing all the opinions expressed in the course of consultations, the President concluded that there was no agreement that the necessary conditions existed for modification of the measures of sanctions established in paragraphs 3 to 7 of resolution 748 (1992).

### Decision of 22 November 1995: statement by the President

On 22 November 1995, after consultations among the members of the Council, the President issued the following statement on behalf of the Security Council:<sup>26</sup>

The members of the Council held informal consultations on 22 November 1995 pursuant to paragraph 13 of resolution 748 (1992), by which the Council decided to review every one hundred and twenty days or sooner, should the situation so require, the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 against the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

After hearing all the opinions expressed in the course of consultations, the President of the Council concluded that there was no agreement that the necessary conditions existed for modification of the measures of sanctions established in paragraphs 3 to 7 of resolution 748 (1992).

<sup>26</sup> S/PRST/1995/56.

25 S/PRST/1995/36.

#### 8. The situation in Mozambique

### Decision of 14 April 1993 (3198th meeting): resolution 818 (1993)

On 2 April 1993, pursuant to resolution 797 (1992) of 16 December 1992, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council a report on the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ),<sup>1</sup> in which he reported on the operation's deployment and the progress made in the implementation of the General Peace Agreement.<sup>2</sup>

The Secretary-General's assessment of the period under review included a number of positive developments. The ceasefire had largely held, both parties had continued to exercise restraint, and a need for peace was strongly felt among the Mozambicans. Arrangements had also been worked out to permit the

Zimbabwean and Malawian troops to remain in the transport corridors which ran across Mozambique to neighbouring landlocked countries beyond the time specified in the Agreement. The Secretary-General noted, however, that there were several reasons for concern. Many of the timetables established in the Agreement had proved to be unrealistic. There had been little progress in implementing a crucial aspect of the Agreement, namely demobilization, which had affected the timetable of the whole peace process. Under the terms of the Agreement, the ceasefire was to be followed by the separation of the two sides' forces and their concentration in certain assembly areas. Demobilization of troops who would not serve in the Mozambican Defence Force was to begin immediately thereafter. Continuing deep mistrust between the parties, however, had resulted in reluctance to begin assembly and demobilization of troops, and had contributed to the delay in the deployment of United Nations military observers. Another complication was the insistence by the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> S/25518; for the establishment and mandate of ONUMOZ, see S/24892 and resolution 797 (1992). See

also chapter V. <sup>2</sup> S/24635, annex.