

Council for the maintenance of international peace and security. In that connection, most participants called for strengthening the relationship between the Council and the Court to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with international law. Many participants called for a greater involvement with the Court by, among other things, making use of the referral of legal disputes to the Court whenever necessary, in accordance with Article 36 (3) of the Charter.<sup>817</sup> Participants at the videoconference made concrete proposals, such as inviting the President of the International Court of Justice to brief the Council when non-compliance with Court decisions could threaten international peace and security, having the Council more involved in following up on provisional measures specified by the International Court of Justice<sup>818</sup> and fully supporting the Court's decisions,<sup>819</sup> including by ensuring compliance with the Court's judgments.<sup>820</sup> At the videoconference, the representative of South Africa announced that his delegation had drafted and placed before the Council for its consideration a draft presidential statement addressing the aforementioned issues. He expressed the hope of reaching an agreement on the text, which he said would help advance the

peaceful resolution of conflicts and put an end to violent conflicts.

Following the videoconference, on 21 December the Council issued a presidential statement in connection with the item, by which it noted the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Charter and the one hundredth anniversary of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.<sup>821</sup> It reaffirmed its commitment to international law and the purposes and principles of the Charter, including the importance of the International Court of Justice in the international architecture and the maintenance of international peace and security.<sup>822</sup> The Council stressed the importance of all the provisions of the Charter regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes and the International Court of Justice, including those pertaining to the interaction between the Council and the International Court of Justice.<sup>823</sup> The Council recognized the positive contribution of the Court to the rule of law at the international level and its key role in adjudicating disputes among States, as well as the need to enhance efforts aimed at capacity-building and assisting Member States.<sup>824</sup> The Council also expressed its continued commitment to fostering interaction between the Court and the Council in accordance with their respective mandates under the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>825</sup>

<sup>817</sup> President of the International Court of Justice, Estonia, Niger, Tunisia, Austria, Bangladesh, Japan, Liechtenstein, Peru and Portugal. For further details on the discussion, see part VI, sect. IV.

<sup>818</sup> Belgium.

<sup>819</sup> Mexico.

<sup>820</sup> Saint Vincent and the Grenadines.

<sup>821</sup> See [S/PRST/2020/13](#), second paragraph.

<sup>822</sup> Ibid., first and fifth paragraphs.

<sup>823</sup> Ibid., third paragraph.

<sup>824</sup> Ibid., sixth and eighth paragraphs.

<sup>825</sup> Ibid., tenth paragraph.

## Videokonferences: the promotion and strengthening of the rule of law in the maintenance of international peace and security

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
18 December 2020	<a href="#">S/2020/1286</a>	Letter dated 23 December 2020 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	
21 December 2020	No record <sup>a</sup>		<a href="#">S/PRST/2020/13</a>

<sup>a</sup> See [A/75/2](#), part I, chap. IV.B.

## 32. Items relating to non-proliferation

### A. Non-proliferation

During the period under review, the Council held one meeting under the item entitled "Non-proliferation", which took the form of a

briefing.<sup>826</sup> More information on the meetings, including on the participants, speakers and outcomes, is given in table 1 below. In 2020, the Council failed to

<sup>826</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II.

adopt a draft resolution in connection with the item owing to the lack of a sufficient number of votes. Council members also held three open videoconferences in connection with the item. More information on the videoconferences is provided in table 2 below.<sup>827</sup>

Under the item, Council members heard briefings by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the President-designate of the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the representative of Belgium as the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations.

On 26 February, the Security Council held a meeting<sup>828</sup> under the sub-item entitled “Supporting the Non-proliferation Treaty ahead of the 2020 Review Conference”. The Council was briefed by the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs and the President-designate of the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. During the meeting, the High Representative reaffirmed the Treaty’s crucial role in constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as well as its function as a de facto negotiating forum for nuclear disarmament. She added that failure to secure a successful outcome at the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons would risk undermining the value that many Member States placed on the Treaty and devalue the review cycle as a way to strengthen the implementation of the Treaty and the regime as a whole. She suggested several issues that should form a part of any consensus document, including a high-level reaffirmation of commitment to the Treaty and all its obligations, recommitment to the norm against the use of nuclear weapons, development of a package of risk-reduction measures to avoid the prospect of nuclear-weapon use, endorsement of the additional protocol as the safeguards standard, and a new vision for disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control to address current nuclear weapons challenges. She underscored the importance of the reaffirmation of Council members’ support for the Treaty and an expression of their commitment to securing success at the Review Conference, given that many Council members would be key players there. The President-designate said that the Treaty and its Review Conference represented an almost universal forum to

discuss issues central to international peace and security, which gave the Treaty a unique level of legitimacy. Explicitly referring to Article 26 of the Charter, which conferred upon the Council the responsibility for disarmament and the regulation of armaments, he noted that issues concerning disarmament and arms control had been an important part of the United Nations since its inception.<sup>829</sup> He observed that the Review Conference came at a time of growing concerns and uncertainties and needed to be opened up to all voices and ideas, making sure that the next generation of leaders and practitioners were included in the conversation and that the voices of women and the gender perspective were considered and included in the conclusions.<sup>830</sup> While acknowledging the Treaty’s valuable contribution to international peace and security, several Council members expressed their concern regarding the termination of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the future of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the nuclear situation in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the standoff involving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.<sup>831</sup> Council Members further noted that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty remained crucial in constraining new weapons development and called on all States that had not signed and ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to do so.<sup>832</sup>

The Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs briefed Council members twice, in June and December, in relation to the ninth and tenth reports of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).<sup>833</sup> During her first briefing,<sup>834</sup> on 30 June, in addition to addressing some of the details of the Secretary-General’s ninth report with respect to the implementation of the nuclear-, ballistic missile- and arms-related provisions of the Plan, the Under-Secretary-General expressed regret at the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan of Action. She added that the United States’ reimposition

<sup>827</sup> See also [A/75/2](#), part II, chap. 31.

<sup>828</sup> See [S/PV.8733](#).

<sup>829</sup> For more information on the practice of the Council in connection with Article 26, see part V, sect. III.

<sup>830</sup> See [S/PV.8733](#).

<sup>831</sup> Germany, Russian Federation, China, Dominican Republic, United Kingdom, Estonia, France, United States and Belgium.

<sup>832</sup> Germany, Viet Nam, Dominican Republic, United Kingdom, Estonia, France and Belgium.

<sup>833</sup> [S/2020/531](#) and [S/2020/1177](#).

<sup>834</sup> See [S/2020/644](#).

of national sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran and the decision not to extend waivers for trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran and for all remaining projects originating under the Plan of Action were contrary to the goals of the Plan of Action. Referencing a letter from the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Secretary-General indicating that the United States sanctions had been constraining his country's response to the COVID-19 pandemic, she recalled the Secretary-General's appeal for the waiving of sanctions that could undermine a country's capacity to respond to the pandemic. The Under-Secretary-General also expressed regret that the Islamic Republic of Iran had surpassed limits stipulated in the Plan of Action on its uranium-enrichment level and its stockpiles of heavy water and low-enriched uranium and that it had lifted limitations in the Plan of Action on its nuclear research and development activities. She appealed to the Islamic Republic of Iran to return to full implementation of the Plan of Action, encouraged all participants in the Plan of Action to resolve all differences within the dispute-resolution mechanism under the Plan and urged all Member States to avoid provocative rhetoric and actions that could have a further negative impact on the Plan of Action and regional stability. Notwithstanding the challenges to the Plan of Action, she recalled that the Plan remained the best way to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran's nuclear programme and that faithful adherence to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) was fundamental to regional stability. The Head of the European Union Delegation to the United Nations stated that nuclear proliferation remained a global threat with potentially worldwide consequences. The Plan of Action had removed the prospect of a nuclear-armed Islamic Republic of Iran from the regional security equation in a verifiable manner. He noted that it was deeply worrisome that the Islamic Republic of Iran had decreased its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan of Action, in particular its continued accumulation of low-enriched uranium in excess of the stockpile and enrichment level thresholds in the Plan, the continued expansion of research and development with advanced centrifuges and the enrichment activities in Fordow. He also recognized the challenges brought about by the United States' withdrawal from the Plan of Action and the reimposition of sanctions, and expressed deep regret at the United States' decision to end the three waivers covering key nuclear projects covered by the Plan in the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the Arak modernization project. The representative of Belgium, as the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), informed Council members that the ninth

report of the Facilitator had not been approved by all the members of the Council, and briefed instead on the highlights of the activities under the 2231 format between December 2019 and June 2020.<sup>835</sup> The representative of the Russian Federation expressed profound disappointment with the ninth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#),<sup>836</sup> adding that it had clearly failed to meet the high standards of impartiality expected in such documents.<sup>837</sup> While expressing regret at the withdrawal of the United States from the Plan of Action, some Council members confirmed their commitment to preserving the agreement.<sup>838</sup> Some Council members also expressed regret at the imposition of unilateral sanctions by the United States.<sup>839</sup> The Secretary of State of the United States said that the Secretary-General's report confirmed that weapons used to attack Saudi Arabia in September 2019 were of Iranian origin and that the weapons interdicted off the coast of Yemen in November of 2019 and February 2020 were also of Iranian origin, adding that the Islamic Republic of Iran was already violating the arms embargo even before its expiration date. He also said that the Islamic Republic of Iran had continued to supply militia groups with arms that were used against the United States and coalition forces. In that regard, he said that the overwhelming preference of the United States was to work with the Council to extend the arms embargo to protect human life and to protect the United States' national security and the national security of Council members. He also welcomed the statement of the United Kingdom, France and Germany recognizing that lifting the embargo would have major implications for regional security and stability, adding that renewing the arms embargo would exert more pressure on Tehran "to start behaving like a normal nation." The representative of the Russian Federation submitted that there were no legal or other grounds to raise the issue of the arms embargo in the Council. The approval-based procedures for the transfer of armaments to and from the Islamic Republic of Iran had been designed as temporary measures and their extension beyond 18 October 2020 had never been either envisaged or discussed. Given all that, he considered it naive to suggest that there could be room for engaging the Council on the issue. The representative of the Islamic

<sup>835</sup> See [S/2020/644](#). See also [S/2020/508](#).

<sup>836</sup> [S/2020/531](#).

<sup>837</sup> See [S/2020/644](#).

<sup>838</sup> Belgium, China, Estonia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Niger, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and South Africa.

<sup>839</sup> Belgium, China, France, Indonesia, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and South Africa.

Republic of Iran stressed that the United States had persistently violated resolution 2231 (2015), a resolution that it had co-sponsored, and had tried to force other States to violate that very text. He also said that the timetable for the removal of arms restrictions embodied in resolution 2231 (2015) was an inseparable part of the hard-won compromise enabling the participants in the Plan of Action to finally agree on the overall package of the Plan of Action and resolution 2231 (2015). The resolution explicitly urged its “full implementation on the timetable”. In that regard, he added that any attempt to change or amend the agreed timetable was thus tantamount to undermining resolution 2231 (2015) in its entirety.

On 14 August, the United States submitted a draft resolution, which was not adopted having failed to obtain the required number of votes. Based on the draft resolution, the Council would have decided that paragraph 5 and subparagraphs (b) and (e) of paragraph 6 of annex B to resolution 2231 (2015) continued to apply until the Council decided otherwise, notwithstanding the durations specified in each paragraph or subparagraph.<sup>840</sup> That would have included preventing the supply, sale or transfer of arms or related materiel from the Islamic Republic of Iran and preventing the supply, sale or transfer of any battle tanks, armoured combat vehicles, large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, missiles or missile systems to the Islamic Republic of Iran.<sup>841</sup> In their explanations of vote,<sup>842</sup> Council members noted that they remained committed to the full implementation of the Plan of Action and that the text of the draft resolution would have jeopardized regional stability and security.<sup>843</sup> In the explanation of vote submitted by the permanent representative of the United States, she reiterated the view that the Council’s “credibility was in tatters”. She noted that by not adopting the proposed resolution, the Council had validated the world’s “number one State sponsor of terror”. She further highlighted her country’s determination to contain “the Iranian threat” and added that unlocking the ability of the Islamic Republic of Iran to purchase sophisticated missile batteries, fighter jets, tanks and other modern weapons would trigger a regional arms race. She added that the defeat of the draft resolution outlined perfectly the Council’s condition of paralysis and inaction in the face of growing threats. In contrast, the representative of

China said that the voting result showed that unilateralism received no support and that “bullying” would fail. In its pursuit of unilateralism and “America first” in recent years, he added, the United States had abandoned its international obligations and withdrawn from multilateral agreements and international organizations, destroying its own credibility. He indicated also that the United States had repeatedly claimed that it would invoke the snapback mechanism. Having withdrawn from the Plan of Action, according to the representative of China, the United States was no longer a participant in the Plan and therefore ineligible to invoke a snapback. Should the United States insist regardless of international opinion, it was doomed to fail. Council members encouraged the parties concerned to continue dialogue, with a view to resolving their differences peacefully, including through the Plan’s dispute resolution mechanism.<sup>844</sup> The representative of the Russian Federation said that it was high time to launch a broad regional dialogue embracing all interested parties to de-escalate tensions and look for pragmatic compromise-based decisions. He referred to the suggestion made by the President of the Russian Federation on 14 August 2020 to convene an online meeting of the Heads of State of the permanent members of the Council, with the participation of the heads of Germany and the Islamic Republic of Iran, in order to outline steps that could prevent confrontation or a spike in tensions in the Council.

During the second briefing for the year in connection with the item, on 22 December,<sup>845</sup> the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs explained that in the preparation of the tenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015), careful note had been taken of the developments in the Council following the receipt of the letters from the United States on 20 August and 23 September 2020.<sup>846</sup> She noted the view of the United States that, as of 20 September 2020, all provisions of prior resolutions that had been terminated by resolution 2231 (2015) applied in the same manner. As she further explained, the United States was also of the view that the measures contained in paragraphs 7, 8 and 16 to 20 of resolution 2231 (2015) were also terminated. She further noted that the majority of Council members and the Islamic Republic of Iran had written to the Council stating that, among other things, the 20 August 2020 letter from the United States did not initiate the process

<sup>840</sup> S/2020/797, para. 1.

<sup>841</sup> Resolution 2231 (2015), annex B, paras. 5 and 6.

<sup>842</sup> See S/2020/805.

<sup>843</sup> Belgium, China, Estonia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom and Viet Nam.

<sup>844</sup> China, Estonia, Germany, Indonesia, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom and Viet Nam.

<sup>845</sup> See S/2020/1324.

<sup>846</sup> See S/2020/815 and S/2020/927.



set forth in paragraph 11 of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).<sup>847</sup> She added that those States had expressed their strong support for the Plan of Action and the continued implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). The Under-Secretary-General further stated that both the President of the Council for the month of August and the President for the month of September had indicated that they were not in a position to take any action with regard to the letter from the United States dated 20 August 2020. She added that the President of the Council in October had also taken note of those developments. She also expressed regret at the steps taken by the United States when it withdrew from the Plan, as well as the steps taken by the Islamic Republic of Iran to reduce some of its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan.<sup>848</sup> The Head of the European Union Delegation, speaking on behalf of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Coordinator of the Joint Commission of the Joint Plan of Action, stated that the remaining participants of the Plan had demonstrated their conviction and willingness to work diplomatically to preserve the deal, proving its importance and value.<sup>849</sup> He expressed particular concern about the Islamic Republic of Iran's continued accumulation of low-enriched uranium in excess of the stockpile and enrichment level thresholds in the Plan of Action. He also expressed his appreciation at the indications of the return of the Islamic Republic of Iran to full implementation of the Plan. Having taken note of the United States' announcement and its position regarding the snapback mechanism under resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), he stressed that the United States could not be considered a Plan of Action participant State and could not initiate the process of reinstating United Nations sanctions under resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#). As the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of

resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), the representative of Belgium briefed Council members on the tenth report of the Facilitator.<sup>850</sup> He noted that following the 20 August 2020 letter from the Secretary of State of the United States, 13 Council members had expressed differing views on the letter, which had been duly reflected in the report.<sup>851</sup> He explained that according to annex B, the sanctions against arms transfers to and from the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as the travel ban, had expired on 18 October 2020 and that differing stances on that matter, too, had been expressed by Member States in letters circulated during the reporting period. Following the briefings, several Council members reiterated their position regarding the United States' attempt to initiate the process of reinstating United Nations sanctions under resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) as either having no legal basis or going against its obligations under resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).<sup>852</sup> The representative of the United Kingdom expressed the hope that the following year the United States would rejoin the Plan of Action and the Islamic Republic of Iran would return to compliance with the agreement. She added that a return to diplomacy represented the best means of bringing greater security to the region, upholding the nuclear non-proliferation regime and preventing the Islamic Republic of Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. The representative of the United States said that the Council had a responsibility to address the Islamic Republic of Iran's destabilizing behaviour. He said that a failure to do so would call into question the credibility of the organ and send a dangerous message to other "rogue actors and despots around the world". He recognized the attention in the report to the snapback of previous United Nations sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran, and expressed regret at the decision of the Secretary-General to encourage the continued use of the procurement channel in resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), which he considered to be inconsistent with the snapback. He then called on the Secretary-General and all Council members to fully implement all United Nations sanctions measures, including those reimposed through the snapback mechanism. Council members further expressed concerns about the non-compliance by the Islamic Republic of Iran with its nuclear obligations and noted, with regret, the law recently adopted by the Iranian Parliament that could pave the way to the significant development of the Islamic Republic of Iran's enrichment programme and reduced access for

<sup>847</sup> See letter dated 21 September 2020 from the representative of Belgium, also on behalf of Estonia, France and Germany ([S/2020/931](#)); letters dated 20 August 2020 ([S/2020/817](#)) and 20 September 2020 ([S/2020/923](#)) from representative of China; letter dated 26 August 2020 from the representative of Germany, also on behalf of Belgium, Estonia and France ([S/2020/839](#)); letter dated 21 August 2020 from the representative of Indonesia ([S/2020/824](#)); letters dated 20 August 2020 ([S/2020/821](#)) and 21 September 2020 ([S/2020/928](#)) from the representatives of the Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, South Africa and Tunisia; and letters dated 20 August 2020 ([S/2020/816](#)), 21 August 2020 ([S/2020/828](#)) and 20 September 2020 ([S/2020/924](#)) from the representative of the Russian Federation.

<sup>848</sup> For the report of the Secretary-General, see [S/2020/1177](#). For more information on the discussion in connection with the snapback mechanism, see part V, sect. II.B.

<sup>849</sup> See [S/2020/1324](#).

<sup>850</sup> See [S/2020/1244](#).

<sup>851</sup> See [S/2020/1324](#).

<sup>852</sup> China, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Tunisia.

the International Atomic Energy Agency.<sup>853</sup> The representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran said that by pursuing a hostile policy towards the Plan of Action and his country since 8 May 2018, the United States had also engaged in persistent widespread public and private harassment of the Islamic Republic of Iran's business partners. By doing so, he argued that the United States had committed multiple cases of "significant non-performance" under the Plan and was, therefore, in continuous systematic material breach of its legal obligations under resolution 2231 (2015), the Charter of the United Nations and international law. He explained that instead of taking remedial measures, as authorized in the Plan of Action, the Islamic Republic of Iran, upon the request of the E3 – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – had exercised restraint and strategic patience for one year. He noted that maximum restraint had been met with the so-called maximum

pressure of the United States and its ever-increasing unlawful sanctions, as well as the utter failure of the E3 and the European Union to implement their commitments. He added that the Islamic Republic of Iran had been left with no choice but to take certain remedial steps, in full conformity with paragraphs 26 and 36 of the Plan of Action, pursuant to which, in the case of "a re-introduction or re-imposition of the sanctions", the Islamic Republic of Iran had the right "to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part". He noted that the United States had imposed over 1,500 sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, adding that such sanctions were in fact "an all-out war with economic measures instead of weapons". He added that the so-called maximum pressure policy of the United States against the Islamic Republic of Iran would not yield any result and noted that the only way out was to go back to the prompt, full and unconditional implementation of the Plan of Action.

<sup>853</sup> Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, South Africa, United Kingdom and United States.

Table 1  
**Meeting: non-proliferation**

<i>Meeting record and date</i>	<i>Sub-item</i>	<i>Other documents</i>	<i>Rule 37 invitations</i>	<i>Rule 39 and other invitations</i>	<i>Speakers</i>	<i>Decision and vote (for- against- abstaining)</i>
<a href="#">S/PV.8733</a> 26 February 2020	Supporting the Non-Proliferation Treaty ahead of the 2020 Review Conference			High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, President-designate of the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	All Council members, <sup>a</sup> all invitees	

<sup>a</sup> Germany was represented by its Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Table 2  
**Videoconferences: non-proliferation**

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
30 June 2020	<a href="#">S/2020/644</a>	Letter dated 2 July 2020 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
14 August 2020	<a href="#">S/2020/805</a>	Letter dated 15 August 2020 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	Draft resolution <a href="#">S/2020/797</a> (not adopted) 2-2-11 <sup>a</sup> <a href="#">S/2020/803</a>
22 December 2020	<a href="#">S/2020/1324</a>	Letter dated 24 December 2020 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General and the Permanent Representatives of the members of the Security Council	

<sup>a</sup> *For*: Dominican Republic, United States; *against*: China, Russian Federation; *abstaining*: Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Indonesia, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, South Africa, Tunisia, United Kingdom, Viet Nam.

## B. Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea

During the period under review, Council members held a videoconference in connection with the item entitled “Non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea” to announce the adoption of a resolution, under Chapter VII of the Charter.<sup>854</sup> In addition, Council members held consultations of the whole and closed videoconferences in connection with the item.<sup>855</sup> More information on the videoconference is given in the table below.

<sup>854</sup> Owing to technical difficulties, instead of an open videoconference to announce the vote on resolution [2515 \(2020\)](#) the videoconference was closed. For more information on the procedures and working methods developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, see part II.

<sup>855</sup> See [A/75/2](#), part II, chap. 34. See also [S/2020/344](#), [S/2020/1045](#) and [S/2021/203](#).

On 30 March, the Council unanimously adopted resolution [2515 \(2020\)](#). By the resolution, the Council extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts appointed pursuant to resolution [1874 \(2009\)](#) in support of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#), for a period of 12 months, until 30 April 2021.<sup>856</sup> The Council requested the Panel to provide periodic reports and expressed its intent to review the Panel's mandate and to take appropriate action regarding a further extension no later than 26 March 2021, as well as to continue to follow the work of the Panel.<sup>857</sup>

<sup>856</sup> Resolution [2515 \(2020\)](#), para. 1. For more information on the mandate of the Committee established pursuant to resolution [1718 \(2006\)](#) and the Panel of Experts, see part IX, sect. I.

<sup>857</sup> Resolution [2515 \(2020\)](#), paras. 1, 2 and 4.

### Videoconference: non-proliferation/Democratic People's Republic of Korea

<i>Videoconference date</i>	<i>Videoconference record</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Decision, vote (for-against-abstaining) and record of written procedure</i>
30 March 2020	<a href="#">S/2020/270</a>		Resolution <a href="#">2515 (2020)</a> 15-0-0 (adopted under Chapter VII) <a href="#">S/2020/246</a>

## 33. Peacebuilding and sustaining peace

During the period under review, the Council held one meeting under the item entitled “Peacebuilding and sustaining peace”, which took the form of an open

debate.<sup>858</sup> More information on the meeting, including on participants and speakers is given in table 1 below. Council members also held three open videoconferences

<sup>858</sup> For more information on the format of meetings, see part II, sect. II.